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Fraud Studies and the Top 10
Fraud Schemes
Overview
The top 10 fraud schemes discussed throughout this book were selected based upon an
extensive review of landmark studies on fraud, professional publications, and current events.
The studies were conducted by public accounting firms, voluntary private sector organizations, and professional societies.1 Findings of some of the more significant studies are presented in this chapter. It is relevant to review these studies to discern how many of the top
10 frauds were selected.
These studies classified fraud and the related schemes to achieve fraud into varying
categories.
Some studies classified fraud into two categories: fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets.Yet other studies focused on occupational fraud, which had subcategories that included corruption, asset misappropriation, and fraudulent statements.
The studies revealed several consistent themes. In the top 10 frauds schemes’ two major
categories (fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets), red flags and preventive and detective controls were fairly consistent both over time and among all of the
studies. The one study that included corruption as a major fraud category had findings that
were consistent over time.
The top 10 fraud schemes are revealed at the end of this chapter.

Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and
Abuse (June 2010), http://butest.acfe.com/rttn/rttn-2010.pdf (cited by the Journal of Accountancy; see note
14); Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1998-2007 (May
2010), www.coso.org/documents/COSOFRAUDSTUDY2010_001.pdf; COSO, Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987-1997 (1999), www.coso.org/publications/ffr_1987_1997.pdf; COSO, Report of the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1987), www.coso.org/publications/ncffr.pdf; PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Global Economic Crime Survey (November 2009), www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/economiccrime-survey/pdf/global-economic-crime-survey-2009.pdf; and KPMG, Fraud Survey 2009 (2009), www.
kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Risk-Compliance/Pages/Fraud-Survey-2009.
aspx.
1

1
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Treadway Commission—Fraudulent
Financial Reporting
Numerous studies have been conducted during the past 50 years that have addressed financial fraud in a variety of types and sizes of entities (for profit, nonprofit, and so on).
One of the more notable studies on fraudulent financial reporting was conducted by the
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (better known as the Treadway
Commission).2 This study was sponsored and funded by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO).3 This report emphasized that the prevention and earlier detection of fraudulent financial reporting must start with the entity that prepares financial reports (emphasis added).The
commission’s recommendations for increased deterrence also involved new Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) sanctions, greater criminal prosecution, improved regulation
of the public accounting profession, adequate SEC resources, improved federal regulation of
financial institutions, and improved oversight by state boards of accountancy. Recommendations also were made to standard-setters, including the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board, to
improve the effectiveness of the audit of financial statements. To encourage educational initiatives, the commission also recommended changes in the business and accounting curricula
as well as in professional certification examinations and continuing professional education.
Issued in October 1987, the report contained numerous recommendations to help improve
the likelihood that financial statements will be free of material fraud.
The objectives of the Treadway Commission were to
• consider the extent to which acts of fraudulent financial reporting undermine the
integrity of financial reporting; the forces and the opportunities, environmental,
institutional, or individual, that may contribute to these acts; the extent to which
fraudulent financial reporting can be prevented or deterred and to which it can be
detected sooner after occurrence; the extent, if any, to which incidents of this type
of fraud may be the product of a decline in professionalism of corporate financial
officers and internal auditors; and the extent, if any, to which the regulatory and law
enforcement environment unwittingly may have tolerated or contributed to the occurrence of this type of fraud.
• examine the role of the independent public accountant in detecting fraud, focusing particularly on whether the detection of fraudulent financial reporting has been
neglected or insufficiently focused on and whether the ability of the independent
public accountant to detect such fraud can be enhanced, and consider whether
changes in auditing standards or procedures—internal and external—would reduce
the extent of fraudulent financial reporting.
James C. Treadway, Jr., was the commission’s chair.
The COSO is a voluntary private-sector organization dedicated to guiding executive management and
governance entities toward the establishment of more effective, efficient, and ethical business operations on
a global basis. It sponsors and disseminates frameworks and guidance based on in-depth research, analysis,
and best practices. The member organizations include the AAA, AICPA, FEI, IMA, and the IIA.
2
3
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• identify attributes of corporate structure that may contribute to acts of fraudulent
financial reporting or to the failure to detect such acts promptly.4
The Treadway Commission issued more than 150 recommendations to various groups,
including independent public accountants, public corporations, the SEC, and Academe, to
help improve the likelihood that financial statements will be free of material fraud.
Additionally, an article in the Journal of Accountancy during this period called for more definitive auditing standards that will meet the public’s expectations concerning fraud.5 The Financial
Executives Research Foundation also issued a report in 1987 on fraudulent financial reporting.6
The Auditing Standards Board, in response to the Treadway Commission, leaders in the profession, and recommendations by other professional associations issued nine new standards7 to
help close the expectations gap between the high level of audit assurance that the public desired
and the level of assurance that the auditing profession believed was possible.8

KPMG 2009 Study
KPMG funded a survey (KPMG Forensic Fraud Survey 2009) of executives of U.S. organizations with annual revenue of at least $250 million. More than 200 interviews were conducted, and the following is a summary of the key findings:9
• Executives expect some form of fraud or misconduct to occur in their organizations.
Nearly one-third of respondents said at least one of the fraud categories (misappropriation of assets, fraudulent financial reporting, and other illegal or unethical acts)
was going to increase during the next year.
• Nearly two-thirds of executives stated that fraud and misconduct is a significant risk
to their industry.
The Treadway Commission, Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Exposure
Draft 1987 (Washington D.C.: The Treadway Commission), 2.
5
Joseph E. Connor, “Enhancing Public Confidence in the Accounting Profession,” Journal of Accountancy
(July 1986): 76–83.
6
Kenneth A. Merchant, Fraudulent and Questionable Financial Reporting: A Corporate Perspective (Morristown,
N.J.: Financial Executives Research Foundation, 1987).
7
These standards are discussed later in this book and were commonly known as the “expectations gap”
standards.
8
The expectation gap is the gap between the auditors’ actual standard of performance and the various
public expectations of auditors’ performance (as opposed to their required standard of performance). Many
members of the public expect that
4

•
•
•
•
•
•

auditors should accept prime responsibility for the financial statements,
auditors “certify” financial statements,
a “clean” opinion guarantees the accuracy of financial statements,
auditors perform a 100 percent check,
auditors should give early warning about the possibility of business failure, and
auditors are supposed to detect fraud.

www.kpmg.com/ZA/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Risk-Compliance/Pages/Fraud-Survey2009.aspx.
9
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• Respondents stated that fraud and misconduct risks will either stay the same (85
percent) or increase (74 percent) during the next 12 months.
• Inadequate internal controls or compliance programs heighten the risks of fraud and
misconduct. Two thirds of the respondents stated that inadequate internal controls or
compliance programs at their organizations enable fraud and misconduct to occur.
• Roughly a quarter of respondents (27 percent) did not have effective protocols on
how investigations should be conducted and when the board of directors should be
alerted to possible irregularities. Likewise, 33 percent of the respondents stated that
they lacked protocols on how to remedy control breakdowns.
• Those areas in which respondents cited the most amount of at least moderate improvement needed in their antifraud programs include employee communication
and training (67 percent), technology-driven continuous auditing and monitoring
techniques (65 percent), and fraud and misconduct risk assessment (60 percent).

Risk Areas
Where did the KPMG respondents perceive the greatest risks? The survey found that there
were anticipated increases in asset misappropriation (25 percent), other illegal and unethical
acts (20 percent), and fraudulent financial reporting (8 percent).

Red Flags
KPMG stated that conditions for fraud increase during times of economic downturns; these
conditions include pressures, opportunities, and rationalizations for committing fraud. Examples of red flags that possibly are indicators of these fraud components include the following:
• Revenue recognition—Those charged with governance should understand how revenue
transactions can be manipulated. Credit memos can provide indications of overstating
revenue.10 “Bill and hold” transactions have very specific tests that need to be met in
order to record revenue.11 Large or unusual transactions near the end of a quarter should
be marked for specific review to be sure that revenue recognition criteria are met.
• Loan covenants—The pressure becomes obvious when operating results or key ratios
approach loan covenant thresholds. Those charged with governance should focus on
financial data that affects covenants and monitor when corporate loans come due for
renewal. What are the covenants? What are potential trouble spots? What reported
numbers are most sensitive to change and how can they affect covenants? What situations can lead to financial manipulation?
• Liability accruals—There have been situations when companies have earnings per
share above market expectations, but they choose to report lower earnings per share
to match competitors. This allows the company to establish a rainy-day reserve.
A sale is recorded in one period and the credit for the sale is issued in the subsequent period.
A sale is recorded but the goods are not shipped until sometime in the future. The requirements for revenue recognition are not met.
10
11
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Audit committees may wish to inquire about unusual or unexpected changes in operating results, liabilities, or subjective contra accounts (that is, positive or negative).
An added proactive step is to ask for after-the-fact monitoring reports to ascertain if
management’s estimates are reasonable.
• Subjectivity in the balance sheet—To understand how susceptible data is to manipulation,
directors should consider drilling down on subjective balance sheet accounts and their
underlying assumptions and key drivers. Those charged with governance may wish to
monitor valuation allowances, assumed rates of returns on pension assets, processes to
value illiquid assets, contingency accruals, and environmental reserves.

Effectiveness of Fraud Risk Efforts
Enablers of Fraud and Misconduct
Executives were asked what factors might permit instances of fraud and misconduct to occur within their organizations. The most commonly cited factors were inadequate internal
controls or compliance programs. Almost half of executives surveyed cited management
override of controls, inadequate director oversight over management, and collusion between
employees and third parties. A lower percentage of respondents, almost a third, cited collusion between management and third parties or between employees and management. (See
exhibit 1-1.)
Exhibit 1-1
Factors That Enable Fraud and Misconduct
Factor

% of Respondents

Inadequate internal controls or compliance programs

66

Management override of internal controls

47

Inadequate oversight by directors over management

44

Collusion between employees and third parties

43

Collusion between management and third parties

32

Collusion between employees and management

27

Other factors

4

Knowledge of Fraud and Misconduct Risks
Respondents described the level of knowledge within various functions with respect to the
ways in which fraud and misconduct may occur. The vast majority of executives surveyed
responded that their organization’s internal audit, legal, or compliance functions, as well as
members of the audit committee and management, were at least moderately knowledgeable.
Slightly fewer executives believed that employees were similarly knowledgeable in this respect. (See exhibit 1-2.)

5
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Exhibit 1-2
Level of Knowledge by Function of How Fraud Can Occur*
Function

High (%)

Moderate (%)

Low (%)

Internal audit

67

22

11

Legal or compliance function

63

25

12

Audit committee

59

27

13

Employees

21

58

21

Management

50

39

10

* The sum of percentages in each function may not be 100 percent due to
rounding.

Detecting Fraud and Misconduct
Almost half of respondents believed their organization’s internal audit, legal, or compliance
personnel were most likely to uncover fraud and misconduct. The next most likely sources,
by a wide margin, were employee whistleblowers or line managers. Few executives (3 percent) believed that government regulators or law enforcement would be most likely to uncover fraud or misconduct. (See exhibit 1-3.)
Exhibit 1-3
The Function Most Likely to Uncover Fraud
Function

% of Respondents

Internal audit, legal, or compliance function

47

Employee whistleblower

20

Line managers

13

External auditors

9

Customers or suppliers

4

Government regulators or law enforcement

3

Other

2

It is relevant to note that the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 2010
Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse (see the section “2010 Report to the
Nations” in this chapter) notes whistleblower hotlines as the primary method of detecting occupational fraud, whereas it is second on KPMG’s list. However, KPMG’s finding
(employee whistleblower is the number two function to uncover fraud—see exhibit 1-3) is
consistent with two other KPMG findings. Note that in exhibit 1-2, employees are ranked
at the bottom in knowing how fraud can occur. Also, exhibit 1-4 shows that 67 percent of
the respondents listed employee communication and training as an area in their antifraud
program that needs at least moderate or significant improvement.

6
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Thus, a possible reason for the difference between the ACFE and KPMG study in the ranking of whistleblower hotlines is that the KPMG study suggests that many employees might not
be able to recognize fraud and, therefore, do not report it via a whistleblower hotline.

Areas for Improvement in Fraud Risk Management
Respondents noted that opportunity exists for at least moderate improvement across the majority
of their antifraud efforts. Those areas in which respondents cited as needing the most improvement include employee communication and training, technology-driven continuous auditing
and monitoring techniques, and fraud and misconduct risk assessment. (See exhibit 1-4.)
Exhibit 1-4
Areas for Improvement in Fraud Risk Management
Minor
Improvement
Needed (%)

Moderate
Improvement
Needed (%)

Significant
Improvement
Needed (%)

Employee communication and training

32

52

15

Technology-driven continuous auditing and
monitoring techniques

31

43

22

Fraud and misconduct risk assessment

30

46

14

Strengthening controls to prevent similar
instances of fraud or misconduct from reoccurring

43

42

14

Process-specific antifraud controls (for example, procurement, sales)

44

45

9

Protocols for conducting due diligence on
retaining third-party agents, consultants, or
distributors

42

42

11

Executive and line management support

46

43

9

Protocols for administering discipline or holding individuals accountable

47

35

15

Protocols for voluntarily disclosing discovered instances of fraud and misconduct to the
government

50

34

10

Internal audit and compliance functions

50

35

12

Protocols for conducting due diligence in hiring, retaining, and promoting employees

51

35

12

Protocols for conducting internal investigations

52

35

11

Standards of conduct, policies, and procedures

55

30

13

Board or audit committee oversight

54

29

12

Channels for reporting concerns about fraud
or misconduct (for example, hotlines)

59

26

12

Area for Improvement

7
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Anticipated Assistance from External Advisers
More than a third of respondents anticipated that external advisers may be called upon to
assist in leveraging technology to identify fraud and misconduct risks, evaluating the effectiveness of compliance programs and related antifraud controls, and providing assistance
with electronic discovery in response to litigation or regulatory inquiries. (See exhibit 1-5.)
Exhibit 1-5
Assistance from Outside Advisors
Assistance from Outside Advisors

% of
Respondents

Leveraging technology to identify fraud and misconduct risks

39

Evaluating the effectiveness of compliance programs and antifraud controls

38

Electronic discovery and preservation of documents pursuant to regulatory
inquiries or litigation

37

Providing fraud and misconduct awareness training

30

Conducting fraud and misconduct risk assessments

25

Conducting complex investigations in response to allegations of fraud or
misconduct

22

Additionally, 75 percent of the respondents expected the amount of funding at their organization to combat fraud to stay the same, 16 percent said increase, and 9 percent said
decrease.

PwC Study
The PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Global Economic Crime Survey, published in November 2009, had 3,037 respondents from 54 countries.12 Quite interestingly, 30 percent of
the respondents reported 1 incident of fraud in the past 12 months. However, the risk of
economic crime increased due to recession. Fifty percent of the respondents stated that, in
the past year, incidences were more frequent and the costs of fraud were greater compared
to 12 months ago.
Exhibit 1-6 lists the types of economic crimes and the percentage of respondents who
reported fraud in each category for 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009. Asset misappropriation and
bribery and corruption have remained fairly constant for the past three surveys. However,
there has been a growing increase in the percentage of respondents who have experienced
an accounting fraud.

12

www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/economic-crime-survey/pdf/global-economic-crime-survey-2009.pdf.
8
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Exhibit 1-6
Types of Economic Crimes*
% of Reported
Frauds 2009

% of Reported
Frauds 2007

% of Reported
Frauds 2005

% of Reported
Frauds 2003

Asset misappropriation

67

70

62

60

Accounting fraud

38

27

24

10

Bribery and corruption

27

30

24

14

Type of Economic Crime

* The top three types of economic crime are presented. Other types of fraud included IP infringement,
money laundering, tax fraud, insider trading, marketing cartels to fix prices, and espionage.

Fraud Detection Methods
Exhibit 1-7 lists fraud detection methods.The KPMG study listed internal audit as the function most likely to uncover fraud, which is consistent with the PwC study (in which fraud
was actually detected). Also, fraud risk management was listed high in both the KPMG and
PwC studies. Quite interestingly, 13 percent of the frauds were detected by accident.
Exhibit 1-7
Fraud Detection Methods
% of Reported
Frauds 2009

% of Reported
Frauds 2007

% of Reported
Frauds 2005

Internal audit

17

19

26

Detection Method

Fraud risk management

14

4

3

Suspicious transaction reporting

5

4

0

Corporate security

5

4

4

Rotation of personnel

5

3

3

Tip-off (internal)

16

21

17

Tip-off (external)

11

14

11

Whistle-blowing system

7

8

3

By accident

13

6

10

By law enforcement

3

3

0

Other methods

4

14

23

Fraud Risk Management
It is important to investigate the impact of fraud risk management on the detection of fraud,
as this was the second major method of fraud detection. Exhibit 1-8 shows that 51 percent
of respondents reported incidences of economic crime when fraud risk assessments were
conducted monthly and the percentage of fraud decreases as the time elapsed between the
frequencies of fraud risk assessments increases. Simply put, organizations that conducted
more frequent fraud risk assessments detected more fraud.

9
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Even though fraud risk management seems to be an effective detective control, KPMG’s
study shows that more than 60 percent of the respondents believe that this is an area that
needs more than moderate improvement (see exhibit 1-4). Therefore, it is suggested that organizations should provide training in fraud risk assessment and perform this function more
frequently in order to increase the likelihood of detecting fraud.
Exhibit 1-8
Percentage of Respondents Experiencing Economic Crime
and Frequency of Fraud Risk Assessments
Frequency of Fraud Risk
Assessments

% of Reported Frauds

Monthly

51

Quarterly

38

Every six months

28

Once

31

Never

26

The PwC study notes that a comprehensive fraud risk assessment should include the following steps:
• Identify the potential inherent fraud risks.
• Assess the likelihood and significance of occurrence of the identified fraud risks.
• Evaluate which people and departments are most likely to commit fraud and identify the methods they are likely to use.
• Identify and map existing preventive and detective controls to the relevant fraud risks.
• Evaluate whether relevant controls and processes are effectively designed to address
identified fraud risks.
• Identify and evaluate residual fraud risks resulting from ineffective or nonexistent
controls.
• Respond to residual fraud risks.

COSO Study—Financial Statement Fraud
COSO sponsored a study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007 (issued May 2010), to
provide a comprehensive analysis of fraudulent financial reporting occurrences investigated
by the SEC between January 1998 and December 2007. This study updates a previous study
of fraud—COSO’s 1999 Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997.13 Some of the important
findings of the more recent study include the following:

13

See www.coso.org for copies of both of these studies.
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• There were 347 alleged cases of public company fraudulent financial reporting from
1998 to 2007, versus 294 cases from 1987 to 1997. Consistent with the high-profile
frauds at Enron, WorldCom, and so on, the dollar magnitude of fraudulent financial
reporting soared in the past decade, with total cumulative misstatement or misappropriation of nearly $120 billion across 300 fraud cases with available information
(a mean of nearly $400 million per case). This compares to a mean of $25 million
per sample fraud in COSO’s 1999 study. Although the large, high-profile frauds of
the early 2000s skewed the 1998–2007 total and mean cumulative misstatement or
misappropriation upward, it should also be noted that the median fraud of $12.05
million in the most recent study was nearly 3 times larger than the median fraud of
$4.1 million in the 1999 COSO study.
• The companies allegedly engaging in financial statement fraud had median assets and
revenues just under $100 million.These companies were much larger than fraud companies in the 1999 COSO study, which had median assets and revenues under $16 million.
• The SEC named the CEO or CFO for some level of involvement in 89 percent
of the fraud cases, up from 83 percent of cases in 1987–97. Within two years of the
completion of the SEC’s investigation, about 20 percent of CEOs or CFOs had
been indicted, and more than 60 percent of those indicted were convicted.
• The most common fraud technique involved improper revenue recognition, followed
by the overstatement of existing assets or capitalization of expenses. Revenue frauds
accounted for more than 60 percent of the cases, versus 50 percent in 1987–97.
• Relatively few differences in the characteristics of the board of director existed between firms engaging in fraud and similar firms not engaging in fraud.
• Twenty-six percent of the fraud firms changed auditors between the last clean
financial statements and the last fraudulent financial statements, whereas only 12 percent of no-fraud firms switched auditors during that same time. Sixty percent of the
fraud firms that changed auditors did so during the fraud period, and the remaining
40 percent changed in the fiscal period just before the fraud began.
• Initial news in the press of an alleged fraud resulted in an average 16.7 percent
abnormal stock price decline in the two days surrounding the news announcement.
In addition, news of an SEC or Department of Justice investigation resulted in an
average 7.3 percent abnormal stock price decline.
• Long-term negative consequences of fraud were apparent. Companies engaged in
fraud often experienced bankruptcy, delisting from a stock exchange, or material
asset sales following discovery of fraud at rates much higher than those experienced
by no-fraud firms.
• Fraud affected companies of all sizes as median revenues, and total assets were just
under $100 million.
• Similarly, fraud occurred in a variety of industries. Consistent with COSO’s 1999
study, the most frequent industries in which fraud occurred included computer
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hardware and software (20 percent of the fraud companies) and other manufacturing
(also 20 percent). These findings suggest that any actions to prevent, deter, or detect
fraud should not be limited to any particular industry.
• Most frauds were not isolated to a single fiscal period.The average fraud period extended
31.4 months, with the median fraud period extending 24 months.This was slightly
longer than the average and median fraud periods of 23.7 and 21 months, respectively,
reported in COSO’s 1999 study.This finding suggests that once fraud is initiated in one
financial period (quarterly or annual), management often continues to perpetrate fraud
in each quarterly and annual financial statement filing for about 2 years.
Given the small number of frauds examined in this study that involve time periods subsequent to the issuance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), additional research will be
needed once sufficient time has passed to allow for more observations of SEC fraud investigations involving post-SOX time periods, before any conclusions can be reached about the
effectiveness of that legislation in reducing instances of fraudulent financial reporting.

Fraud Schemes
The two most common techniques used to fraudulently misstate the financial statements
involved improper revenue recognition and asset overstatements. The majority of frauds (61
percent) involved revenue recognition, whereas 51 percent involved overstated assets primarily by overvaluing existing assets or capitalizing expenses. The understatement of expenses
and liabilities was much less frequent (31 percent). Misappropriation of assets occurred in
14 percent of the fraud cases, which was similar to the 12 percent reported in COSO’s 1999
study. (See exhibit 1-9.)
Exhibit 1-9
Common Financial Statement Fraud Schemes
Scheme to Misstate Financial Statements

% of Companies Using
Fraud Method*

Improper revenue recognition:

61

Recording fictitious revenues

48

Recording revenues prematurely

35

No description or “overstated”

2

Overstatement of assets (excluding accounts receivable overstatements
due to revenue fraud):

51

Overstating existing assets or capitalizing expenses

46

Recording fictitious assets or assets not owned

11

Understatement of expenses or liabilities

31

Misappropriation of assets

14

Inappropriate disclosure (with no financial statement line item effects)

1
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Other miscellaneous techniques (acquisitions, joint ventures, netting of
amounts, and so on)

20

Disguised through use of related-party transactions

18

Insider trading also cited

24

* The subcategories, such as premature revenues or fictitious revenues and assets, do not sum to the
category totals due to multiple types of fraud employed at a single company. Also, because the financial
statement frauds at the sample companies often involved more than one fraud technique, the sum of the
percentages reported exceeds 100 percent.

Asset Misstatements
More than half of the sample companies misstated the financial statement information by
overstating assets. Exhibit 1-10 highlights the typical asset accounts overstated by sample
companies. Even after excluding the effects of misstating accounts receivable due to the revenue recognition frauds, the two most common asset accounts misstated were inventory (51
cases) and accounts receivable (43 cases). Other asset accounts misstated included property,
plant, and equipment (24 cases); cash or marketable securities (19 cases); loans, notes receivable, or mortgages (13 cases); investments (12 cases); and prepaid expenses (11 cases). (See
exhibit 1-10.)
Exhibit 1-10
Number of Fraud Cases with Asset Accounts Misstated
Type of Asset

Number of Cases

Inventory

51

Accounts receivable

43

Property, plant, and equipment

24

Cash or marketable securities

19

Loans or notes receivable

13

Investments

12

Prepaid expenses

11

2010 Report to the Nations
The ACFE issued its 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse (hereinafter
ACFE study) in June 2010. The report is based on a survey of 1,843 cases of occupational
fraud that occurred globally between January 2008 and December 2009.14 All information
was provided by the certified fraud examiners who investigated the cases. The ACFE’s study
This section is based upon “A Snapshot of Workplace Fraud,” Journal of Accountancy (June 2010), www.
journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2010/Jun/WorkplaceFraud.htm, which reported on the ACFE 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse. As of the date of publication of this book, the 2010 report
is the most recent available ACFE study.
14
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includes cases from 105 countries outside the United States that represent 40 percent of the
cases. Global findings and findings that pertain solely to the United States are indicated in
the exhibits that follow.
The ACFE study focused on occupational fraud, which is defined as the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets. The ACFE has identified three primary categories of
occupational fraud used by individuals to defraud their employers: asset misappropriation,
corruption schemes, and financial statement fraud schemes.
Asset misappropriations are those schemes in which the perpetrator steals or misuses an
organization’s resources. These frauds include schemes such as skimming cash receipts, falsifying expense reports, and forging company checks.
Corruption schemes involve the employee’s use of his or her influence in business transactions in a way that violates his or her duty to the employer for the purpose of obtaining a
benefit for him or herself or someone else. Examples of corruption schemes include bribery
(which includes invoice kickbacks and bid rigging) and conflicts of interest (which includes
purchasing and sales schemes).
Financial statement fraud schemes are those involving the intentional misstatement or
omission of material information in the organization’s financial reports. Common methods
of fraudulent financial statement manipulation include recording fictitious revenues, concealing liabilities or expenses, and artificially inflating reported assets.
Exhibit 1-11 shows that the percentage of cases of financial statement frauds decreased
between 2008 and 2010, but they continued to be by far the most costly (median loss of
more than $1.7 million in 2010) of the three fraud categories. Corruption fraud also decreased during this time period and was the second most costly (median fraud loss of more
than $175,000 in 2010). The percentage of asset misappropriation schemes remained fairly
constant at approximately 90 percent, and the median loss in 2010 was $100,000.
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Exhibit 1-11
Occupational Frauds by Category—U.S. Only Frequency and Median Loss*

Occupational Frauds by
Category (U.S. only)—
Median Loss
While financial statement
fraud schemes made up less
than 5% of the frauds in the
study, they were by far the
most costly.

4.3%

Type of Fraud

Financial
Statement

10.3%

2010
2008

21.9%

Corruption

26.9%
89.8%

Asset Misappropriation

88.7%
0

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Percentage of Cases

$1,730

Financial
Statement
Type of Fraud

Occupational Frauds by
Category (U.S. only)—
Frequency
Asset misappropriation
schemes represented the most
common form of fraud in
the study by a wide margin,
representing roughly 90% of
cases, though they were the
least costly form of fraud, according to the study.

$2,000
$175

Corruption

2010

$375

2008

$100

Asset Misappropriation

$150
0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

Median Loss (in thousands $)

* The sum of percentages in this chart exceeds 100 percent because several cases involved schemes from more
than one category.

Exhibit 1-12 depicts how fraud was detected. The primary method of fraud detection
was tips, which accounted for 40.2 percent of frauds detected. It should be noted that tips
included noncompany sources (which accounted for 34 percent of fraud tips). Management
review accounted for 15.4 percent, followed by internal audit at 13.9 percent, by accident at
8.3 percent, and account reconciliation at 6.1 percent. This is somewhat consistent with the
PwC findings (see exhibit 1-7), which listed the top 5 fraud detection methods in 2009 as
internal audit (17 percent), internal tip-off (16 percent), fraud risk management (14 percent),
by accident (13 percent), and external tip-off (11 percent). PwC had a separate category for
whistleblowing which accounted for 7 percent of the frauds that were detected.To make the
percentages comparable, when all the PwC findings of tip-off and whistleblowing are combined (16 percent internal, 11 percent external, and 7 percent whistleblowing), the percentage of fraud detected by tips is 34 percent which causes tips (or whistleblower hotlines) to
be ranked the number one method of fraud detection in both the PwC and ACFE’s studies.
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Exhibit 1-12
Initial Detection of Occupational Fraud

Initial Detection of
Occupational Frauds
Tips were, by far, the biggest
source of fraud detection.
Employees were the most
common source of those tips.
However, customers, vendors,
competitors and other noncompany sources provided at
least 34% of fraud tips, which
suggests that fraud-reporting
programs should be publicized
to customers, vendors and
other external stakeholders,
not just employees, the ACFE
says.

40.2%

Tip
15.4%

Management Review

13.9%

Internal Audit
By Accident

8.3%
6.1%

Account Reconciliation

5.2%

Document Exam

4.6%

External Audit
Surveillance/Monitoring

2.6%

Notified by Police

1.8%

Confession

1.0%
0.8%

IT Control
0

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

The ACFE study also reported the number of cases, percentage, and median loss for each
type of asset misappropriation scheme (see exhibit 1-13). In terms of median loss, check
tampering ranks first. In terms of number of occurrences, billing schemes rank first. Skimming, cash larceny, payroll, and noncash schemes also rank fairly high in terms of median loss.
Exhibit 1-13
Asset Misappropriation Subcategories*

Category

Description

Example

Cases
Reported

All
Cases
(%)**

Median
Loss ($)

Skimming

Any scheme in which
cash is stolen from an
organization before
it is recorded on the
organization’s books
and records

Employee accepts
payment from a
customer, but does
not record the sale,
and instead pockets
the money

267

14.5

60,000

Cash Larceny

Any scheme in which
cash is stolen from an
organization after it has
been recorded on the
organization’s books
and records

Employee steals
cash and checks
from daily receipts
before they can be
deposited in the
bank

181

9.8

100,000
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479

26.0

128,000

Employee files
fraudulent expense
report, claiming
personal travel,
nonexistent meals,
and so on

278

15.1

33,000

Any scheme in which
a person steals his or
her employer’s funds
by intercepting, forging
or altering a check
drawn on one of the
organization’s bank
accounts

Employee steals
blank company
checks, makes them
out to himself or
herself or an accomplice

274

13.4

131,000

Any scheme in which
an employee causes
his or her employer
to issue a payment by
making false claims for
compensation

Employee claims
overtime for hours
not worked

157

8.5

72,000

Any scheme in which
an employee makes
false entries on a cash
register to conceal the
fraudulent removal of
cash

Employee fraudulently voids a sale
on his or her cash
register and steals
the cash

55

3.0

23,000

Cash on Hand
Any scheme in which
Misappropriations the perpetrator misappropriates cash kept
on hand at the victim
organization’s premises

Employee steals
cash from a company vault

121

12.6

23,000

Any scheme in which
a person causes his or
her employer to issue a
payment by submitting
invoices for fictitious
goods or services,
inflated invoices or
invoices for personal
purchases

Employee creates a
shell company and
bills employer for
services not actually rendered

Expense Reimbursements

Any scheme in which
an employee makes a
claim for reimbursement of fictitious
or inflated business
expenses

Check Tampering

Billing

Payroll

Cash Register
Disbursements

Employee purchases personal
items and submits
invoice to employer
for payment

Employee steals
outgoing check to
a vendor, deposits it
into his or her own
bank account

Employee adds
ghost employees to
the payroll

(continued on next page)
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(continued from previous page)

Category

Description

Non-Cash
Any scheme in which
Misappropriations an employee steals or
misuses non-cash assets
of the victim organization

Example

Employee steals
inventory from a
warehouse or storeroom

Cases
Reported

All
Cases
(%)†

156

16.3

Median
Loss ($)

90,000

Employee steals or
misuses confidential
customer financial
information
* www.acfe.com/rttn.aspx.
† The sum of percentages in this table exceeds 100 percent because several cases involved asset misappropriation schemes from more than one category.

The Top 10 Fraud Schemes Revealed
Fraud schemes were selected based upon an extensive review of landmark studies on fraud,
professional publications, and current events. The top 10 schemes are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Recording revenues prematurely
Recording fictitious revenue
Preparing fraudulent top-sided and other journal entries
Overstatement of assets
Manipulating estimates
Misappropriation of assets
Ponzi schemes
Asset flips
Bribery
Conflicts of interest

These schemes are classified as having primarily an impact on fraudulent financial reporting, misappropriation of assets, or other category. The other category includes corruption
frauds (as discussed in the ACFE study) and recent extensive frauds that have proliferated
popular media headlines.
It is sometimes difficult to assign a specific fraud scheme to a particular category. For
example, some misappropriation of asset schemes were so material that they resulted in
fraudulent financial statements (a large overstatement of fictitious ending inventory results
in fraudulently misstated balance sheets and income statements—for at least two years).
Therefore, some schemes can be classified as both fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets.
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Some of the other top 10 fraud schemes, such as the Ponzi scheme, are not related to a
specific account, nor can these schemes be clearly classified as either fraudulent financial
reporting or misappropriation of assets. Therefore, an “other” fraud scheme category was
created to include these types of frauds.
Why were the following selected as the top 10 fraud schemes? The rationalization for these
schemes to be selected is presented in the following section. The rationale is also supported
by numerous real-world cases presented throughout this book.

Financial Reporting Frauds
Recording Revenues Prematurely and Recording Fictitious
Revenue
These two revenue schemes were selected because the two COSO studies found an increase
in revenue fraud schemes between the time periods covered by the two studies. Also, revenue
fraud schemes occurred in a significant number of cases in the two studies. Revenue fraud
schemes were reported in 50 percent of the financial statement fraud cases in the first study
and over 60 percent in the second study.

Preparing Fraudulent Top-Sided and Other Journal Entries
This scheme was selected because journal entries were used in several recent large and landmark cases to perpetrate fraudulent financial reporting. This scheme could also be classified
in the other two major fraud categories, as fraudulent journal entries have also been recorded
to hide misappropriation of assets and also aid in perpetrating Ponzi and related schemes in
the other fraud category.

Overstatement of Assets
This scheme was selected to be among the top 10 fraud schemes because this scheme occurred in 51 percent the financial statement frauds identified in the 2010 latest COSO study.

Manipulating Estimates
This scheme was selected because numerous recent and landmark cases that resulted in
fraudulent financial reporting were due to management’s manipulation of estimates. Additionally, professional guidance is provided throughout auditing standards regarding the audit
of estimates due to both the inherent and control risks associated with estimates (management subjectivity in the assumptions surrounding estimates). Finally, AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards), addresses fraud
risks associated with estimates and audit procedures that can be performed to mitigate this
fraud risk.
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Misappropriation of Asset Fraud
Misappropriation of Assets
This scheme was selected because the two most recent studies performed by the ACFE
found that asset misappropriation accounts for approximately 90 percent of the fraud cases
studied.

Other Fraud Schemes
Ponzi Schemes
This type of scheme was selected due to the historical use of it to scam investors. It was used
recently and infamously by Bernie Madoff, resulting in a loss to investors of more than $66
billion.

Asset Flips
This scheme was selected due to historical and a more recent increase in the use of this to
create unrealistic real estate prices.

Bribery and Conflicts of Interest
These two corruption sub-schemes were selected to be among the top 10 most common
fraud schemes because corruption schemes are generally not included in any of the traditional public accounting standards’ fraud classifications (fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets). Corruption schemes are significant per the ACFE’s studies. The
percentage of reported cases for corruption schemes was more than the percentage of cases
for fraudulent financial reporting and, in the most recent ACFE study, the median loss was
greater than the median loss for misappropriation of assets.
Corruption scheme sub-categories in the ACFE’s studies also included illegal gratuities
and economic extortion schemes in addition to bribery and conflicts of interest schemes.
Since separate data was not presented for each of the four sub-categories of corruption
schemes, bribery and conflicts of interest schemes were selected to be among the top 10
fraud most common schemes based upon a review of professional literature which had more
cases using these two schemes when compared with the illegal gratuities and economic
extortion schemes. However, there will be coverage and examples of the illegal gratuities
and economic extortion corruption sub-schemes because, if data were provided concerning
percentage of reported cases and median loss for each one of the four corruption scheme
subcategories, it might have been found that illegal gratuities and economic extortion would
have been ranked higher than the other sub-schemes. Therefore, it is possible that illegal
gratuities and economic extortion could have been selected to be among the top 10 most
common fraud schemes.
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The 10 Most Common Fraud Schemes Applied to
Accounts
According to the COSO study, the three highest ranked accounts in which fraud occurred
(in terms of number of cases) were inventory; accounts receivable; and property, plant, and
equipment. Six of the top 10 fraud schemes that are included in the fraudulent financial
statements and misappropriation of assets categories oftentimes are perpetrated in these accounts. Methods of how these schemes occur in these accounts (and related red flags, controls, and audit procedures) are addressed in three separate chapters—one chapter for each
for each of the three highest ranked accounts.
It should be noted that sometimes a particular scheme can overlap with other schemes or,
in order to perpetrate a particular fraud, several schemes must be used. For example, management’s manipulation of property, plant, and equipment’s depreciation methodology could be
classified as an estimate scheme, an overstatement of asset scheme, or a journal entry scheme.
Also, some of the top 10 fraud schemes (and their sub-schemes), such as recording fictitious revenue and overstatement of assets, can occur in various accounts. For example, a revenue fraud scheme could include a sub-scheme of “bill and hold” (revenue and accounts receivable are both overstated). Several examples to illustrate an overstatement of assets include
• an overstatement of accounts receivable by not providing a sufficient allowance for
doubtful accounts, causing bad debt expense to be understated;
• an overstatement of property, plant, and equipment by not providing a sufficient
allowance for accumulated depreciation, thereby understating depreciation expense;
and
• an overstatement of property, plant, and equipment by improperly capitalizing
repairs and maintenance expenses, causing repair and maintenance expense to be
understated.

21

CommonFraud-2012.indb 21

3/19/2012 11:34:42 AM

CommonFraud-2012.indb 22

3/19/2012 11:34:42 AM

Fraud: Red Flags, Rules, and the
Expectations Gap
Overview
In addition to reviewing notable studies on fraud (see chapter 1, “Fraud Studies and the Top
10 Fraud Schemes”), it is relevant to provide an overview of the expectations gap, legislation, and professional standards concerning financial fraud before addressing the top 10 fraud
schemes in detail. This overview is important because the top 10 fraud schemes have occurred repeatedly for more than 100 years. Despite legislative action as well as the issuance
of professional standards, there has not been a significant reduction in either the quantity or
the amount of financial fraud.
Numerous questions arise concerning why regulators and professional standard-setters
have not been more effective in their efforts. Are they adequately addressing appropriate
fraud risk factors and controls to mitigate these fraud risk factors? Has too much effort been
placed solely on internal controls to prevent or detect financial fraud? Have effective rules
been issued that are just not followed? Are refinements continually being made to ineffective rules? It is important to review the historical evolution of legislation and professional
pronouncements in order to assess the impact of these rules on financial frauds.
Numerous regulators, standard-setters, and researchers provide varying definitions and
classifications of financial fraud.1 In this book, two categories of financial misstatements due
to fraud will be used: fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets.The definition of fraudulent financial reporting provided in AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in
a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards), will be utilized in this book. AU
section 316 defines fraudulent financial reporting as follows:
• Misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements designed
to deceive financial statement users where the effect causes the financial statements not to be presented, in all material respects, in conformity with generally

For example, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners has three categories of occupational fraud and
abuse.
1
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accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Fraudulent financial reporting may
be accomplished by the following:
—— M
 anipulation, falsification, or alteration of accounting records or supporting documents from which financial statements are prepared
—— Misrepresentation in or intentional omission from the financial statements of events, transactions, or other significant information
—— Intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating to amounts,
classification, manner of presentation, or disclosure
Fraudulent financial reporting need not be the result of a grand plan or conspiracy. It may be that management rationalizes the appropriateness of a material
misstatement, for example, as an aggressive rather than indefensible interpretation
of complex accounting rules, or as a temporary misstatement of financial statements, including interim statements, expected to be corrected later when operational results improve.

AU section 316 defines misstatements due to misappropriation of assets as follows:
Misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets (sometimes referred to as theft or
defalcation) involve the theft of an entity’s assets where the effect of the theft causes
the financial statements not to be presented, in all material respects, in conformity
with GAAP. Misappropriation of assets can be accomplished in various ways, including embezzling receipts, stealing assets, or causing an entity to pay for goods or
services that have not been received. Misappropriation of assets may be accompanied by false or misleading records or documents, possibly created by circumventing controls. The scope of this section includes only those misappropriations of
assets for which the effect of the misappropriation causes the financial statements
not to be fairly presented, in all material respects, in conformity with GAAP.

Six of the top 10 fraud schemes can be classified as fraudulent financial reporting or a
misappropriation of assets:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Recording revenues prematurely
Recording fictitious revenue
Preparing fraudulent top-sided and other journal entries
Overstatement of assets
Manipulating estimates
Misappropriation of assets

The standards list common characteristics for each of the two major fraud categories,
including risks and red flags. Knowing the characteristics of the two major fraud categories
will assist management, auditors, and others to identify the frauds and design controls and
systems that will prevent or detect material misstatements due to fraud. These issues are addressed later in this chapter.
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Regulation
There have many cases of material misstatements in financial statements since external auditors began examining financial statements. Oftentimes, when it was found that there had
been a major misstatement of financial statements due to fraud, there was a corresponding
issuance of professional standards or governmental regulations to enhance either the external
auditors or management’s practices. Subsequently, the standard-setters and regulators then
have increased confidence that there would be no similar future issuance of materially misstated financial statements due to fraud. However, history has shown that standard-setters
and regulators have repeatedly failed to issue rules that completely prevent or detect material
fraud in financial statements.
For example, the United States experienced the Great Depression after the stock market
crash in 1929.2 At the time, there were allegations of materially misstated financial statements
due to numerous reasons, including fraud. Congress reacted by issuing the Securities Act
of 1933 to regulate the offering and selling of securities. Additionally, Congress, through
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, established the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to regulate the secondary trading of securities (through brokers and dealers).3 Congress believed that it had solved the problem, the stock market would never again crash, and
companies with stocks traded on U.S. stock exchanges would not issue financial statements
that were materially misstated due to error or fraud.
Then, in the 1970s, numerous publicly held corporations were caught bribing foreign
officials. Congress responded by issuing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, requiring public companies not to offer bribes to foreign officials and also mandating that public
companies devise and maintain an adequate system of internal controls.4
More recent legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), was enacted in response
to the numerous financial statement frauds and other irregularities perpetrated by publicly
held companies. SOX created the Public Companies Accounting Standards Board (PCAOB).
The PCAOB is a private-sector, nonprofit corporation with a mission to oversee the auditors of public companies in order to protect investors and the public interest by promoting
informative, fair, and independent audit reports. For the first time in history, auditors of U.S.
public companies were subject to external and independent oversight when the profession
previously was self-regulated. Congress again believed that as a result of its action, the financial statements of publicly held companies would not be materially misstated due to fraud
or error.
Since SOX was issued, the United States has entered a major recession, numerous banks
have failed, massive Ponzi schemes5 have occurred, and large public companies have survived
financial demise by funding from the federal government. Additionally, there have been
Audited financial statements were not required at this time.
Section 10b (law) and Rule 10b-5 (issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]) are the
anti-fraud provisions.
4
“Tipping” foreign officials is not illegal as long as this practice is permitted by the laws of the host country.
5
For example, Bernie Madoff ’s Ponzi scheme was estimated to involve more than $65 billion.
2
3
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numerous instances of fraudulent financial statements issued by publicly held companies
(discussed later in this chapter). If history is a predictor of the future, it should be expected
that new laws and regulations will be issued in response to the material frauds and financial
failures that have occurred since SOX was enacted.
Given the small number of frauds examined in this study that involve time periods subsequent to the issuance of SOX, further research will be needed once sufficient time has
passed to allow for more observations of SEC fraud investigations involving post-SOX time
periods before any conclusions can be reached about the effectiveness of that legislation in
reducing instances of fraudulent financial reporting. The entire report can be obtained at
www.coso.org.

Early Twentieth Century, the Expectations
Gap, and Professional Standards
In the early years of auditing, auditors examined substantially more individual transactions
compared with modern practice in an effort to provide assurance that the financial statements were free of any misstatement—whether due to fraud, illegal acts, irregularities, or
errors. This fact, among others, created the perception that the purpose of an audit was to
detect fraud. External auditors, however, stressed that the purpose of an audit was not to discover fraud, but to provide an opinion about the fairness of financial statement presentation.
Thus, an expectations gap evolved between what stakeholders believed was the purpose of
an audit and the types of assurance actually provided by external auditors.6
The increasing complexity of business and the resultant increase in the volume of transactions caused auditors to employ sampling techniques and refine concepts concerning materiality. Thus, the likelihood that fraud, error, illegal acts, or errors could exist in financial
statements and the auditor provide an unqualified report was generally accepted provided
that the amount or qualitative characteristics of any one of these misstatements was immaterial to the financial statements.
It is important to note that during the early part of the twentieth century7
• there were no laws requiring audits.
• the audit was performed for management.
The expectation gap is the gap between the auditors’ actual standard of performance and the various
public expectations of auditors’ performance (as opposed to their required standard of performance). Many
members of the public expect that
6

•
•
•
•
•
•

auditors should accept prime responsibility for the financial statements,
auditors “certify” financial statements,
a “clean” opinion guarantees the accuracy of financial statements,
auditors perform a 100 percent check,
auditors should give early warning about the possibility of business failure, and
auditors are supposed to detect fraud.

Donald H. Taylor and G. William Glezen, Auditing: Integrated Concepts and Procedures, 4th ed. (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1989), 118.
7
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• the audit was viewed as a type of guarantee or certification of the correctness of accounts largely due to the description of the audit report as a “certificate” during the
mid-1930s.
• fraud detection was the purpose of some audits.
• the audit was centered on the balance sheet—which was generally the only published financial statement.
• almost all reliance was placed on internal, not external, evidence.
• there was a belief that the amounts in financial statements were exact and to the
penny correct.
Also, during this era, debates ensued about the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud
in light of the public’s expectations of the auditor’s responsibility for fraud. Both legislation
and court cases shaped the debate and were the impetus behind the issuance of many auditing standards.

Depression Era Changes
As mentioned previously, after the Depression, Congress became active in regulating corporations and corporate financial reporting and passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Congress defined characteristics of fraud related to offerings
of public securities and reports that are to be filed with the SEC, including audited financial
statements. Thus, a pattern begins to emerge which is repeated even to today. A perception
exists that businesses, auditors, or both have failed either in fair financial reporting or in the
ability to detect and report fraud. Congress reacts with legislation that specifies increased
reporting requirements by management, increased liability and expectations for external
auditors, or both. The profession reacts by issuing new standards that addresses the legislation. The workload for auditors (and oftentimes the auditee) increases, and the demand for
persons with auditing skills also increases.
An early example of case law that caused changes in auditing standards was the 1939
case involving McKesson & Robbins. This company had a Canadian subsidiary that had
a warehouse in Canada. All the transactions with this subsidiary were fictitious. The SEC
recommended that the profession issue standards requiring auditors to gather independent
and external evidence on accounts receivable and inventory. The profession, in response to
this pressure, issued pronouncements that would satisfy the SEC (obtain independent verifications, provided that accounts receivable and inventory were material) and help close the
expectations gap. It was thought that these additional procedures should help to close the
public’s expectation gap concerning the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud. The auditors believed at this time that they had met the public (and government) expectations with
regard to fraud. The performance of additional procedures should help detect fraud (or so it
was believed).
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Statement on Auditing Standards Nos. 53 and 54
The expectations gap continued to widen until the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) took
action in the 1980s.8 Two of the nine standards issued to narrow the expectations gap included extant Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibilities
to Detect Errors and Irregularities,9 and SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients (AICPA, Professional
Standards, AU sec. 317). It is important to note that the term fraud was not used in the titles
of either of these standards. It appeared to many practitioners that the ASB was possibly intentionally avoiding the use of this term as the use of the term “fraud” might further confuse
the public and widen the expectations gap.
Extant SAS No. 53 defined errors as unintentional mistakes or omissions in financial statements that could be caused by
• mistakes in gathering or processing accounting data.
• incorrect accounting estimates.
• mistakes in the application of accounting principles.
Irregularities were defined as intentional acts such as
• falsification of financial statements.
• intentional omission of necessary financial statement information.
• misappropriation of assets.
What was made clear was the auditor’s responsibility with regards to errors and irregularities. Extant SAS No. 53 stated:
The auditor should assess the risk that errors and irregularities may cause the financial statements to contain a material misstatement. Based on that assessment, the auditor should design the audit to provide reasonable assurance of detecting errors and
irregularities that are material to the financial statements … the subsequent discovery
that a material misstatement exists in the financial statements does not, in and of itself,
evidence inadequate planning, performance, or judgment on the part of the auditor.

This is a positive statement; the auditor is required to take a proactive stance on planning
the audit to detect material errors and irregularities. If the auditor does not detect a material
error or irregularity, then this does not imply auditor negligence.
SAS No. 54 defines illegal acts as violations of laws or governmental regulations. The auditor’s responsibility for detecting illegal acts that have a material and direct effect of the financial
statements is the same as is for errors and irregularities.The classical example given of an illegal
During this time period numerous savings and loans failed during this period for a variety of reasons,
including fraud. The public questioned the effectiveness of external auditors in detecting fraud.
9
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibilities to Detect Errors and Irregularities, superseded SAS No. 16, The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility of the Detection of Errors or Irregularities.
SAS No. 53 was later superseded by SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. SAS
No. 82 was then superseded by SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA,
Professional Standards, AU sec. 316).
8
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act that has a direct and material effect on the financial statements is the client’s intentional failure to accrue income taxes. Under SAS No. 54, the auditor’s responsibility for illegal acts that
are material and have an indirect impact on the financial statements is different. The auditor
investigates these acts only if specific information comes to the auditor’s attention that provides
evidence about these acts.Then the auditor should apply audit procedures specifically designed
to determine if an illegal act has occurred. SAS No. 54 notes that, due to the characteristics of
illegal acts having an indirect effect, an audit made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) provides no assurance that these types of illegal acts will be discovered.
With the issuance of these two standards among others, The ASB and many in the profession believed the expectations gap was sufficiently narrowed to satisfy the public.

Extant SAS No. 82
Despite the passage of standards in the 1980s to narrow the expectations gap, these standards were subsequently not perceived as being effective in reducing the size of the gap as
numerous financial frauds occurred during the 1990s. For example, the SEC brought action
against Waste Management, charging that the defendants (five former top officers) engaged
in a systematic scheme to falsify and misrepresent Waste Management’s financial statements
between 1992 and 1997.10 In response to these frauds and other matters, the ASB issued another standard to narrow the expectations gap. In 1997, extant SAS No. 82, Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, was issued, superseding SAS No. 53. Some of the major
aspects of this standard were as follows:
• This is the first time the term fraud was used in a standard.
• Fraud has two categories of misstatements: misstatements from fraudulent financial
reporting (normally committed by management) and misstatements from misappropriation of assets (normally committed by employees).
• Risk factors are presented that auditors should consider in assessing whether misstatements were a result of fraudulent financial reporting. These included risk factors
concerning the characteristics of management and its influence over the control
environment, industry conditions, and operating characteristics as well as financial
stability.
• Risk factors are presented that related to misstatements due to misappropriation of
assets. These include risk factors concerning the susceptibility of assets to misappropriation (for example, a large amount of cash on hand) and risk factors relating to
controls (for example, inadequate separation of duties).
• The auditor’s response to the assessment of risk of material misstatement due to
fraud is addressed.
• Documentation of the auditor’s risk assessment and response is reviewed.
• Communications about fraud to management, the audit committee, and others is
discussed.
SEC, “Waste Management Founder, Five Other Former Top Officers Sued for Massive Fraud,” news
release, March 26, 2002, www.sec.gov/news/headlines/wastemgmt6.htm.
10
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It was believed that with the issuance of extant SAS No. 82, the expectations gap was
extremely narrowed, if not closed. The profession had taken an aggressive stance and identified risk factors that auditor should consider in planning and performing the audit. It was
thought that this standard would stand the test of time and be in place longer than extant
SAS No. 53—for at least more than a decade. Alas, this was not the case.

Panel on Audit Effectiveness
Evidently, the SEC did not believe that professional standards were as effective as they
could be in preventing material misstatements in the financial statements due to either error or fraud. At the request of the SEC Chairman, the Public Oversight Board11 appointed
a Panel on Audit Effectiveness to examine the current audit model and make recommendations that
…will result in more effective audits that improve the reliability of financial statements, enhance their credibility, contribute to investors’ confidence in the profession, and improve the efficiency of the capital markets.12

The panel’s report was issued on August 31, 2000, and contained recommendations that
would revolutionize auditing concepts in the arena of auditor responsibility with regard to
detecting material financial statement fraud. It is important to observe that extant SAS No.
82 was effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after December
15, 1997. It only took three years for an independent committee’s report on fraud to be issued that stated the ASB should have done more in the area of fraud.
Some relevant excerpts from the report are as follows:
• The Panel recommends that the Auditing Standards Board develop stronger and
more definitive auditing standards to effect a substantial change in auditors’ performance and thereby improve the likelihood that auditors will detect fraudulent
financial reporting.
• The Panel envisions that the new requirements would be over and above those that
are now contemplated by a GAAS audit.
• The Panel recommends that personnel discus the vulnerability of the entity to
fraud…The engagement team members to be involved in their dialogue should
include information technology and other specialists assigned to the audit.
• Introduction of a “forensic-type fieldwork phase.” …this new forensic-type phase
should become an integral part of the audit…this does not mean converting a
GAAS audit to a “fraud audit.”
• During this phase, auditors should modify the otherwise neutral concept of professional skepticism and presume the possibility of dishonesty at various levels of
The Public Oversight Board was created in 1977 as an independent private sector body charged with
overseeing and reporting on the programs of the SEC Practice Section, also created in 1977 by the AICPA.
12
The Panel on Audit Effectiveness, The Panel on Audit Effectiveness: Report and Recommendations (Stamford,
C.T.: The Public Oversight Board, 2000).
11
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management, including collusion, override of internal control and falsification of
documents.13
The panel made additional recommendations which are addressed later in this book. However, certain revolutionary recommendations include “introducing a forensic-type fieldwork
phase” and “modify the otherwise neutral concept of professional skepticism.” The conceptual basis of auditing, up until this report, included precepts that the objective of an audit was
to render an opinion of the fairness of presentation of financial statements. Now, auditors
are to be more proactive in procedures designed to detect material fraud. Additionally, the
concept that auditors should assume neither dishonesty nor honesty (professional skepticism)
is tilted somewhat to the presumption of dishonesty.
Traditional auditing concepts would question how an audit could be performed if one
assumes management is dishonest and has a tendency to perpetrate fraud. The auditing procedures would have to be quite extensive if the auditor presumed management is dishonest.
However, it must be acknowledged that the panel’s recommendation about the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures continued to be based upon the auditor’s assessment of
risk related to the likelihood of material financial statement misstatement due to fraud.

SAS No. 99 (AU Section 316)
The ASB, in response to recommendations made by the panel and others issued SAS No.
99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, AU
sec. 316).
This standard was effective for audits of financial statements for periods beginning on or
after December 15, 2002, and supersedes SAS No. 82. This standard does not change any of
the auditor’s responsibilities for fraud in a financial statement audit. However, as noted previously, it introduces new concepts and guidance for auditors to meet these responsibilities.
This standard has the following major provisions:
• Audit teams are required to discuss during the planning stage the potential for material misstatement due to fraud (brainstorming).
• The auditor is required to gather the information needed to identify risks of material misstatement due to fraud (emphasis added) by
——inquiring of management and others (that is, those outside the accounting and
financial reporting process) within the entity about the risks of fraud.
——considering the results of the analytical procedures performed in planning the
audit.
——considering fraud risk factors.
——considering certain other information. (Such as that obtained during “brainstorming,” acceptance and continuance procedures, and during review of interim
financial information.)
13

Ibid., 87–89.
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• Auditors are required to evaluate the entity’s programs and controls (see appendix A,
“Management Antifraud Programs and Controls: Guidance to Help Prevent, Deter,
and Detect Fraud”) that address the identified risks of material misstatement due
to fraud and to assess the risks taking into account this evaluation. The auditor is
required to go beyond extant SAS No. 82 requirements and must evaluate whether
these programs and controls have been suitably designed and placed in operation.
A recent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) lists the frequency of fraud risk
assessments as a major factor in detecting fraud.14 The reader should consult appendix
A to obtain an understanding of an antifraud program. Particular attention should be
given to the sections “Mitigating Fraud Risks” and “Identifying and Measuring Fraud
Risks.”
• The auditor’s response to the risks of material misstatement due to fraud involves the
application of professional skepticism when gathering and evaluating audit evidence.
Auditors should consider the overall responses to the results of the risk assessment
by using
——a response that has an overall effect on how the audit is conducted, that is, a response involving more general considerations apart from the specific procedures
otherwise planned. (Assign more experienced personnel, assign personnel with a
specialized expertise—such as in IT or forensics, and increase supervision.)
——a response to identified risks that involves the nature (that is, positive versus negative confirmations), timing (that is, interim versus year-end tests), and extent (that
is, sample size) of the auditing procedures to be performed.
——a response involving the performance of certain procedures to further address
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud involving management override of
controls. The auditor should consider management’s selection and application of
significant accounting principles, particularly those related to subjective measurements and complex transactions. The auditor should incorporate an element of
unpredictability in the selection from year to year of auditing procedures to be
performed. Clients anticipate when the auditor conducts his or her audit and the
procedures that will be performed. The auditor might perform some procedures
on an unannounced basis, such as a surprise cycle count of inventory or a reconciliation of the bank account at other than year-end.
• The auditor is required to assess the risks of material misstatement due to fraud
throughout the audit and to evaluate at the completion of the audit whether the accumulated results of auditing procedures and other observations affect the assessment
(see exhibit 2-1). It also requires the auditor to consider whether identified misstatements may be indicative of fraud and, if so, directs the auditor to evaluate their
implications.
• The auditor is provided with guidance regarding auditor communications about
fraud to management, the audit committee, and others.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Global Economic Crime Survey (November 2009), www.pwc.com/en_GX/
gx/economic-crime-survey/pdf/global-economic-crime-survey-2009.pdf.
14
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• The auditor is required to document his or her consideration of fraud, including
brainstorming, risk procedures performed, response to risks of fraud, communications about fraud, and other items.
• A concept that has existed for decades in forensic accounting literature, the fraud
triangle, is introduced in this standard. The fraud risk factors addressed in extant SAS
No. 82 are categorized in accordance with the components of the fraud triangle
(pressure, opportunity, and rationalization).
• Auditors will presume that revenue is misstated (and will perform tests on revenue).
• In order to respond to the risk of management override of internal control
——the auditor is required to examine journal entries, whether or not controls over
journal entries are strong, for evidence of possible material misstatement due to
fraud. The standard and a related practice aid notes that the auditor might need
to use a specialist with IT skills and employ computer-assisted audit techniques
to extract and examine journal entries.
——the auditor must review accounting estimates for biases that could result in material misstatement due to fraud.
——the auditor must evaluate the business rationale for significant unusual transactions.
• The auditor should consider whether analytical procedures performed in planning
the audit result in identifying any unusual or unexpected relationships that should be
considered in assessing the risks of material misstatement due to fraud. The auditor
also should evaluate whether analytical procedures that were performed as substantive tests or in the overall review stage of the audit (see AU section 329, Analytical
Procedures [AICPA, Professional Standards]) indicate a previously unrecognized risk of
material misstatement due to fraud.
Exhibit 2-1
Red Flags: Conditions Identified During the Audit That Affect
the Auditor’s Fraud Risk Assessment

Discrepancies in the accounting records, including the following:
• Transactions that are not recorded in a complete or timely manner or are improperly recorded
with respect to the amount, accounting period, classification, or entity policy
• Unsupported or unauthorized balances or transactions
• Last-minute adjustments that significantly affect financial results
• Evidence of employees’ access to systems and records inconsistent with that necessary to
perform their authorized duties
• Tips or complaints to the auditor about alleged fraud
Conflicting or missing audit evidence, including the following:
• Missing documents
• Documents that appear to have been altered*
• Unavailability of other than photocopied or electronically transmitted documents when documents in original form are expected to exist
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• Significant unexplained items on reconciliations
• Inconsistent, vague, or implausible responses from management or employees arising from
inquiries or analytical procedures
• Unusual discrepancies between the entity’s records and confirmation replies
• Missing inventory or physical assets of significant magnitude
• Unavailable or missing electronic evidence, inconsistent with the entity’s record retention practices or policies
• Inability to produce evidence of key systems development and program change testing and
implementation activities for current year system changes and deployments
Problematic or unusual relationships between the auditor and management, including the following:
• Denial of access to records, facilities, certain employees, customers, vendors, or others from
whom audit evidence might be sought
• Undue time pressures imposed by management to resolve complex or contentious issues
• Complaints by management about the conduct of the audit or management intimidation of audit
team members, particularly in connection with the auditor’s critical assessment of audit evidence
or in the resolution of potential disagreements with management
• Unusual delays by the entity in providing requested information
• Unwillingness to facilitate auditor access to key electronic files for testing through the use of
computerassisted audit techniques
• Denial of access to key IT operations staff and facilities, including security, operations, and
systems development personnel
• An unwillingness to add or revise disclosures in the financial statements to make them more
complete and transparent
Auditors are not trained as or expected to be experts in the authentication of documents; however, if the auditor believes
that documents may not be authentic, he or she should investigate further and consider using the work of a specialist to
determine the authenticity.

*

Committee of Sponsoring Organizations, Auditing
Standards, and Fraud Risk
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO),15 in its definition of internal control,
addresses fraud risk. The COSO principle for fraud risk is as follows:
The potential for material misstatement due to fraud is explicitly considered in
assessing risks to the achievement of financial reporting objectives.16
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) is a voluntary private-sector organization dedicated to guiding executive management and governance entities toward the establishment of more effective,
efficient, and ethical business operations on a global basis. It sponsors and disseminates frameworks and
guidance based on in-depth research, analysis, and best practices. Its members include the AICPA, IIA, IMA,
AAA, and the FEI.
16
COSO, “Internal Control over Financial Reporting—Guidance for Smaller Public Companies” (2006),
www.coso.org/guidance.htm.
15
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COSO lists the following attributes of this principle:
• Management considers the incentives and pressures, attitudes and rationalizations, as
well as opportunity to commit fraud. This is the fraud triangle discussed in AU section 316.
• Risk factors that affect the possibility of someone committing a fraud and the impact of a fraud on financial reporting are considered.
• Responsibility and accountability for fraud policies and procedures reside with management of the business unit or process in which the risk resides.17
AU section 316 further notes that management has a unique ability to perpetrate fraud
because management frequently is in a position to directly or indirectly manipulate accounting records and present fraudulent financial information.18 Management fraud may be
difficult to detect due to collusion with parties inside or outside of the entity. Additionally,
management might direct subordinates to record fictitious transactions or not record legitimate transactions.
AU section 316 provides a list of fraud risk factors classified by either fraudulent financial
reporting or misappropriation of assets. Because COSO specifically makes reference to fraud
risk, the risk factors (red flags) mentioned in AU section 316 are listed in exhibit 2-2. These
risk factors should be carefully reviewed because they are red flags for both fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets frauds.
Additionally, within each fraud category, risk factors are categorized by the three aspects
of fraud—pressure, opportunity, and rationalization (commonly referred to as “the fraud
triangle”). This standard notes that there two additional factors that contribute to fraud
other than weaknesses in internal control (opportunity) and that fraud can be reduced by
means other than by implementing more and more internal controls. For example, pressure
to commit fraud can be reduced by the entity establishing employee assistance programs.
Rationalization to commit fraud can be reduced by establishing and communicating policies
(that is, not to accept vendor gifts and so on). It might be less costly to establish programs
to reduce pressure and policies to reduce rationalization than to implement more internal controls in order to reduce the risk of fraud. (See appendix B, “AICPA CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention, An Organizational Code of Conduct” and
appendix C, “Financial Executives International Code of Ethics Statement,” for examples
of a code of conduct and code of ethics.)

Post-AU Section 316
AU section 316 provided extensive guidance to the external auditor concerning fraud. It
was believed that the expectations gap was now virtually closed. However, many other major
frauds (such as SEC v. Sunwest Management, Inc., SEC v. General Electric, and SEC v. Nature

17
18

Op. cit., COSO.
AU section 316.
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Sunshine’s Products, Inc.)19 have occurred since its issuance and post-SOX. At the beginning of
this chapter, questions were presented, such as the following:
• Have the regulators, standard-setters, auditors, management, and others in the control community failed in their efforts to decrease the amount and number of fraudulent financial reporting cases by issuing ineffective rules or suggesting ineffective
controls? (The COSO authors note that because the number of frauds examined
in this study involving financial reporting periods after the passage of SOX is very
limited, further research is needed to assess the effects of SOX in addressing fraud.)20
• Are the rules and controls effective but not applied or implemented and followed?
• If the controls are effective, are there any controls that are more effective than the
others?
• Should more emphasis be placed on alleviating pressure and more clearly understanding rationalization (establishing policies) instead of opportunity (internal control) to reduce the number and amount of financial fraud?
• Will the new legislation passed due to the financial problems that occurred during
the latter part of the first decade of this century be effective in combating fraud?21

Auditors Are Not an Antifraud Control
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational
Fraud and Abuse22 provides evidence that the expectations gap still exists and that efforts to
close the gap have not been successful. This survey reports that the number one antifraud
control by small (less than 100 employees) and large businesses (greater than 100 employees)
is the external audit of financial statements. External auditing standards state that external
auditors are not part of an entity’s antifraud controls. If companies perceive that external
auditors are the primary antifraud control then perhaps these entities are neglecting to implement or not complying with internal controls to prevent and detect fraud. Additionally,
auditors are prohibited from providing internal control services (authorization, reconciling,
designing, and implementing systems, and so on) as they would not be considered independent with respect to the client.23 The Treadway Commission also noted that the prevention
and earlier detection of fraudulent financial reporting must start with the entity that prepares
financial reports.24
“Selected Enforcement Cases: Ponzi Schemes, Financial Fraud and FCPA,” SEC Actions, January 7, 2010,
www.secactions.com/?p=1836.
20
COSO, Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1998-2007 (May 2010), www.coso.org/documents/COSO
FRAUDSTUDY2010.pdf.
21
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 111th Cong., 2010, H.R. 4173.
22
http://butest.acfe.com/rttn/rttn-2010.pdf.
23
Thomas A. Ratcliffe and Charles E. Landes, “Understanding Internal Control and Internal Control Services,” Journal of Accountancy (September 2009), www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2009/Sep/White+
Paper+Understanding+Internal+Control+and+Internal+Control+Services.htm.
24
COSO, Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1987), www.coso.org/Publications/NCFFR.pdf.
19
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The remainder of the book will address risk factors associated with the top 10 fraud
schemes and controls that can be implemented to prevent and detect the top 10 fraud
schemes.
Exhibit 2-2
Fraud Risk Factors (Red Flags) From AU Section 316

Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising from Fraudulent Financial Reporting
The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting.
Incentives or Pressures to Commit Fraudulent Financial Reporting Risk Factors
• Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating conditions, such as (or as indicated by)
—— high degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
—— high vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, or
interest rates.
—— significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the industry or overall economy.
—— operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy, foreclosure, or hostile takeover imminent.
—— recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows from
operations while reporting earnings and earnings growth.
—— rapid growth or unusual profitability especially compared to that of other companies in the
same industry.
—— new accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
• Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third
parties due to the
—— profitability or trend level expectations of investment analysts, institutional investors, significant creditors, or other external parties (particularly expectations that are unduly aggressive
or unrealistic), including expectations created by management in, for example, overly optimistic press releases or annual report messages.
—— need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive—including financing of
major research and development or capital expenditures.
—— marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements.
—— perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant pending
transactions, such as business combinations or contract awards.
• Information available indicates that management or the board of directors’ personal financial
situation is threatened by the entity’s financial performance arising from
—— significant financial interests in the entity.
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—— significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses and stock options) being
contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, financial
position, or cash flow.
—— personal guarantees of debts of the entity.
• Excessive pressure exists on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets set up
by the board of directors or management, including sales or profitability incentive goals.
Opportunities to Commit Fraudulent Financial Reporting Risk Factors
• The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from
—— significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related
entities not audited or audited by another firm.
—— a strong financial presence or ability to dominate a certain industry sector that allows the
entity to dictate terms or conditions to suppliers or customers that may result in inappropriate
or non-arm’s-length transactions.
—— assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.
—— significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to period-end that
pose difficult “substance over form” questions.
—— significant operations located or conducted across international borders in jurisdictions
where differing business environments and cultures exist.
—— significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven jurisdictions for
which there appears to be no clear business justification.
—— management incentive plans may be contingent upon achieving targets relating only to
certain accounts or selected activities of the entity, even though the related accounts or
activities may not be material to the entity as a whole.
• There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of
—— domination of management by a single person or small group (in a nonowner-managed business) without compensating controls.
—— ineffective board of directors or audit committee oversight over the financial reporting process and internal control.
• There is a complex or unstable organizational structure, as evidenced by
—— difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in the
entity.
—— overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial lines of
authority.
—— high turnover of senior management, counsel, or board members.
• Internal control components are deficient as a result of
—— inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls over interim
financial reporting (when external reporting is required).
—— high turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or information
technology staff.
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—ineffective
—
accounting and information systems, including situations involving significant
deficiencies.
Attitudes or Rationalizations to Commit Fraudulent Financial Reporting Risk Factors
• Ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity’s values or ethical standards by management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards
• Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in or preoccupation with the selection of accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates
• Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations, or claims against the
entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud or violations of laws and regulations
• Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings
trend
• A practice by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third parties to achieve
aggressive or unrealistic forecasts
• Management failing to correct known reportable conditions on a timely basis
• An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize reported earnings for
tax-motivated reasons
• Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting on the basis
of materiality
• The relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor is strained, as
exhibited by the following:
—— Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or reporting matters
—— Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time regarding the completion
of the audit or the issuance of the auditor’s report
—— Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit access to people or
information or the ability to communicate effectively with the board of directors or audit committee
—— Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving attempts
to influence the scope of the auditor’s or the selection or continuance of personnel assigned
to or consulted on the audit engagement
Incentives or Pressures to Commit Misappropriation of Assets Risk Factors
• Personal financial obligations may create pressure on management or employees with access to
cash or other assets susceptible to theft to misappropriate those assets.
• Adverse relationships between the entity and employees with access to cash or other assets
susceptible to theft may motivate those employees to misappropriate those assets. For example,
adverse relationships may be created by the following:
—— Known or anticipated future employee layoffs
—— Recent or anticipated changes to employee compensation or benefit plans
—— Promotions, compensation, or other rewards inconsistent with expectations
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Opportunities to Commit Misappropriation of Assets Risk Factors
• Certain characteristics or circumstances may increase the susceptibility of assets to misappropriation. For example, opportunities to misappropriate assets increase when there are
—— large amounts of cash on hand or processed.
—— inventory items that are small in size, of high value, or in high demand.
—— easily convertible assets, such as bearer bonds, diamonds, or computer chips.
—— fixed assets that are small in size, marketable, or lacking observable identification of ownership.
• Inadequate internal control over assets may increase the susceptibility of misappropriation of
those assets. For example, misappropriation of assets may occur because there is
—— inadequate segregation of duties or independent checks.
—— inadequate management oversight of employees responsible for assets, for example, inadequate supervision or monitoring of remote locations.
—— inadequate job applicant screening of employees with access to assets.
—— inadequate recordkeeping with respect to assets.
—— inadequate system of authorization and approval of transactions (for example, in purchasing).
—— inadequate physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or fixed assets.
—— lack of complete and timely reconciliations of assets.
—— lack of timely and appropriate documentation of transactions, for example, credits for merchandise returns.
—— lack of mandatory vacations for employees performing key control functions.
—— inadequate management understanding of information technology, which enables information
technology employees to perpetrate a misappropriation.
—— inadequate access controls over automated records, including controls over and review of
computer systems event logs.
Attitudes or Rationalizations to Commit Misappropriation of Assets Risk Factors
AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards),
notes that risk factors reflective of employee attitudes or rationalizations that allow them to justify
misappropriations of assets are generally not susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless,
the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such information should consider it in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from misappropriation of assets. For example, auditors
may become aware of the following attitudes or behavior of employees who have access to assets
susceptible to misappropriation:
• Disregard for the need for monitoring or reducing risks related to misappropriations of assets
• Disregard for internal control over misappropriation of assets by overriding existing controls or by
failing to correct known internal control deficiencies
• Behavior indicating displeasure or dissatisfaction with the company or its treatment of the employee
• Changes in behavior or lifestyle that may indicate assets have been misappropriated
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COSO Study25
Alleged Motivation for the Fraud (Red Flags)
The SEC cited the following most common reasons for committing fraud:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Meet external earnings expectations of analysts and others
Meet internally set financial targets or make the company look better
Conceal the company’s deteriorating financial condition
Increase the stock price
Bolster financial position for pending equity or debt financing
Increase management compensation through achievement of bonus targets and
through enhanced stock appreciation
• Cover up assets misappropriated for personal gain

PwC Study Pressure and Rationalizations
A recent study by PwC found that the respondents believed the major factor contributing
to fraud is pressure (68 percent), followed by opportunity (18 percent) and rationalization
(14 percent). Hence, more emphasis might be placed on reducing pressure (for example, employee assistance programs) than on implementing more internal controls in order to reduce
the amount of fraud. Exhibit 2-3 lists the most likely pressures that are being faced in entities
today. Exhibit 2-4 lists the increased opportunities for fraud due to the current recession.
Exhibit 2-3
Red Flags
% of Respondents Who Believe Increased Pressures Are the Most Likely Reason
for Greater Risk of Economic Crime in a Downturn (Recession)

Financial targets more difficult to achieve

47

Fear of losing job

37

Desire to earn personal performance bonuses

27

For senior executives to achieve desired financial results

25

Bonuses not paid this year

23

Maintain financial performance to ensure lenders do not cancel debt facilities

18

There is a belief that competitors are paying bribes to win contracts

13

Other factors

14

COSO, Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1998-2007 (May 2010), www.coso.org/documents/COSO
FRAUDSTUDY2010_001.pdf.
25
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Exhibit 2-4
Red Flags: Factors Contributing Toward Creating More Opportunity for Fraud
% of Respondents Who Believe More Opportunity Constitutes the Most Likely Reason
for Greater Risk of Economic Crime in a Downturn (Recession)

Staff reductions resulting in fewer resources being deployed on internal controls

62

Shift of management’s focus to survival of business

49

Increased workload of internal audit staff

34

Weakening of IT controls resulting in increased vulnerability of external penetration

22

Transfer of operations to new territories

22

Diversification of product portfolio

15

Reduced regulatory oversight

12

Other factors

6
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Revenue Fraud Schemes—
Fictitious Revenue Recognition,
Recognizing Revenue Prematurely,
and Fictitious Journal Entries
Overview
Revenue fraud is a type of fraudulent financial reporting. Red flags (risks) and other general
characteristics of fraudulent financial reporting (including preventive and detective controls)
are addressed in the first two chapters of this book. Therefore, these financial reporting fraud
characteristics applicable to all types of financial reporting fraud are also applicable to revenue fraud and will not be repeated in this chapter.
This chapter will address specific types of revenue fraud schemes, red flags, and methods to
prevent and detect these schemes.This chapter is based upon a review of material and practical advice that exists in both the professional literature and professional standards.
It bears repeating that studies have shown that fraudulent financial reporting fraud is typically perpetrated by senior management. Other studies have consistently found that between
5 to 10 percent of all cases of fraud is due to fraudulent financial reporting which account
for 90 to 95 percent of the total dollar amount of all fraud. A recent study, addressed in the
following section, found that more than 60 percent of fraudulent financial reporting is due
to revenue fraud.Two of the top 10 fraud schemes, recording fictitious revenue and recognizing revenue prematurely (and their related sub-schemes), and controls to prevent and detect
these schemes are addressed in this chapter.
AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards), notes that management has a unique ability to perpetrate fraud because management frequently is in a position to directly or indirectly manipulate accounting records and
present fraudulent financial information. Management fraud may be difficult to detect due
to collusion with parties inside or outside of the entity. Additionally, management might direct subordinates to record fictitious transactions or not record legitimate transactions. Management accomplishes this by making fictitious top-sided (on spreadsheets) or other journal
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entries—one of the top 10 fraud schemes. Controls to prevent and detect these schemes are
addressed later in this chapter.

Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
Revenue Fraud Schemes
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) released its study, Fraudulent Financial
Reporting: 1998-2007, which was an analysis of U.S. public companies investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for fraudulent financial reporting. Improper revenue
recognition was the scheme used by 61 percent of the companies. This was accomplished by
recording fictitious sales (48 percent of the companies), recording revenues prematurely (35
percent of the companies), and no description or overstated (2 percent of the companies).1,2
The COSO study noted the following schemes were primarily used to record fictitious
revenue or to record revenue prematurely:
• Sham sales—To conceal the fraud, company representatives often falsified inventory
records, shipping records, and invoices (see exhibits 3-1 and 3-2). In some cases, the
company recorded sales for goods merely shipped to another company location. In
other cases, the company pretended to ship goods to appear as if a sale occurred and
then hid the related inventory, which was never shipped to customers, from company auditors.
Other examples include the following:3
——Crazy Eddie, an electronic equipment retailer, allegedly recorded sales to other
chains as if they were retail sales (rather than wholesale sales).
——Centennial Technologies, a manufacturer of PC memory cards, was involved in
hyped sales. According to court documents, CEO Emanuel Pinez used a form of
trickery rarely seen: he hyped sales by using his ample personal fortune to fund
purchases. “Any auditor would have had a hard time catching that,” said William
Coyne, an accounting professor at Babson College. Centennial Director John J.
Shields, a former CEO of Computervision Corp., said in an affidavit that Pinez
admitted to him that he altered inventory tags and recorded sales on products
that were never shipped. Pinez’ lawyer says he is innocent.4
• Conditional sales—These transactions were recorded as revenues even though the
sales involved unresolved contingencies or the terms of the sale were amended subsequently by side letter agreements, which often eliminated the customer’s obligation to keep the merchandise.
The subcategories (that is, recording fictitious revenues) do not sum to the category (improper revenue
recognition) total as multiple types of fraud occurred at a single company.
2
The entire study is available at www.coso.org/documents/COSOFRAUDSTUDY2010.pdf.
3
Nicholas G. Apostolou and D. Larry Crumbley, “Forensic Investing: Red Flags,” 1990, www.bus.lsu.edu/
accounting/faculty/napostolou/forensic.html.
4
Geoffrey Smith, “Why Didn’t Anyone Smell a Rat at Centennial?” Business Week, March 24, 1997, 190.
1
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• Round-tripping or recording loans as sales—Some companies recorded sales by shipping
goods to alleged customers and then providing funds to the customers to pay back
to the company. In other cases, companies recorded loan proceeds as revenues. The
Lincoln Savings and Loan fraud used a variation of recording loans as a sales scheme.
• Bill and hold transactions—Several companies improperly recorded sales from bill and
hold transactions that did not meet the criteria for revenue recognition (see exhibit
3-1).
• Premature revenues before all the terms of the sale were completed—Generally, this involved
recording sales after the goods were ordered but before they were shipped to the
customer.
• Improper cutoff of sales—To increase revenues, the accounting records were held open
beyond the balance sheet date to record sales of the subsequent accounting period in
the current period (see exhibit 3-1).
• Improper use of the percentage of completion method—Revenues were overstated by accelerating the estimated percentage of completion for projects in process. For example,
Four Seasons Nursing Centers of America, Inc., changed its method accounting for
percentage-of-completion to manipulate profits.
• Unauthorized shipments—Revenues were overstated by shipping goods never ordered
by the customer or by shipping defective products and recording revenues at full,
rather than discounted, prices. For example, there was a $115.5 million settlement
of a shareholder class suit against Phillip Morris for, among other issues, alleged manipulation of the company’s sales performance through “channel stuffing” (shipping
goods never ordered) of its products.5
• Consignment sales—Revenues were recorded for consignment shipments or shipments of goods for customers to consider on a trial basis.
The COSO study did not provide percentages for each of these types of fraudulent revenue schemes because the language used by the SEC to describe fraud techniques varied
extensively, and this made it difficult to classify the schemes.
Also, in several instances, company representatives were able to falsify confirmation responses directly or indirectly by convincing third parties to alter their confirmation response.
In other cases, company personnel created a variety of false documents (see exhibit 3-2).
Exhibit 3-1
Mattel, Inc.

Fraudulent Financial Reporting Case
Management was concerned that the company would fail to meet sales and earnings expectations
for the fiscal year ending in 1971. One method that was employed to overstate revenue was the “bill
and hold” scheme. Customers would be billed in the current year but the goods would not be delivered until a future date. Effectively, the company was not meeting the revenue recognition criteria

5

Dan Bailey, Size of D&O Settlements Exploding, www.eperils.com/pdf/doclaims.pdf.
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required by generally accepted accounting principles and booking future sales in the current period
(improper cut-off of sales).
Supporting documentation was created and included sales orders, sales invoices, and bills of
lading. The fictitious bills of lading were marked “bill and hold” and the Mattel employee signed
for both Mattel and the common carrier. The auditors, Arthur Andersen, did not inquire of Mattel
personnel concerning those fictitious bills of lading that were marked “bill and hold.” Additionally,
these bills of lading did not contain delivery instructions and other necessary information. Arthur
Anderson reviewed many of these fictitious bills of lading as an additional audit procedure when accounts receivable confirmation responses indicated that the customers should not have been billed
for the “bill and hold” sales.
Management also made numerous large reversing and correcting journal entries to hide this
scheme. Journal entries were also posted to make the accounts receivable control account balance with the subsidiary accounts receivable ledger.
For a more complete discussion of this and other fraud cases see Michael C. Knapp, Contemporary
Auditing: Real Issues and Cases, 4th ed. (South-Western College Publishing: Cincinnati, OH.).

Exhibit 3-2
Equity Funding

Insurance Fraud Case*
The Equity Funding insurance fraud began when Mr. Goldblum, chairman of the board, instructed
the CFO to make fictitious entries to revenue and accounts receivable to inflate the companies’
stock price. This would then allow Equity Funding to acquire other companies with Equity Funding
stock. The fraud involved over 64,000 phony transactions with a face value of $2 billion, $25 million
in counterfeit bonds, and $100 million in missing assets. There was widespread collusion among the
employees. Equity Funding sold life insurance and mutual funds.
Equity Funding was trusted by the other insurance companies. In order to generate cash flow,
Equity Funding would sell fake insurance policies to other insurance companies and receive, for
example, $1.90 for every $1.00 of premium. The $0.90 is compensation by the buyer to the seller for
the commission the seller had to pay the insurance agent who sold the policy to the policyholder. In
subsequent years, Equity Funding would receive, for example, $0.10 on every premium $1 (the buyer
of the policy receives the remaining $0.90) for processing all the policy accounts and claims. The
buyer is liable for claims.
Mr. Goldblum instructed employees to create numerous fictitious insurance policies. An employee
wrote a computer program creating fictitious policies with a face value of $430 million and a total
yearly premium of $5.5 million. Later these phony policies were reinsured with other insurance companies. Employees were then instructed to create death claims on some of the policies. The face
value of the insurance policy (for example, $100,000) was then paid by the reinsurance company to
Equity Funding which was supposed to pay an imaginary beneficiary. Needless to say, Equity Funding’s cash flow increased significantly due to the demise of fictitious policyholders.
When the auditors requested policies and other supporting documentation from Equity Funding
(documentation had never been created), Equity Funding personnel made excuses and created the
supporting documentation at night, providing the documentation to the auditors the next day.
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Equity Funding personnel assisted the auditor in preparing confirmations. These were sent to Equity
Funding branch managers, sales force employees, and others who prepared the confirmation
replies for the fictitious policyholders.
A source reports that the head of data processing calculated that by the end of the decade, at
Equity Funding’s current growth rate, Equity Funding would have insured the entire population of the
world and its assets would surpass the gross national product of the planet. The president merely
insisted that this showed how well the company was doing.
How was the scheme discovered? An angry operator who had to work overtime reported the
scheme to authorities. This method of detection (tip) is consistent with studies noted in chapter
1, “Fraud Studies and the Top Ten 10 Fraud Schemes,” in this book by the Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners and PricewaterhouseCoopers which found that tips are the number one method of
fraud detection.
*
Sources: David R. Hancox, “Could the Equity Funding scandal happen again? Auditors need to guard against the scenario
that led to one of auditing’s darkest hours,” Internal Auditor, October 1, 2007, www.allbusiness.com/accounting-reporting/
auditing/641903-1.html; M. E. Kabay, “The Equity Funding fraud,” Network World Security Newsletter, January 21, 2002,
www.networkworld.com/newsletters/sec/2002/01190226.html.

AU Section 316—Presumption of Revenue
Fraud
AU section 316 states that if the auditor has not identified in a particular circumstance
improper revenue recognition as a risk of material misstatement due to fraud, the reasons
supporting the auditor’s conclusion should be documented. Furthermore, the standard notes
that material misstatements due to fraudulent financial reporting often result from an overstatement of revenues (for example, through premature revenue recognition or recording
fictitious revenues) or an understatement of revenues (for example, through improperly shifting revenues to a later period).Therefore, the auditor should ordinarily presume that there is
a risk of material misstatement due to fraud relating to revenue recognition.

How the Auditor Can Respond to Risks
of Revenue-Related Fraudulent Financial
Reporting—Detective Procedures
AU section 316 provides additional examples of responses to identified risks of material
misstatements relating to revenue-related fraudulent financial reporting. The auditing procedures that can be performed in response to a high risk of fraud are also detective controls
that management or internal audit can perform.
Because revenue recognition is dependent on the particular facts and circumstances, as well
as accounting principles and practices that can vary by industry, the auditor ordinarily will
develop auditing procedures based on the auditor’s understanding of the entity and its environment, including the composition of revenues, specific attributes of the revenue transactions,
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and unique industry considerations. If there is an identified risk of material misstatement due
to fraud that involves improper revenue recognition, the auditor also may want to consider6
• performing substantive analytical procedures relating to revenue using disaggregated data. For example, comparing revenue reported by month and by product line
or business segment during the current reporting period with comparable prior
periods. Computer-assisted audit techniques (CAATs) may be useful in identifying
unusual or unexpected revenue relationships or transactions.
• confirming with customers certain relevant contract terms and the absence of side
agreements, because the appropriate accounting often is influenced by such terms or
agreements. Relevant contract terms and side agreements may include acceptance
criteria, delivery and payment terms, the absence of future or continuing vendor
obligations, the right to return the product, guaranteed resale amounts, and cancellation or refund provisions often are relevant in such circumstances.
• inquiring of the entity’s sales and marketing personnel or in-house legal counsel
regarding sales or shipments near the end of the period and their knowledge of any
unusual terms or conditions associated with these transactions.
• being physically present at one or more locations at period-end to observe goods
being shipped or being readied for shipment (or returns awaiting processing) and
performing other appropriate sales and inventory cutoff procedures.
• for those situations for which revenue transactions are electronically initiated, authorized, processed, and recorded, testing controls to determine whether they provide
assurance that recorded revenue transactions occurred and are properly recorded.

Journal Entries Schemes, Red Flags, and Controls
Several high profile cases that resulted in restatement of financial statements and involved
management fraud were, in part, perpetrated through the use of inappropriate journal entries
to revenue and other adjustments. Numerous companies have made fictitious journal entries to misstate financial statements and increase revenue, including Mattel, Inc., and Equity
Funding, as discussed in exhibit 3-1 and exhibit 3-2, respectively. A classical financial statement revenue fraud accomplished partially through the posting of fictitious or unsupported
journal entries occurred at WorldCom. WorldCom’s fraud was estimated to be $11 billion.7
Exhibit 3-3 contains excerpts from the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors
of WorldCom report that address the fabricated journal entries.8

It was believed that these procedures should help close the expectations gap between what the public expects
the auditor’s responsibilities are with regard to fraud and what the auditor believes is his or her responsibility.
7
Simon English, “WorldCom fraud figure nears $11bn,” Daily Telegraph, April 2, 2003, www.telegraph.
co.uk/finance/2847992/WorldCom-fraud-figure-nears-11bn.html.
8
The full report is available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/bdspcomm60903rpt.pdf.
6
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Exhibit 3-3
WorldCom Fraud—Excerpts from Investigative Committee Report

“There was also a systemic attitude conveyed from the top down that employees should not question their superiors, but simply do what they were told. Employees told us [Andersen] that personnel were discouraged from challenging anyone above them in the corporate hierarchy, and senior
officers and managers made it clear that their actions should not be questioned. Staff accountants
in the General Accounting group frequently and without question entered large, round-dollar journal
entries—in the tens, and often hundreds, of millions of dollars—after the close of a quarter, without
being provided any supporting documentation whatsoever.”
“We [Andersen] found hundreds of huge, round-dollar journal entries made by the staff of the
General Accounting group without proper support; examples include unsupported journal entries
of $334,000,000 and $560,000,000 on July 21, 2000, and July 17, 2001, respectively. We also found accrual reversals were made with little or no support.”
Andersen’s June 2001 “fraud brainstorming” meeting also did not alter Andersen’s audit plan.
The purposes of the meeting were to identify potential fraudulent accounting schemes based on
Andersen’s understanding of the business realities facing WorldCom, and “sensitize the complete
engagement team to potential financial statement fraud risks and schemes.” Although Andersen
specifically noted that the improper capitalization of costs and the use of top-side journal entries
(emphasis added) were significant risks, it judged that they were relatively unlikely to occur and that
its audit procedures adequately addressed these risks.
“We [Andersen] found hundreds of huge journal entries, many of them in round dollar amounts,
made by the staff of the General Accounting group without any support other than a Post-it Note or
written instruction directing that the entry be made. What support we did find was often organized
in a haphazard manner in both marked and unmarked rooms, and at least one closet, in WorldCom’s
Clinton facility.”

Because of the WorldCom debacle and other issues, the AICPA’s Professional Issues Task
Force (PITF) issued detailed guidance with regard to journal entries.9 This guidance was also
needed because AU section 316 notes that a major risk of management override of internal
controls is the creation of fraudulent journal entries and requires auditors to test journal
entries. In the case cited previously, revenue fraud was perpetrated through the fabrication
of bogus journal entries, many without supporting documentation. COSO and other organizations have consistently found that approximately 90 to 95 percent of the dollar amount
of fraud is due to fraudulent financial reporting and that this is oftentimes accomplished by
management originating improper journal entries.
In many fraud cases, management posted numerous improper journal entries in relatively
small amounts, which affected large balance sheet and income statement accounts, thereby
not resulting in a significant fluctuation being identified through analytical procedures. The
affected accounts included receivables, inventory, fixed assets, accumulated depreciation,
goodwill, prepaid expenses, and operating expenses, among others. Among other things, if

Michael Glynn, “Practice Alert 2003-2, Journal Entries and Other Adjustments,” The CPA Letter, May 5,
2003.
9
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management is committed to creating fraudulent financial statements, it can design journal
entries to
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

mask the diversion of funds.
record top-side adjustments that improperly increase revenue.
improperly adjust segment reporting.
improperly reverse purchase accounting reserves.
improperly write off uncollectible accounts receivable to purchase accounting reserve accounts and intercompany accounts, thereby not reducing income.
understate payables through the recording of post-closing journal entries to increase
various revenue accounts.
improperly decrease accounts payable and general and administrative expenses.
improperly capitalize costs as fixed assets or construction in progress instead of expensing those costs as incurred.
improperly record adjustments to allowances.

Hence it is important to review the PITF’s guidance on red flags associated with fictitious
journal entries and auditing procedures (which are detective controls that can be performed
by management and internal audit). The following is an adaptation of the PITF’s guidance
on journal entries.
The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) has promulgated standards that address an auditor’s
understanding and evaluation of journal entries and other adjustments. For example, in AU
section 314, Understanding the Entity and Its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material
Misstatement (AICPA, Professional Standards), the ASB noted that in obtaining an understanding of the financial reporting process (including the closing process), the auditor should
obtain understanding of the automated and manual procedures an entity uses to prepare its
financial statements and related disclosures.This should include the procedures an entity uses
to (a) enter transaction totals into the general ledger; (b) initiate, record, and process journal
entries in the general ledger; and (c) record recurring and nonrecurring adjustments (such as
consolidating adjustments, report combinations, and reclassifications) that are not reflected
in formal journal entries.
In addition, AU section 316 states that material misstatements of financial statements due to
fraud often involve the manipulation of the financial reporting by (a) recording inappropriate
or unauthorized journal entries throughout the year or at period-end, or (b) making adjustments to amounts reported in the financial statements that are not reflected in formal journal
entries, such as through consolidating adjustments, report combinations, and reclassifications.
Accordingly, the auditor should design procedures to test the appropriateness of journal entries
recorded in the general ledger and other adjustments (for example, entries posted directly to
financial statement drafts) made in the preparation of the financial statements.
AU section 316 further states that standard journal entries used on a recurring basis to
record transactions such as monthly sales, purchases, and cash disbursements, or to record
recurring periodic accounting estimates generally are subject to the entity’s internal controls.
Nonstandard entries (for example, entries used to record nonrecurring transactions, such as
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a business combination, or entries used to record a nonrecurring estimate, such as an asset
impairment) might not be subject to the same level of internal control. In addition, other
adjustments such as consolidating adjustments, report combinations, and reclassifications
generally are not reflected in formal journal entries and might not be subject to the entity’s
internal controls. Accordingly, the auditor should consider placing additional emphasis on
identifying and testing items processed outside of the normal course of business.
In response to the risk of management override, AU section 316 requires the auditor, in
all audits, to (a) obtain an understanding of the entity’s financial reporting process and the
controls over journal entries and other adjustments, (b) identify and select journal entries
and other adjustments for testing, (c) determine the timing of the testing, and (d) inquire of
individuals involved in the financial reporting process about inappropriate or unusual activity relating to the processing of journal entries or other adjustments.
The purpose of the PITF statement is to provide auditors with guidance regarding the
design and performance of audit procedures to fulfill the responsibilities outlined in AU section 316 regarding journal entries and other adjustments.

Obtaining an Understanding of the Entity’s
Financial Reporting Process and Its Controls Over
Journal Entries and Other Adjustments
AU section 316 states that an entity may have implemented specific controls over journal
entries and other adjustments. For example, an entity may use journal entries that are preformatted with account numbers and specific user approval criteria and may have automated
controls to generate an exception report for any entries that were unsuccessfully proposed
for recording or entries that were recorded and processed outside of established parameters.
The auditor should obtain an understanding of the design of such controls over journal
entries and other adjustments and determine whether they are suitably designed and have
been placed in operation.
An entity’s financial reporting system also includes the use of nonstandard journal entries
to record nonrecurring or unusual transactions or adjustments, such as business combinations, or a nonrecurring estimate, such as asset impairment. Additionally, nonstandard entries
include consolidation entries, reclassification entries, and spreadsheet or other worksheet
adjustments. Because of the risk of misstatements (intentional or unintentional) oftentimes
linked to nonstandard journal entries and other adjustments, the engagement team needs
to obtain a thorough understanding of the entity’s controls surrounding this aspect of the
financial reporting process.
Obtaining an understanding of the entity’s financial reporting process helps the auditor to
identify important information, such as
• the entity’s written and unwritten policies and procedures regarding the initiation,
recording, and processing of standard and nonstandard journal entries and other
adjustments;
• the sources of significant debits and credits to an account;
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• individuals responsible for initiating entries to the general ledger, transaction processing systems, or consolidation;
• approvals and reviews required for such entries and other adjustments;
• the mechanics for recording journal entries and other adjustments (for example,
whether entries are initiated and recorded online with no physical evidence or created in paper form and entered in batch mode);
• controls, if any, designed to prevent and detect fictitious entries and unauthorized
changes to journals and ledgers; and
• controls over the integrity of the process used to generate reports used by the auditors.

Assessing the Risk of Material Misstatement
Resulting From Journal Entries and Other
Adjustments
Although AU section 316 requires the auditor to test journal entries and other adjustments
regardless of the risk assessment, the nature, timing, extent, and focus of the testing will
be influenced by the auditor’s risk assessments. The auditor should assess the nature and
risk of management’s incentive to manipulate earnings or financial ratios through financial
statement misstatement. That assessment should be made in conjunction with the interim
reviews as well as the year-end audit. For example, if a client has loan covenant ratios that
depend on earnings, and net income is close to causing covenant violations, then the auditor
may assess the risk of material misstatement as higher. The auditor may also assess the risk of
material misstatement as higher when executive compensation is tied to earnings thresholds
and earnings are close to the threshold. Additionally, market expectations in many cases have
led to earnings manipulations. In those cases in which the auditor determines that the risk
of fraudulent journal entries is high due to questions regarding the integrity of management,
the auditor should reassess his or her client acceptance or continuance decision.
AU section 316 states that members of the audit team should discuss the potential for
material misstatement due to fraud. The discussion should include an exchange of ideas or
“brainstorming” among the audit team members, including the auditor with final responsibility for the audit, about how and where they believe the entity’s financial statements might
be susceptible to material misstatement due to fraud, how management could perpetrate and
conceal fraudulent financial reporting, and how assets of the entity could be misappropriated.
Journal entries and other adjustments oftentimes exist only in electronic form, which requires extraction of the desired data by an auditor with IT knowledge and skills or the use of
an IT specialist. In audits of entities with complex IT systems, the IT auditors or IT specialists should
be included in the brainstorming session. It is important to note that it is the complexity of the
IT system that is the driver, not the size of the entity. Auditors of small and midsized businesses may need IT specialists on the audit team. In the brainstorming session, the auditors
normally will discuss the following:
• The various ways in which management could originate and post inappropriate
journal entries or other adjustments
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• The kinds of unusual combinations of debits and credits that the engagement team
should be looking for
• The types of journal entries or other adjustments that could result in a material misstatement that would not likely be detected by standard audit procedures

Inquiries of Individuals Involved in the Financial
Reporting Process
Paragraph .24 of AU section 316 states that the auditor should inquire of others within the
entity about the existence or suspicion of fraud.The auditor should use professional judgment
to determine those others within the entity to whom inquiries should be directed and the
extent of such inquiries. In making this determination, the auditor should consider whether
others within the entity may be able to provide information that will be helpful to the auditor in identifying risks of material misstatement due to fraud—for example, others who may
have additional knowledge about or be able to corroborate risks of fraud identified in the
discussions with management or those charged with governance. When practical, regardless
of the fraud risk assessment, the auditor should inquire of the entity’s accounting and data
entry personnel about whether those individuals were requested to make unusual entries
during the audit period. The auditor should also consider asking selected programmers and
IT staff about the existence of unusual or unsupported entries and specifically inquire about
these entries, including whether any were initiated directly by top management outside the
normal accounting process. The auditor should not expect client personnel to volunteer
information about known or suspected fraud. However, those same individuals may be more
likely to provide information if asked directly.

Assessment of Completeness of Journal Entry
and Other Adjustments Sources
It is important in testing journal entries and other adjustments that the auditor be aware of
and consider the entire population of journal entries and other adjustments. The auditor’s
ability to detect fraud is adversely affected if he or she is not assured of access to the entire
journal entries posted and other adjustments made during the audit period. The auditor
should be aware that journal entries and other adjustments may be made outside of the
general ledger and should obtain a complete understanding about how the various general
ledgers are combined and the accounts are grouped to create the consolidated financial statements. For example, at large, multinational companies, multiple general ledgers are utilized,
adjustments are made to convert from local generally accepted accounting principles to accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America, and translation and
other adjustments are made before the numbers are combined (perhaps at more than one
level of sub-consolidation) and become subject to further elimination and adjusting entries.
Appropriate procedures should be applied to all of the various sources of information from
which journal entries and other adjustments are selected for testing to assist the auditor in
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assessing completeness. The nature and extent of these procedures will depend on the engagement risk assessments and the client’s systems for recording transactions.

Identification of Journal Entries and Other
Adjustments for Testing
After the auditor has made his or her assessment of the risk of fraudulent journal entries
and other adjustments and has performed appropriate procedures to assess completeness,
he or she should design procedures, based on that assessment, to test the appropriateness
of the journal entries and other adjustments from the various sources previously identified,
including (a) journal entries recorded in the general ledger and (b) top-side consolidation
or report entries that are not actually posted to the general ledger. The auditor should test
the appropriateness of selected journal entries and other adjustments in all engagements—
including those in which the risk of fraudulent journal entries is assessed as low. Those tests
are performed to confirm that entries are appropriately approved by management and are
adequately supported and reflect the underlying events and transactions. Such tests should be
designed to detect inappropriate entries.
After considering the identified population of journal entries and other adjustments, the
auditor should use professional judgment to determine the nature, timing, and extent of the
testing of journal entries and other adjustments. AU section 316 requires that the auditor
consider
• the auditor’s assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
• the effectiveness of controls that have been implemented over journal entries and
other adjustments.
• the entity’s financial reporting process and the nature of the evidence that can be
examined.
• the characteristics of fraudulent entries or adjustments.
• the nature and complexity of the accounts.
• journal entries or other adjustments processed outside the normal course of business.
For many entities, routine processing of transactions involves a combination of manual and
automated steps and procedures. Similarly, the processing of journal entries and other adjustments might involve both manual and automated procedures and controls. Regardless of the
method, the auditor’s procedures should include selecting, from the various sources of information from which journal entries and other adjustments are posted, specific entries and
other adjustments to be tested and examining the support for those items. In addition, the
auditor should be aware that journal entries and other adjustments might exist in either electronic or paper form. In an IT environment, it may be necessary for the auditor to employ CAATs
(as noted previously, these include report writers, software or data extraction tools, or other systems-based
techniques) to identify the journal entries and other adjustments to be tested. In addition, the CAATs
ordinarily are designed to detect the following:
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• Entries made at unusual times of day, that is, outside regular business hours
• Entries made by unusual users, blank or nonsensical user names, senior management,
or the IT staff
• Electronic entries that, through management manipulation, are not documented in
the general ledger10
Additionally, it is normally beneficial if the CAATs filter out recurring transactions in
order to identify nonrecurring transactions and foot the detail in accounting records. The
CAATs should be designed specifically to assist in evaluating whether all journal entries
and other adjustments are included in the population to be reviewed. This is important, as
generally accepted auditing standards require the auditor to document procedures used to
provide assurance that all journal entries were available for testing. Firms utilizing internal IT
specialists to perform the CAATs should invest appropriate resources in training to ensure that the IT
specialists are able to competently perform the procedures and understand the importance of detecting any
inappropriate journal entries or other adjustments.

Red Flags—Journal Entries
Characteristics of fraudulent journal entries related to revenue and other financial statement
fraud schemes may include entries
• made to unrelated, unusual, or seldom-used accounts,
• made by individuals who typically do not make journal entries,
• recorded at the end of the period or as post-closing entries that have little or no
explanation or description,
• made either before or during the preparation of the financial statements to accounts
that do not have account numbers,
• made on holidays or other non-working days, or
• containing round numbers or a consistent ending number.
The auditor should look for unusual entries during both the year-end and quarter-end
cutoff procedures. Any entries that were reversed at the beginning of the subsequent period
should be scrutinized more carefully. Also, the auditor ordinarily should consider looking for
unusual entries that affect revenue and cost of sales.
Inappropriate journal entries may be applied to accounts that
•
•
•
•

contain transactions that are complex or unusual in nature,
contain significant estimates and period-end adjustments,
have been prone to errors in the past,
have not been reconciled on a timely basis or contained unreconciled differences,

Most IT systems have a utility program the permits changes to a data file, such as a ledger, without using
the accounting application software. There have been cases in which fictitious journal entries have been
“posted” in this manner.
10
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• contain intercompany transactions, or
• are otherwise associated with an identified risk of material misstatement due to
fraud.
The auditor should recognize, however, that inappropriate journal entries also might be
made to other accounts.

Journal Entries Selected for Testing—Additional
Issues
In audits of entities that have several locations or components, the auditor should consider the
need to select journal entries from locations based on factors set forth in AU section 312, Audit
Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards).Those factors include
(a) the nature and amount of assets and transactions executed at the location or component;
(b) the degree of centralization of records or information processing; (c) the effectiveness of the
control environment, particularly with respect to management’s direct control over the exercise
of authority delegated to others and its ability to effectively supervise activities at the location
or component; (d) the frequency, timing, and scope of monitoring activities by the entity or
others at the location or component; and (e) judgments about materiality of the location or
component; and (f) risks associated with the location, such as political or economic instability.
After considering the factors outlined in the previous paragraph, as well as the number and
monetary amount of journal entries and other adjustments, the auditor should select journal
entries and other adjustments from the population and examine documentary evidence indicating that the journal entries are properly supported and approved by management. The
selections should include both journal entries recorded in the general ledger and top-side
or report adjustments that are not actually posted to the general ledger. Because fraudulent
journal entries often are made at the end of a reporting period, the auditor’s testing ordinarily should focus on the journal entries made at that time. However, because material misstatements in financial statements due to fraud can occur throughout the period and may involve
extensive efforts to conceal how it is accomplished, the auditor should consider whether
there is also a need to test journal entries throughout the period under audit. Additionally,
if entries are used to correct errors in financial statements of a previous period, the auditor
should evaluate whether those previously issued financial statements should be restated.
The auditor should introduce an element of unpredictability regarding the dollar amount
and types of journal entries and other adjustments tested. Often, companies are able to
perpetrate fraud when, over a period covering several engagements, management is able to
determine the auditor’s scope or strategy and, therefore, design inappropriate journal entries
and other adjustments that have a high probability of not being tested.11

For example, all journal entries over a certain dollar amount could be selected for testing and also a random sample of the remaining population of journal entries. Additionally, all top-sided entries could also be
selected.
11
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Paragraph .23 of AU section 722, Interim Financial Information (AICPA, Professional Standards), states that the accountant performing the review of interim financial information
ordinarily will also be engaged to perform an audit of the annual financial statements of
the entity. Certain auditing procedures may be performed concurrently with the review
of interim financial information. As a matter of good practice, the auditor should consider
auditing journal entries and other adjustments concurrently with the interim reviews. The
auditor should especially focus on journal entries and other adjustments that were reversed
at the beginning of the subsequent period.

Documentation
Audit documentation should be sufficient to show that the accounting records agree or reconcile with the financial statements or other information under audit. The results of procedures
performed relative to the entity’s journal entries and other adjustments should be documented
in the appropriate section of the current audit file. This documentation should include
• the procedures used by the engagement team to assess the completeness of the
population of journal entries and other adjustments subject to review and testing.
• the journal entries and other adjustments that were selected for testing and the basis
therefore.
• the procedures performed to audit the journal entries and other adjustments.
• the conclusions reached.
• who performed and reviewed the work.

Journal Entries—Other Preventive Controls
Two other preventive controls concerning journal entries include the use of a standard journal entry checklist and approval of complex, unusual, nonrecurring, large dollar amount, and
similar journal entries by a supervisor or, depending upon the journal entry, by the board of
directors.
A standard journal entry checklist provides the accounts that are to be debited and credited at the end of a reporting period to help ensure that all adjusting and similar journal entries will be made before financial statements are generated.The amount of the journal entry
is left blank. For example, the list might include a debit to deferred revenue and a credit to
revenue to remind the bookkeeper that unearned rent has now been earned (rent is prepaid
at the start of each month).
Special approval should be required of complex, unusual, nonrecurring, large dollar amount
and for any journal entry that meets specified criteria before it can be posted. This should
provide assurance that only approved journal entries at the appropriate amounts are made.

Other Adjustments
In many cases, entities utilize spreadsheets to group general ledger accounts and make consolidating adjustments, reclassifications, and other adjustments to arrive at financial statement
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amounts.Those consolidating adjustments, report combinations, and reclassifications that are
not reflected in formal journal entries should also be tested based on the auditor’s risk assessment. Tests of other adjustments would normally involve comparing the adjustments to
underlying supporting information and considering the rationale underlying the adjustment
as well as the reason it was not reflected in a formal journal entry.
Risks and controls over spreadsheets used to support journal entries or as a mechanism for
preparation of financial statements are addressed in the following section.

Spreadsheets
One of the major public accounting firms issues a whitepaper on spreadsheets and related controls because many companies use spreadsheets to either support accounting entries
and disclosures or serve as the foundation from which the entity’s financial statements are
prepared.12 There are risks that the spreadsheets might contain errors or fraudulent entries
because many spreadsheets are developed by and under the control of one user or a small
number of users. Top-sided entries on spreadsheets, such as reclassification and combining
entries, are journal entries and should require an approved journal voucher documenting the
support for the journal entry.
For example, WorldCom management used a spreadsheet to help perpetrate its financial
statement fraud that affected revenue. A news article notes that “WorldCom created spreadsheets that recorded two versions of the company’s books side-by-side: a ‘normalized’ version that reflected actual operating expenses, and a ‘final’ version, adjusted to meet market
expectations.”13 See exhibit 3-4 for an excerpt from the Special Investigative Committee of
Board of Directors of WorldCom, Inc.14
Exhibit 3-4
WorldCom Fraud—Excerpts from Investigative Committee Report

In the third quarter of 2000, the exercise of finding accounting entries to meet Sullivan’s target was
tracked on a series of spreadsheets, each designated “Sept Hit List.”* These documents were
maintained by the Revenue Accounting group on a shared computer drive; some included a “3Q Target” number, and all included a list of potential revenue items to meet the target. An early version of
the spreadsheet contained three columns, headed “conservative,” “moderate,” and “aggressive,”
presenting a range of revenue that could be booked for each proposed item.
One version of the “Hit List” reflected the Revenue Accounting group’s assessment that, if their
accounting for these items was “conservative,” recorded revenue would have to be reduced by
$7.8 million; if “moderate,” the Company could recognize an additional $65 million in revenue; and, if
“aggressive,” revenue could increase as much as $273 million. Subsequent versions of the “Hit List”
PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Use of Spreadsheets: Considerations for Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
(July 2004). Portions of this section are based upon this document.This document has served as the foundation for implementation of spreadsheet controls by numerous entities.
13
Patrick Martin,“Ebbers found guilty in WorldCom fraud: a case study of US corporate criminality,” World
Socialist Web Site, March 18, 2005, www.wsws.org/articles/2005/mar2005/ebb-m18.shtml.
14
The full report is available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/bdspcomm
60903rpt.pdf.
12
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dropped the “conservative” option entirely, added several potential opportunities, and showed an
“aggressive” revenue increase of $279 million. What appears to be the final version of the “Hit List”
showed that Revenue Accounting in fact “booked” the full $279 million. Among the items recorded
as revenue was an additional $133 million for Minimum Deficiencies.
*

Sullivan was WorldCom’s CFO.

Potential Risks and Issues With Spreadsheets
It is suggested that the following be considered when evaluating the risk and significance of
potential spreadsheet issues:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Complexity of the spreadsheet and calculations
Purpose and use of the spreadsheet
Number of spreadsheet users
Type of potential input, logic, and interface errors
Size of the spreadsheet
Degree of understanding and documentation of the spreadsheet requirements by the
developer
• Uses of the spreadsheet’s output
• Frequency and extent of changes and modifications to the spreadsheet
• Development, developing (and training), and testing of the spreadsheet before it is
utilized

Steps for Evaluating Spreadsheet Preventive and Detective
Controls
It is suggested that the following methodology be followed to ensure there are appropriate
controls over spreadsheets:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Take an inventory of the spreadsheets that affect significant accounts or processes.
Evaluate the use and complexity of spreadsheets.
Determine the necessary level of controls for “key” spreadsheets.
Evaluate existing “as is” controls for each spreadsheet.
Develop action plans for remediating control deficiencies.

The appropriate combination of the following detective and preventive controls should be
considered to help mitigate the risks inherent in a spreadsheet environment:
a.

b.

Change control—Maintaining a controlled process for requesting changes to a spreadsheet, making changes and then testing the spreadsheet and obtaining formal sign-off
from an independent individual that the change is functioning as intended.
Version control—Ensuring only current and approved versions of spreadsheets are being
used by creating naming conventions and directory structures.
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c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.
i.
j.
k.

l.

Access control (for example, create, read, update, delete)—Limiting access at the file level to
spreadsheets on a central server and assigning appropriate rights. Spreadsheets can also
be password protected to restrict access.
Input control—Ensuring that reconciliations occur to make sure that data is inputted
completely and accurately. Data may be inputted into spreadsheets manually or systematically through downloads.
Security and integrity of data—Implementing a process to ensure that data embedded in
spreadsheets is current and secure. This can be done by “locking” or protecting cells to
prevent inadvertent or intentional changes to standing data. In addition, the spreadsheets
themselves should be stored in protected directories.
Documentation—Ensuring that the appropriate level of spreadsheet documentation is
maintained and kept up-to-date to understand the business objective and specific functions of the spreadsheet.
Development life cycle—Applying a standard software development life cycle to the development process of the more critical and complex spreadsheets covering standard phases:
requirements specification, design, building, testing, and maintenance.Testing is a critical
control to ensure that the spreadsheet is producing accurate and complete results.
Back-ups—Implementing a process to back up spreadsheets on a regular basis so that
complete and accurate information is available for financial reporting.
Archiving—Maintaining historical files no longer available for update in a segregated
drive and locking them as “read only.”
Logic inspection—Inspecting the logic in critical spreadsheets by someone other than the
user or developer of the spreadsheet. This review should be formally documented.
Segregation of duties or roles and procedures—Defining and implementing roles, authorities,
responsibilities, and procedures for issues such as ownership, sign-off, segregation of duties, and usage.
Overall analytics—Implementing analytics as a detective control to find errors in spreadsheets used for calculations. However, analytics alone are not a sufficient control to
completely address the inherent risk of financial amounts generated using spreadsheets.

It is suggested that the level of controls implemented should be considered relative to the
spreadsheet’s use, complexity, and required reliability of the information. Even for spreadsheets categorized as low in complexity and importance, control-types (a)–(e) generally
should be in place.

Analytical Procedures
The auditing standards state that the auditor should perform analytical procedures related
to revenue. Furthermore, the auditor should consider both current financial and operating
data to develop an expectation (reasonableness testing) in addition to trend analysis. If there
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is a risk of misstatement due to fraud, the auditor should disaggregate the data to highlight
where the suspected fraud is occurring.15
AU section 316 notes the following:
In planning the audit, the auditor also should perform analytical procedures relating to revenue with the objective of identifying unusual or unexpected relationships involving revenue accounts that may indicate a material misstatement
due to fraudulent financial reporting. An example of such an analytical procedure
that addresses this objective is a comparison of sales volume, as determined from
recorded revenue amounts, with production capacity. An excess of sales volume
over production capacity may be indicative of recording fictitious sales. As another
example, a trend analysis of revenues by month and sales returns by month during
and shortly after the reporting period may indicate the existence of undisclosed
side agreements with customers to return goods that would preclude revenue recognition.
The extent of the procedures applied should reflect the assessment of the risks
of material misstatement due to fraud. For example, … performing analytical procedures at a more detailed level may be appropriate. Performing substantive analytical procedures using disaggregated data, for example, comparing gross profit
or operating margins by location, line of business, or month to auditor-developed
expectations.

Analytical Procedures to Detect Revenue Fraud
An article in the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ journal, Fraud Magazine, summarizes with an example the work of Messod Daniel Beneish, Ph.D., an Indiana University
accounting professor, regarding ratios that can be used to detect financial statement fraud due
to revenue and other types of financial statement fraud.16 The results of applying Beneish’s
ratios to Enron at Cornell University indicate that indeed revenue fraud was occurring at
Enron. The article notes that the ratios stand the test of time and still help send up red flags
of potential fraud. (See exhibit 3-5.)
Exhibit 3-5
Ratios That Provide Red Flags of Possible Revenue Fraud

Sales Growth Index
Companies with high growth rates find themselves highly motivated to commit fraud when the trend
reverses. Shareholders from inside and outside the company expect that growth to continue, and
those expectations pressure managers to produce.

For a more extensive discussion of analytical procedures, refer to AICPA Audit Guide Analytical Procedures
(available at www.cpa2biz.com/AST/Main/CPA2BIZ_Primary/AuditAttest/TopicSpecificGuidance/PR
DOVR~PC-012551/PC-012551.jsp).
16
Cynthia Harrington, “Analysis ratios for detecting financial statement fraud,” Fraud Magazine, March/
April 2005, www.acfe.com/article.aspx?id=4294967726&terms=(messon+beneish)+.
15
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Sales Growth Index =

Sales Current Year
Sales Prior Year

Results show that companies that manipulated earnings have a mean sales growth index (SGI) of
1.607 and a median of 1.411. Cornell students calculated the SGI of Enron at 1.526, which placed it in
the range of the average manipulator.
Gross Margin Index
Comparing the gross margins from one period to the previous period produces the gross margin
index (GMI). When the GMI is greater than 1 the company’s gross margins have deteriorated and
management is motivated to show better numbers. Like the SGI, the GMI sounds a potential note of
caution. Finding a high GMI means auditors and CFEs should look deeper into reporting of sales and
cost of goods sold.

Growth Margin Index =

(Sales Prior Year – Cost of Goods Sold Prior Year) / Sales Prior Year
(Sales Current Year – Cost of Goods Sold Current Year) / Sales Current Year

Manipulators sported GMIs of 1.193 at the mean and 1.036 at the median. Enron soared into the upper ranges with 1.448.
Days’ Sales in Receivables Index
Sales and receivables typically stay in fairly consistent trend. If the ratio detects a rise in receivables the change might result from revenue inflation.
The days’ sales in receivables index (DSRI) is an example of how the ratio might give a false signal.
An explanation of a rising DSRI might be the perfectly legal activity of a company extending more
credit to customers. Companies that overstated revenue had a mean DSRI of 1.465 and median of
1.281. Enron’s was lower than the median for nonmanipulating companies at 0.625.
Sales, General, and Administrative Expenses Index
If sales increase faster than expenses there needs to be an explanation. If not, the sales, general,
and administrative expenses index (SGAI) may be pointing to overstated revenues.

SGAI =

Sales, General, and Administrative Expenses Current Year / Sales Current Year
Sales, General, and Administrative Expenses Prior Year / Sales Prior Year

While the mean for manipulators was 1.041 and the median 0.96, Enron dipped into the lower rankings at 0.649.
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Trend Analysis and Classic Ratios to Detect
Revenue Fraud
Another ratio that might be indicative of revenue fraud, a type of trend analysis noted by
Professors Apostolou and Crumbley at Louisiana State University,17 is to look at revenues and
compare the trend in sales with the trend in net income. For example, from 1999 to 2001,
HealthSouth’s net income increased nearly 500 percent, but revenues grew only 5 percent. On
March 19, 2003, the SEC stated that HealthSouth faked at least $1.4 billion in profits since
1999 under the auditing eyes of Ernst & Young.
Other classic ratio red flags using trend analysis that might be indicative of revenue fraud
include18
• Receivables turnover—number of times in an operating cycle a company collects its
receivable balance.

Receivables Turnover =

Net Credit Sales
Average Receivables

If fictitious sales are recorded, then a fraudulent debit is made to accounts receivable
causing this ratio to decrease over time.
• Average Collection Period (Day’s Sales Outstanding)

Average Collection Period =

365 Days
Receivable Turnover

If fictitious sales are recorded, then the receivable turnover ratio is decreasing and
the average collection period increases as no cash is being collected on the fictitious
accounts.
Also, if fictitious accounts receivable are being established, then the aging of receivables
would have an increasing amount in the long overdue time periods. Additionally, the allowance for doubtful accounts and bad debts expense would, as a percentage of accounts receivable, be lower in the current year when compared with prior year.

Reasonableness Testing
Another method to detect revenue fraud is to use current year financial and operational
data to predict revenue. For example, the author was speaking in Jackson, Mississippi, and a

Nicholas G. Apostolou and D. Larry Crumbley, “Forensic Investing: Red Flags,” 1990, www.bus.lsu.edu/
accounting/faculty/napostolou/forensic.html.
18
CliffsNotes, “Ratio Analysis,” www.cliffsnotes.com/study_guide/Ratio-Analysis.topicArticleId-21248,
articleId-21213.html.
17
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hospital administrator was present at the seminar. The speaker suggested that a method that
could be used to predict overall revenue at the hospital would be to multiply total number
of hospital beds times an average daily rate. If predicted revenue was significantly lower than
recorded revenue then the data would be disaggregated to highlight which department(s)
was reporting more revenue than could be made given physical capacity constraints. The
hospital administrator responded that using the total number of beds times an average daily
rate would provide an estimate of revenue far in excess of the actual book amount.
The hospital administrator explained that the hospital only experienced a 50 to 55 percent
occupancy rate due to the lack of availability of skilled staff. Hence, it is important for the
person using reasonableness testing as method to predict revenue have a proficient understanding of the industry and the particular entity in order to develop a more precise and
reliable expectation.

Common Size Income Statements
The preparation of common size income statements, when the accounts in the income statement are represented as a percentage of sales (with sales being 100 percent), can be helpful in
detecting revenue fraud when the percentages are compared in a trend analysis, with industry
averages, or within the statement.
For example, the common size income statement can be compared with industry averages at www.yahoofinance.com and questions asked about any major differences. Within an
income statement, a perpetrator might create fictitious revenue and adjust the related cost
of goods sold percentage but forget to increase other costs—such as materials handling and
shipping costs.This would be detected by using a trend analysis and comparing the materials
and handling and shipping cost percentages from the prior with the current year. If the perpetrator just made fraudulent entries to cost of goods sold so that the percentage would be
consistent from year to year and neglected to make entries to increase related variable costs
of materials handling and shipping, then materials handling and shipping costs as a percentage of sales would be lower in the current year when compared with the prior year.

Red Flags
A list of red flags that might alert management or the auditor to revenue-related fraudulent
financial reporting is contained in exhibit 3-6.
Exhibit 3-6
Revenue-Related Fraudulent Financial Reporting Red Flags

• Credit memos to accounts receivable after the end of the period
• Customer complaints about amounts billed
• Discrepancies in accounts receivable
• Unusual journal entries
• Missing or altered documents
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• Lack of cash flow from operations when income is reported
• Unusual reconciling differences between the sales journal and the general ledger
• Sales to customers in the last month at more favorable terms than previous months
• Sales with affiliates and related parties
• Predated or post-dated transactions
• Journal entries made to the sale or revenue account directly (not posted from the accounts
receivable subledger or the sales journal)
• Large or unusual adjustments to sales accounts made just prior to or just after the end of the
period
• Channel stuffing
• Sales to nonexistent customers
• Phony sales to legitimate customers
• Billing for items not shipped or ordered
• Double billing
• Bill and hold
• Earnings process not complete and transactions do not meet revenue recognition criteria

Additional red flags and questions to be asked concerning revenue fraud are provided in
an Ernst & Young report presented in the following section.

Ernst & Young Report
Ernst & Young issued a report providing examples of revenue schemes and revenue fraud
red flags.19 These are presented in exhibits 3-7 and 3-8, respectively. Several of the revenue
schemes are consistent with those found in the COSO study (fictitious sales, recording in
the wrong period, and so on).
Exhibit 3-7
Revenue Schemes

• Recording gross, rather than net, revenue
• Recording revenues of other companies when acting as a “middleman”
• Recording sales that never took place
• Recording future sales in the current period
• Recording sales of products that are out on consignment
• Smoothing of earnings—Often referred to as using “cookie jar reserves,” this involves overestimating
liabilities during “good” periods and storing away funds for future use against declining revenues
www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/FIDS-FI_DetectingFinancialStatementFraud.pdf/$FILE/
FIDS-FI_DetectingFinancialStatementFraud.pdf.
19
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Exhibit 3-8
Revenue Schemes Red Flags

• Increased revenues without a corresponding increase in cash flow, especially over time
• Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, particularly those that are closed near the
end of a financial reporting period
• Unusual growth in the number of days’ sales in receivables
• Strong revenue growth when peer companies are experiencing weak sales

In exhibit 3-8, revenues would increase without a corresponding increase in cash flow as
fictitious accounts receivable (which would never be paid) would also need to be established.
As mentioned previously, this would also cause a growth in the number of days’ sales in receivables. Similarly, revenue growth would be larger when compared with peer companies.
Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions may be recorded particularly near the
end of a financial period as the entity would have a good idea of what revenue would be,
and if it is lower than expected, record a transaction to increase sales.
The Ernst & Young report also states that the following questions should be asked to bring
to light possible revenue fraud:20
• Why did revenues increase sharply during the end of the period compared with
prior-year and current-year results and the budget forecast?
• How does revenue growth compare with that of peers during the same period? If
substantially higher, does the explanation make sense?
• Did receivables increase due to a particular customer? If so, should a reserve be
established?

These types of fraud questions are examples of ones that are required by AU section 316, Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards).
20
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Inventory Fraud Schemes
Overview
Inventory fraud schemes were selected to be among the top 10 most common fraud schemes
for several reasons. First, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations’ (COSO’s) Report on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1998-2007 found that the inventory account had the largest number of misstatements among the sample companies included in the study.1 Second,
inventory is a pervasive account. A misstatement in ending inventory can affect both balance sheet (accounts payable and accounts receivable) and income statement accounts (cost
of goods sold, gross margin, and net income).2 Further, a misstatement in ending inventory
can affect the following year’s income statement since the current year’s ending inventory
becomes the subsequent year’s beginning inventory. Third, many misstatements in inventory
due to fraud can be classified as both fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of
assets.3
Red flags (risks) and other general characteristics of fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets (including preventive and detective controls) are addressed in the
first two chapters of this book. Therefore, the characteristics that are applicable to all types
of financial reporting and misappropriation of assets frauds are also applicable to inventory
fraud and will not be repeated in this chapter.
This chapter will address specific types of inventory fraud schemes, red flags, and methods
to prevent and detect these schemes. This chapter is based upon a review of material and
practical advice that exists in both the professional literature and professional standards.
Three of the top 10 most common fraud schemes that are addressed in this chapter and
their use to perpetrate fraud in the inventory account include misappropriation of assets,
overstatement of assets, and use of fraudulent journal entries.

The entire report is available at www.coso.org/documents/COSOFRAUDSTUDY2010.pdf.
Other accounts that could be affected include purchases, purchase returns and allowances, purchase discounts, sales returns and allowances, and sales discounts.
3
For example, the CPA Journal noted in the Phar-Mor case (discussed later in this chapter) that the areas
where the plaintiffs alleged the auditors were reckless and did not perform an audit in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards centered around accounting for inventory and corresponding effects
on both the balance sheet and income statement.
1
2
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Those companies that want to increase net income will use a variety of techniques to
increase ending inventory, which in turn decreases cost of goods sold and increases gross
margin and net income. Oftentimes, the manipulators own stock in the company which is
publicly held and the increase in net income increases the company’s stock price and the
manipulators’ wealth. Other companies, such as those privately owned, will want to decrease
ending inventory (which decreases net income) in order to avoid paying income tax.

Misappropriation of Assets Schemes
Skimming
Skimming is both a revenue and inventory fraud scheme that is often employed at convenience stores, mall kiosks, and retail stores. When a cash sale of a product occurs, the employee pockets the cash and does not record the sale.There is no transaction trail.The scheme
would be detected when an inventory is conducted by an independent person and the
amount of inventory on hand is less than what is recorded on the books. Depending upon
how often inventory is taken, this scheme might continue for several months. To prevent or
detect this type of scheme, management should install surveillance equipment—such as a
camera or a webcam. If employees are informed surveillance equipment is in place, then this
control would be classified as a preventive control. If employees do not know surveillance
equipment has been installed, then this control is a detective control.
Also, to detect this fraud, many retail stores employee “mystery shoppers” as a method
of surveillance. These individuals observe an entity’s operations and are not known to the
company’s employees.4

Stolen Inventory Schemes
A professional resource notes that schemes involving stolen inventory fall into one of the
following categories.5

Larceny Schemes
Larceny is the removal of inventory from the company premises without attempting to
conceal the theft in the books and records. Losses resulting from larceny of company assets
can run into the millions of dollars. Typically larceny is committed by employees with access
to inventory or supplies (warehouse personnel, inventory clerks, shipping clerks, and so on).
The employees just take the inventory or supplies with them as they leave the company’s
facilities.
Variations of this skimming scheme and additional detection and preventive controls are presented in
chapter 6, “Property, Plant, and Equipment and Estimation Fraud Schemes,” of this book.
5
GIA Trading Group, “Inventory and Other Assets Theft and Fraud,” www.bifranchise.net/forum10/8.html.
4
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These thefts can also be committed by customers who shoplift the goods or use incorrect labeling (discussed subsequently) and pay a lower price for a higher price item. The
customer can also take items to a self-checkout station and not scan the items. This scheme
should be detected by surveillance methods—cameras or store personnel who observe the
self-checkout stations.
However, if there is collusion, two or more “customers” at a multiple self-checkout station
can feign having problems with the equipment and the store employee’s attention is directed
toward this “customer” while the other perpetrators are stealing the goods by not scanning
the items. This risk could be mitigated by placing sensor tags on the higher priced items
or items that have a high likelihood of being stolen. The sensor tag must be deactivated or
removed by a store clerk. If the item that has a sensor tag attached has either not been deactivated or removed by a store clerk, then the security towers will trigger an alarm if the item
with the activated sensor tag passes through the store’s security towers.6
Another control to detect shoplifting is that security personnel can check receipts with
goods in the employees’ or customers’ possession as the individual leaves the premises.
The author sat next to the head of security for a major retail shoe chain on a flight and
a discussion ensued concerning the use of sensor tags and security towers. The head of security noted that her stores did employ sensor tags and security towers, however, they were
never activated. This is an example of a “window dressing” of controls. The head of security
believed that the mere presence of the security towers would deter shoplifting or employee
theft.
Also, another major store chain uses security cameras in its outdoor garden area and signs
are prominently placed indicating that the area is under surveillance. The cameras are not
operational—mere props. Evidently the inventory theft prevention department at this major
store chain, like the head of security at the shoe store chain, believes this “window dressing”
of control will prevent shoplifting.

Raw Materials Asset Requisitions and Transfers
This is a scheme whereby the perpetrator requisitions materials for a project and then embezzles the materials or overstates the amount of supplies or equipment needed and steals
the excess. This happens quite frequently at job sites when the foreperson has the authority
to accept delivery of raw materials and hire labor. A preventive control is the installation of
a webcam at the job site so that management can remotely monitor the number of workers
(and if work is being performed) and the delivery of raw materials that meet requisite specifications. A detective control is the use of labor and materials variance analysis and having
management investigate any variances that are outside stated limits.

There is a slight increase of the use of radio-frequency identification (RFID) on products as a method of
product identification and inventory control. These RFID tags work similar to tokens for theft prevention
and contain a variety of information about the product.
6
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Purchasing and Receiving Schemes
Purchasing and receiving schemes are perpetrated by manipulating the purchasing and receiving functions of a company to facilitate the theft of inventory and other assets, such as
purchasing and misappropriating inventory and other assets.
See the section, “Preventive Control,” in this chapter for a more complete discussion of
this issue.

False Shipments of Inventory and Other Assets
False shipments occur when false shipping documents and false sales documents are created and then cause the victim company to deliver (unknowingly) the targeted assets to the
perpetrator of the scheme. The false documents make it appear that the inventory taken was
sold rather than stolen.
See the “Preventive Control,” “Channel Stuffing,” and “MiniScribe” sections in this chapter for a more complete discussion of this issue.

Incorrect Labeling of Inventory and Self-Checkout
A common scheme to obtain products at lower-than-marked prices at self-checkouts is to
switch barcodes on the items that are being purchased with barcodes from lower-priced
items. Alternatively, the perpetrator can go to numerous websites and create his or her own
stick-on bar codes. Also, more expensive items can be placed in the lower-priced item container that contains the lower-priced item’s barcode. The shoplifter would not be under suspicion as it appears that the perpetrator is conducting a normal transaction. For example, the
customer could put high-end Jimmy Choo shoes in a Keds sneakers shoe box.The customer
would then pay the amount on the Keds sneakers shoe box—a much lower price than the
price of Jimmy Choo shoes.
Some unscrupulous customers at a grocery store have been known to place rib eye steaks
on the scale at the self check-out and input the code for green beans. The rib eye steaks’
package barcode is not scanned, and the perpetrator obtains the beef at green bean prices!
What are the mitigating controls? An employee who observes the self-checkout or surveillance cameras would be functioning as a mitigating control. Also, a store clerk who checks
all merchandise in unsealed containers to provide assurance that the proper product is in the
container is functioning as a mitigating control.

Scrapping Good Inventory
This scheme occurs when a store manager will state that good inventory is damaged and
either pilfer the inventory or “sell” the inventory at retail and pocket the proceeds (difference
between the retail price and the “scrapped” or “damaged” price).
The preventive control is to implement separation of duties and not allow the store manager to sell goods or receive the proceeds (access to assets). The store manager can authorize
the write-down of merchandise (authorization of transaction). The write-down should be
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recorded by another individual (bookkeeping). The inventory is conducted by employees
independent of the other three functions (independent reconciliation).
Corporate management should review write-downs among all stores to assess if any stores
appear to have an excessive amount of write-downs.

Overstatement of Assets Schemes
Sales Return Schemes
A common sales return scheme that occurs at retail stores that do not have a separate returns
department occurs when a sales clerk at a mall kiosk will state that goods have been returned
and issue a refund to him or herself (either a cash refund or a credit to a charge card which
happens to be the employee’s charge card). Inventory is overstated by the amount of the
fictitious sales returns.
This scheme will be detected when an inventory is taken by an independent employee
and less inventory is actually present than is on the books. A preventive control is to install
surveillance cameras at the kiosk.

Manipulating Counts
One scheme to increase the ending amount of inventory and increase net income is to
increase the number of items included in the inventory.This is illustrated by the Crazy Eddie
and Laribee Manufacturing Company fraud schemes (discussed subsequently) and Salad Oil
scandals (addressed later in this chapter in the section titled “Fictitious Inventory”).
• In the Crazy Eddie case, the auditors inadvertently may have contributed to the
fraud by the way the inventory observations were conducted. Rather than climb
over boxes in the warehouse, the auditors asked employees to assist them. Shady
employees volunteered to help the auditors count the inventory. An employee would
stand on top of a stack of television sets, for example, and inform the auditor of the
count. If there were 10 sets, the worker would state there were 25. This occurred
repeatedly and more fictitious inventory was added to the count. The moral of the
story is that if the auditor is supposed to verify the inventory count, then the auditor
must observe it.7
• In 1990, Laribee Manufacturing Company obtained $130 million in loans using as
collateral inventory that either did not exist or was carried on the books in excess of
market value. Also, Laribee carried shipments between two locations as inventory at
both locations. Fictitious documents were created to support the fictitious inventory.8
Joseph T. Wells, “So That’s Why It’s Called a Pyramid Scheme,” Journal of Accountancy (October 2000),
www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2000/Oct/SoThatSWhyItSCalledAPyramidScheme.
8
Charles F. Malone, “Detection of inventory fraud,” The National Public Accountant, December 1, 1994,
available at www.allbusiness.com/accounting-reporting/auditing/477762-1.html.
7
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Consigned Goods Included in Ending Inventory
The ending inventory at a retail store might include goods held on consignment which are
not owned by the company, but are owned by a vendor.This ruse would be detected through
inquiry of store personnel, review of accounts payable transactions for payments made to
vendors when consigned items are sold, and review of contracts with suppliers.

Obsolete Inventory
This scheme is to include obsolete inventory in the ending inventory as salable merchandise.
The obsolete inventory should be written down in accordance with the lower of cost or
market rule and not be recorded on the books at the higher salable merchandise price. One
method to identify this scheme is to compute the inventory turnover and number of days
inventory ratios (discussed subsequently) by inventory category. A low number for inventory
turnover and a high number for number of days inventory might be indicative of obsolete
inventory.
One auditor was conducting an inventory at a toy store and was instructed to rub his hand
on the top of the toy boxes to determine if dust had collected on the boxes. If dust had collected then this might be indicative of slow moving inventory (possibly obsolete inventory)
that should be written down. Alternatively, the toy boxes might be on display only and the
sold toys might be obtained from a secure storage area. Therefore, dust on the top of the
display toy boxes might be indicative of maintenance personnel who do not clean the display
toy boxes.

Capitalizing Costs Instead of Expensing
A classic case of improperly classifying costs that should be expensed as capital expenditures
(and increase the inventory account) occurred in the U.S. Surgical Corporation case. U.S. Surgical pressured one of its vendors (a division of Barden Manufacturing) to prepare invoices
that described its charges as ones that should be capitalized and not expensed. Both companies were audited by the same international CPA firm.9 Both companies colluded with one
another.
A control would be to have capitalized expenses subject to a secondary review. Another
control would be to review engineering specifications to determine if the acquired materials
should be capitalized.
See http://accounting-financial-tax.com/2008/11/17-techniques-to-prevent-and-catchinventory-fraud-part-2/ to learn more about schemes to detect inventory fraud in a manufacturing environment when costs are improperly capitalized.

See Michael C. Knapp, Contemporary Auditing, 3d ed. (South-Western College Publishing: Cincinnati,
1999), for a more in-depth discussion of this and other cases.
9
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Bill and Hold and Store Transfers
An article in the Journal of Accountancy addressed fraudulent inventory valuations at a large
retail chain as follows:10
Although any asset can be fraudulently valued, the most frequent manipulations
occur in inventory. In the Crazy Eddie fraud, Antar overvalued inventory by $80
million, and employed some pretty outrageous tricks to get there. He and his
conspirators ‘borrowed’ merchandise from suppliers to boost the ending inventory count. These were the same suppliers who confirmed Crazy Eddie’s phony
receivables. Eddie convinced the suppliers to simply ship merchandise to the Crazy
Eddie’s stores, and hold the billing until after the end of the accounting period.
They also shipped stock from one store to another so it could be double-counted.
And, most outrageous of all, they got into the auditors’ desk and altered inventory
count sheets in the workpapers to increase the numbers.

Fraudulent Journal Entries Schemes
Oftentimes, perpetrators will fabricate fraudulent journal entries to increase ending inventory and ultimately increase net income.11 The Phar-Mor fraud provides an example of this
type of scheme:
After the outside inventory service submitted a report of their physical count,
Phar-Mor accountants would prepare an inventory compilation packet. The package included the physical counts, retail pricing, Phar-Mor’s calculations of inventory at cost, and cost of goods sold. Based on the compilation, a series of journal
entries were prepared and recorded in the operating general ledger. Each year, the
auditors randomly selected one compilation packet for extensive testing and 14
other packets for limited testing. The auditors reviewed journal entries for reasonableness for all 15 packets.
The post fraud examination determined that many of Phar-Mor’s inventory
compilations packets contained fraudulent journal entries. The entries were often
large in even dollar amounts, did not have journal entry numbers, had no explanation or supporting documentation, and contained suspicious account names
like ‘Accounts Receivable Inventory Contra’ or ‘Cookies.’ Phar-Mor’s fraud team
used these entries to inflate inventory and earnings. Based on the physical count
and results of the compilation, an appropriate entry was made to reduce (credit)
inventory. However, rather than record the offsetting debit to cost of goods sold, a
debit entry was recorded to a ‘bucket’ account. The bucket accounts accumulated
the fraudulent entries during the year. At year-end, to avoid auditor detection, the

“So That’s Why It’s Called a Pyramid Scheme,” Journal of Accountancy (October 2000), www.journalof
accountancy.com/Issues/2000/Oct/SoThatSWhyItSCalledAPyramidScheme.
11
See chapter 3, “Revenue Fraud Schemes—Fictitious Revenue Recognition, Recognizing Revenue Prematurely, and Fictitious Journal Entries,” in this book for controls over top-sided and other journal entries.
10
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bucket accounts were emptied by allocating a portion back to the individual stores
as inventory or some other asset.12

Many of the controls over journal entries were addressed in chapter 2, “Fraud: Red Flags,
Rules, and the Expectations Gap,” in this book. However, in this case, appropriate controls
for these entries should have been to require a formal journal voucher that is appropriately
approved, numerically sequenced, and has supporting documentation. The auditors should
have extended procedures after reviewing entries with suspicious account names (that is,
“Cookies”).

Other Inventory Fraud Scheme
Channel Stuffing
Channel stuffing is a revenue or inventory fraud perpetrated when a company ships inventory to customers who never ordered the goods.
A method to detect this scheme is to review inventory returns after year-end. If this
scheme is occurring, there will be an increase in the number of credit memos issued after
year-end. A control is to have a separate returns department that will report to appropriate
management or an independent audit committee reasons about why goods were returned
(never ordered, not meeting specifications, damaged, and so on).

Preventive Controls
Physical Access Controls
The value and number of items in inventory in many organizations is oftentimes skewed—
there are a large number of items of a small average dollar value and a small number of items
with a high average dollar value. A risk assessment of the inventory might conclude that
physical access controls should be placed over the population of items that have a large average dollar value. For example, the higher-priced items in a jewelry store are not usually on
display. These items are kept locked in a safe.
Irrespective of the inventory item’s value, some items might be more subject to the risks
of shoplifting or misappropriation by employees. For example, some decongestants that are
taken by allergy suffers can also be used to manufacture illegal drugs. These medications are
subject to additional physical access controls (behind the counter, under lock and key, and so
on) due to the concern that the drugs will be acquired to manufacture illegal drugs.

David M. Cottrell and Steven M. Glover, “Finding Auditors Liable for Fraud: What the Jury Heard in the
PharMor Case,” The CPA Journal (2007), www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/1997/0797/features/f1.htm.
12
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Surveillance
As mentioned previously, if individuals know they are under surveillance (via cameras, webcams, and mystery shoppers), then this is a detective control. One type of surveillance in a
smaller entity that processes inventory transaction when there is inadequate separation of
duties in the bookkeeping function is to tell the bookkeeper: “Don’t worry if you make a
mistake as the system records everything you do” (including fraudulent transactions).

Separation of Duties
The internal control issue that needs to be addressed concerning inventory is separation of
duties.The functions of access to assets, independent reconciliation, authorization of transactions, and bookkeeping should be separated. Authorization of inventory acquisition should
be performed by the purchasing department. Authorization of sales of inventory is provided
by the credit department. The bookkeeping department records sales of inventory based
upon receipt of shipping documents. Payment for inventory occurs after the bookkeeping
department has matched receiving reports (inventory received), purchase orders (authorization for procurement), and vendor’s invoices (independent confirmation). Access to inventory is permitted only to warehousing personnel who sign off when they obtain inventory
from the receiving department. The shipping department is required to sign off when the
shipping department receives the authorized products from the warehouse to send to the
customer. The independent reconciliation is performed by still yet another employee who
reports any counted inventory amount variance from the amount recorded on the books.
It is relevant to address the implications if duties are not separated among those individuals
who have physical access to the inventory such as receiving, shipping, and warehousing. If
the warehousing and receiving functions are combined, then the warehousing or receiving
employee could state that goods were added to inventory when he or she stole the goods.
The same is true if the warehousing or shipping functions were combined.The warehousing
or shipping employee could obtain goods from the warehouse, not ship them, and abscond
with the goods. If the shipping or receiving functions are combined, then the perpetrator
could receive goods and not record that they were received and either steal the goods or ship
them to co-conspirators (and not forward the shipping paperwork [that is, bill of lading] to
accounts payable).
These schemes would ultimately be detected. First, an independent inventory count would
show that the actual inventory was lower than what was recorded on the books. Second, if
goods are received and not recorded, then accounts payable will receive a bill from the vendor for these goods and would investigate the reasons underlying the charges (goods received
but stolen by employees). If goods are shipped and not recorded then, again, an independent
inventory count would detect this scheme. Also, the common carrier would send a bill to
accounts payable, which would then initiate an investigation about why there was a bill from
the common carrier but not a matching shipping document from the shipping department
(or customer purchase order).
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Manipulation of Inventory Counts—
Inventory Observation and the Auditor’s
Responsibilities
The origin of the auditing standard that addresses inventory observation is based upon an
early case of inventory fraud—McKesson & Robbins (more fully addressed later in this
chapter).
The McKesson & Robbins fraud led to significant changes in procedures for appointing auditors and conducting audits. After four months of hearings, during
which forty-six witnesses produced 3,000 pages of testimony, the SEC recommended that non-officer members of the client’s board nominate the auditors and
that auditors be elected by and address their report to the shareholders. In the summer of 1939, the American Institute of [Certified Public] Accountants appointed
its first standing committee on auditing procedures. The committee’s first standard,
Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 1, Extensions of Auditing Procedure, made observing inventory and confirming accounts receivable, two procedures that would
have helped detect the McKesson & Robbins fraud, standard audit procedures.13

Another source notes the following:
When accepting the audit of a U.S. company in 1924, Price Waterhouse agreed not
to make a physical examination of inventories or to circularize debtors. Later, both
of these assets proved to be overstated. Dramatic circumstances of the case gave it
much publicity, and ensured that auditors now make some check of inventories
and debtors.14

Observation of inventories is a generally accepted auditing procedure. The independent
auditor who issues an opinion when he or she has not employed them must bear in mind
that he or she has the burden of justifying the opinion expressed.

Periodic Method of Inventory
When inventory quantities are determined solely by means of a physical count, and all
counts are made as of the balance-sheet date or as of a single date within a reasonable time
before or after the balance-sheet date, it is ordinarily necessary for the independent auditor
to be present at the time of count and, by suitable observation, tests, and inquiries, satisfy him
or herself respecting the effectiveness of the methods of inventory-taking and the measure
of reliance which may be placed upon the client’s representations about the quantities and
physical condition of the inventories.

Paul M. Clikeman, “The Greatest Frauds of the (Last) Century,” New Accountant, May 2003, www.new
accountantusa.com/newsFeat/wealthManagement/Clikeman_Greatest_Frauds.pdf.
14
W.T. Baxter, “McKesson & Robbins: a milestone in auditing,” Accounting History Review 9 (1999): 157–59,
accessed October 1, 2010, doi: 10.1080/095852099330287.
13
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Perpetual Method of Inventory
When the well-kept perpetual inventory records are checked by the client periodically by
comparisons with physical counts, the auditor’s observation procedures usually can be performed either during or after the end of the period under audit.

Statistical Methods to Estimate Inventory
In recent years, some companies have developed inventory controls or methods of determining inventories, including statistical sampling, which are highly effective in determining
inventory quantities and which are sufficiently reliable to make unnecessary an annual physical count of each item of inventory.
In such circumstances, the independent auditor must satisfy him or herself that the client’s
procedures or methods are sufficiently reliable to produce results substantially the same as
those which would be obtained by a count of all items each year. The auditor must be present to observe such counts as he or she deems necessary and must satisfy him or herself about
the effectiveness of the counting procedures used.
If statistical sampling methods are used by the client in the taking of the physical inventory,
the auditor must be satisfied that the sampling plan is reasonable and statistically valid, that it
has been properly applied, and that the results are reasonable in the circumstances.
When the independent auditor has not satisfied him or herself with respect to inventories
in the possession of the client through the procedures described previously, tests of the accounting records alone will not be sufficient for him or her to become satisfied about quantities; it will always be necessary for the auditor to make, or observe, some physical counts of
the inventory and apply appropriate tests of intervening transactions.This should be coupled
with inspection of the records of any client’s counts and procedures relating to the physical
inventory on which the balance-sheet inventory is based.

Prior Period Inventory Not Observed
The independent auditor may be asked to audit financial statements covering the current period and one or more periods for which he or she had not observed or made some physical
counts of prior inventories. The auditor may, nevertheless, be able to become satisfied about
such prior inventories through appropriate procedures, such as tests of prior transactions,
reviews of the records of prior counts, and the application of gross profit tests, provided that
he or she has been able to become satisfied about the current inventory.

Inventories Held in Public Warehouses
If inventories are in the hands of public warehouses or other outside custodians, the auditor
ordinarily would obtain direct confirmation in writing from the custodian. If such inventories represent a significant proportion of current or total assets, to obtain reasonable assurance with respect to their existence, the auditor should apply one or more of the following
procedures as considered necessary in the circumstances:
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a.

Test the owner’s procedures for investigating the warehouse employee and evaluating his
or her performance
b. Obtain an independent accountant’s report on the warehouse employee’s control procedures relevant to custody of goods and, if applicable, pledging of receipts, or apply
alternative procedures at the warehouse to gain reasonable assurance that information
received from the employee is reliable
c. Observe physical counts of the goods, if practicable and reasonable
d. If warehouse receipts have been pledged as collateral, confirm with lenders pertinent
details of the pledged receipts (on a test basis, if appropriate)

Timing of Inventory Observation
Circumstances, such as the timing of the work, may make it impossible for the auditor to
accomplish these procedures. In this case, if the auditor is able to satisfy him or herself about
inventories or accounts receivable by applying alternative procedures, there is no significant
limitation on the scope of the work, and the report need not include a reference to the omission of the procedures or the use of alternative procedures. It is important to understand,
however, that AU section 331, Inventories (AICPA, Professional Standards), states that it will
always be necessary for the auditor to make, or observe, some physical counts of the inventory and apply appropriate tests of intervening transactions.

Fictitious Inventory
The most reliable way to validate inventory quantity is to count it in its entirety. Even when
this is done, fraud schemes can allow inventory fraud to go undetected:
• Management representatives follow the auditor and record the test counts—Thereafter, the
client can add phony inventory to the items not tested. This will falsely increase the
total inventory values (see the section titled “Manipulating Counts” in this chapter).
• Auditors announce when and where they will conduct their test counts—For companies
with multiple inventory locations, this advance warning permits management to
conceal shortages at locations which auditors will not visit (see the section titled
“The Phar-Mor Case—Gross Margin” in this chapter).
• Sometimes auditors do not take the extra step of examining packed boxes—To inflate inventory, management stacks empty boxes in the warehouse. (See the sections titled
“MiniScribe” and “Salad Oil Scandal” in this chapter for examples of boxes and
containers that did not contain inventory.)15

Salad Oil Scandal
A classic case of both fictitious inventory and moving inventory during the auditor’s observation of the physical count is the Salad Oil Scandal. Many investors made loans on the
Joseph T. Wells, “Ghost Goods: How to Spot Phantom Inventory,” Journal of Accountancy (June 2001),
www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2001/Jun/GhostGoodsHowToSpotPhantomInventory.htm.
15
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fictitious inventory, including American Express, which experienced a loss of $58 million
and had a drop in its stock price of approximately 50 percent when the fraud was announced.
The following is a synopsis of the case:
The Salad Oil Scandal, also referred to as the “Soybean Scandal,” was a major
corporate scandal in 1963 that ultimately caused over $150 million losses to corporations including American Express, Bank of America, and Bank Leumi, as well
as many international trading companies. The scandal’s ability to push otherwise
cautious and conservative lenders into increasingly risky practices has prompted
some comparisons to recent financial crises including the 2007–8 subprime mortgage financial crisis.
The scandal involved the Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Company in New Jersey,
led by Tino De Angelis, which discovered that it could obtain loans based upon
the inventory of its salad oil.
Ships apparently full of salad oil would arrive at the docks, and inspectors would
confirm that the ships were indeed full of oil, allowing the company to obtain millions in loans. In reality, the ships were mostly filled with water, with only a few
feet of salad oil on top. Since the oil floated on top of the water, it appeared to
inspectors that these ships were loaded with oil. The company even transferred oil
between different tanks while entertaining the inspectors at lunch.16
Allied employees were fattening up the assets by turning out warehouse receipts
for oil that was not there at all.17

Inventory Red Flags—Inquiry
AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards), requires the auditor to make inquiries of management and others within the entity
regarding the following:18
• Whether management has knowledge of any fraud or suspected fraud affecting the
entity
• Whether management is aware of allegations of fraud or suspected fraud affecting
the entity, for example, received in communications from employees, former employees, analysts, regulators, short sellers, or others
• Management’s understanding about the risks of fraud in the entity, including any
specific fraud risks the entity has identified or account balances or classes of transactions for which a risk of fraud may be likely to exist

www.answers.com/topic/salad-oil-scandal-1.
Charles C. Miller, “Tino’s Bottomless Tanks of Oil,” Saturday Evening Post, April 25, 1964, available at
www.mafianj.com/saladoil/tino1.shtml.
18
In addition to asking the questions that follow in the text, the auditor is required to make additional
inquiries.
16
17
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An article in the Journal of Accountancy notes that in evaluating risks of inventory overstatements, the auditor should answer the following questions. The more “yes” answers, the
higher the risk for inventory fraud:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Is the company attempting to obtain financing secured by inventory?
Is inventory a significant balance-sheet item?
Has the percentage of inventory to total assets increased over time?
Has the ratio of cost of goods sold to total sales decreased over time?
Have shipping costs fallen compared with total inventory?
Has inventory turnover slowed over time?
Have there been significant adjusting entries that have increased the inventory balance?
After the close of an accounting period, have material reversing entries been made
to the inventory account?
• Is the company a manufacturer, or does it have a complex system to determine the
value of inventory?
• Is the company involved in technology or another volatile or rapidly changing industry?

Audit Program
An audit program that may be helpful in detecting inventory theft is presented in exhibit 4-1.19
Exhibit 4-1
Inventory Audit Program

• Do adequate, detailed, written inventory instructions and procedures exist?
• Do inventory procedures give appropriate consideration to the location and arrangement of
inventories?
• Do inventory procedures give appropriate consideration to identification and description of
inventories?
• Is the method of determining inventory quantities specified?
• Is the method used for recording items counted adequate?
• Are adequate procedures in place to identify inventory counted, ensure that all items have been
counted, and prevent double counting?
• Are obsolete, slow-moving, or damaged inventories properly identified and segregated?
• Is the inventory reasonably identifiable for proper classification in the accounting records?
• Are counts performed by employees whose functions are independent of the physical custody of
inventories and recordkeeping functions?
• Do proper accounting controls and procedures exist for the exclusion from inventory of merchandise on-hand which is not property of the client?

GIA Trading Group, “Inventory and Other Assets Theft and Fraud,” www.bifranchise.net/forum10/8.
html.
19

80

CommonFraud-2012.indb 80

3/19/2012 11:34:50 AM

Chapter 4: Inventory Fraud Schemes

• Do proper accounting controls and procedures exist for the inclusion in inventory of merchandise
not on-hand, but the property of the client?
• Will identical inventory items in various areas be accumulated to allow a tie in total counts to a
summary listing subsequent to the observation?
• Is the movement of inventory adequately controlled during the physical count?
• Are significant differences between physical counts and detailed inventory records investigated
before the accounting and inventory records are adjusted to match the physical counts?
• Will inventory at remote locations be counted?
• Will special counting procedures or volume conversions be necessary?
• How will work-in-process inventory be identified?
• How will the stage of completion of work-in-process inventory be identified?
• Are there any other matters that should be noted for the inventory count?

Use Experienced Auditors on the Inventory
Observation
An article in a professional journal noted that many accounting firms traditionally start new
employees on the audit of inventory. Accounting firms should consider assigning new audit
personnel based on risk area and use more experienced auditors on high-risk items. If inexperienced auditors must be used, they should be closely supervised, and supervision should
be visible to the client. The auditors of the Laribee inventory were referred to by Laribee
management as being inexperienced because they were “fresh out of college.”20

Inventory Fraud Scheme Cases
Two major cases that use some of the inventory fraud schemes discussed previously are the
Phar-Mor (exhibit 4-2) and McKesson & Robbins (exhibit 4-3) cases.
Exhibit 4-2
Case Study: Far More Ghosts*

Since he was a kid, Mickey Monus loved all sports—especially basketball. But with limited talents
and height (five foot nine on a good day), he would never play on a professional team. Monus did
have one trait, however, shared by top athletes: an unquenchable thirst for winning.
Monus transferred his boundless energy from the court to the board room. He acquired a single
drugstore in Youngstown, Ohio, and within 10 years he had bought 299 more stores and formed the
national chain Phar-Mor. Unfortunately, it was all built on ghost goods—undetected inventory overstatements—and phony profits that eventually would be the downfall of Monus and his company,
and would cost the company’s Big 5 auditors millions of dollars. Here is how it happened.
Charles F. Malone, “Detection of inventory fraud,” The National Public Accountant, December 1, 1994,
available at www.allbusiness.com/accounting-reporting/auditing/477762-1.html.
20
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After acquiring the first drugstore, Monus dreamt of building his modest holdings into a large pharmaceutical empire using power buying, that is, offering products at deep discounts. But first he took
his one unprofitable, unaudited store and increased the profits with the stroke of a pen by adding
phony inventory figures.
Armed only with his gift of gab and a set of inflated financials, Monus bilked money from investors,
bought 8 stores within a year and began the mini-empire that grew to 300 stores. Monus became
a financial icon and his organization gained near-cult status in Youngstown. He decided to fulfill a
sports fantasy by starting the World Basketball League (WBL) in which no players would be over six
feet tall. He pumped $10 million of Phar-Mor’s money into the league.
However, the public did not like short basketball players and were not buying tickets. So Monus
poured more Phar-Mor money into the WBL. One day, a travel agent who booked flights for league
players received a $75,000 check for WBL expenses, but it was disbursed on a Phar-Mor bank account. The employee thought it odd that Phar-Mor would be paying the team’s expenses. Since she
was an acquaintance of one of Phar-Mor’s major investors, she showed him the check. Alarmed,
the investor began conducting his own investigation into Monus’s illicit activities, helping expose an
intricate financial fraud that caused losses of at least half a billion dollars.
The Game Is Over
Generating phony profits over an entire decade was no easy feat. Phar-Mor’s CFO said the company was losing serious money because it was selling goods for less than it had paid for them. But
Monus argued that through Phar-Mor’s power buying it would get so large that it could sell its way
out of trouble. Eventually, the CFO caved in under extreme pressure from Monus, and for the next
several years, he and some of his staff kept two sets of books—the ones they showed the auditors
and the ones that reflected the awful truth.
They dumped the losses into the “bucket account” and then reallocated the sums to one of the
company’s hundreds of stores in the form of increases in inventory costs. They issued fake invoices
for merchandise purchases, made phony journal entries to increase inventory and decrease cost
of sales, recognized inventory purchases but failed to accrue a liability and over-counted and
double-counted merchandise. The finance department was able to conceal the inventory shortages
because the auditors observed inventory in only 4 stores out of 300, and they informed Phar-Mor,
months in advance, which stores they would visit. Phar-Mor executives fully stocked the 4 selected
stores but allocated the phony inventory increases to the other 296 stores. Regardless of the accounting tricks, Phar-Mor was heading for collapse. During the last audit, cash was so tight suppliers threatened to cut the company off for nonpayment of bills.
The auditors never uncovered the fraud, for which they paid dearly. This failure cost the audit firm
more than $300 million in civil judgments. The CFO, who did not profit personally, was sentenced to
33 months in prison. Monus went to jail for 5 years.
Sharpened Insight
Why didn’t the auditors see signs of fraud at Phar-Mor? Perhaps, they just believed in their client—
they read the newspaper articles and watched the television spots on the hard-driving Monus and
bought the hype. They might have conducted the audit under a faulty assumption: Their client would
not be motivated to commit financial statement fraud because it was making money hand over fist.
Looking back, the auditors might have been able to spot the ghosts if anyone had asked a fundamental question: How can a company make money by selling goods below cost?
Adapted from Joseph T. Wells, “Ghost Goods: How to Spot Phantom Inventory,” Journal of Accountancy (June 2001),
www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2001/Jun/GhostGoodsHowToSpotPhantomInventory.htm. Joseph T. Wells is the
founder of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners.

*
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How might have the fraud been detected by the auditors in the Phar-Mor case? The auditors could have selected some stores and performed a cycle count of some of the inventory
on a surprise basis. AU section 316 states the following about the predictability of auditing
procedures:
The auditor should incorporate an element of unpredictability in the selection
from year to year of auditing procedures to be performed—for example, performing substantive tests of selected account balances and assertions not otherwise
tested due to their materiality or risk, adjusting the timing of testing from that
otherwise expected, using differing sampling methods, and performing procedures
at different locations or at locations on an unannounced basis.

Additionally, AU section 316 notes that the extent of auditing procedures (number of
Phar-Mor locations) should be increased if there is a risk of misstatements. Alas, this was not
the case in the Phar-Mor case, when the client was informed in advance of the locations
where inventory was to be observed and the sample size (number of locations) was surprisingly small.
Exhibit 4-3
McKesson & Robbins*

Criminal Convictions and Forgery—Management Integrity and Ethical Values?
The mastermind of the McKesson & Robbins fraud was Philip Musica. Musica had been convicted
for bribing custom officials and forging invoices to obtain bank loans.
He changed his name to Frank D. Coster to conceal his criminal record. Musica founded the Adelphi
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company which manufactured high alcohol-content products, such
as hair tonic and cosmetics. The company’s major customers were bootleggers who used the company’s products to make illegal alcohol.
Musica, using his alias as Coster, bought McKesson & Robbins, a company that sold over-the-counter medications, such as cough syrups.
Skimming and Related Parties
To inflate McKesson & Robbins’ reported assets while skimming cash into his own pocket, Musica
signed up his three brothers to help increase the company’s assets. One brother, using the alias
George Vernard, was placed in charge of a fictitious sales agency, W.W. Smith & Co. The W.W.
Smith office was actually a “letter-writing plant” containing seven typewriters, each with a distinct
typeface and a unique supply of stationery. Musica and his brother created purchase orders bearing the names of fictitious companies and mailed them to McKesson & Robbins.
Seven typewriters were used since the banks made loans on the purchase orders and auditors
reviewed the purchase orders as evidence of accounts receivable. At this time the type font on a
particular typewriter could be traced back to a particular typewriter—just like a fingerprint can be
traced to a particular individual. The reason several typewriters were used was because Musica,
adept at forgery, thought the bank and auditors would compare the type font on purchase orders
among dissimilar fictitious companies to determine if the type font was the same, and the fake
purchase order scheme would be discovered since different companies would never have the same
type font.
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In reality, the auditors probably would never have performed this procedure (comparing the type
font on purchase orders from different companies to assess if they were the same). Hence, another
example of the expectations gap—the gap between what auditors do and what the public and others
think auditors do.
Another Musica brother, using the alias Robert Dietrich, was placed in charge of McKesson &
Robbins’ shipping department. This brother would forge shipping documents to make it appear that
inventory had been delivered by McKesson & Robbins to legitimate customers.
The third Musica brother, using the alias George Dietrich, was appointed as McKesson & Robbins’
assistant treasurer. This brother would transfer money between numerous company bank accounts
to create the appearance of cash payments for purchases and cash receipts from customers.
For each sale, McKesson & Robbins paid W.W. Smith & Co. a commission. The four Musica brothers
divided the Smith commissions among themselves with Philip, the oldest brother and mastermind,
getting the largest share.
The McKesson & Robbins fraud was not discovered until late 1938 when the company’s treasurer,
Julian Thompson, became suspicious of the large payments McKesson was making to W.W. Smith
& Co. Thompson obtained copies of the Dunn & Bradstreet (D&B) credit reports that had been
used to satisfy McKesson & Robbins’ auditors of W.W. Smith’s viability. When he showed the credit
reports to a D&B representative, he learned that D&B had never heard of W.W. Smith & Co. and that
the credit reports in his possession were forgeries.
On December 6, 1938, the Securities and Exchange Commission opened an investigation into
McKesson & Robbins’ accounting, and the New York Stock Exchange suspended trading of the
company’s shares. One week later, federal agents arrested Coster (Musica), fingerprinted him, and
released him on bond. The next day, investigators discovered from his fingerprints that respected
businessman F. Donald Coster, M.D., Ph.D., was really twice-convicted fraudster Philip Musica.
Musica got word that he had been unmasked and that federal marshals were on their way to arrest
him. Unwilling to face almost certain conviction and a long prison term, he locked himself in the
bathroom and shot himself in the head. He was careful to stand in a way that when he fell into a
large marble bathtub, none of his blood stained the carpet on the floor.
Lifestyle Red Flag
Before his suicide, Musica was extremely wealthy, buying a 28-room mansion in Fairfield, a yacht,
racing horses, and a stable of cars. By 1937, McKesson & Robbins was the third-largest drug
company in the world. However, he remained an intensely private man, in part out of fear of being
unmasked.
Comments
Based upon current standards, this fraud most likely would have been discovered due to the issuance of numerous professional standards. The auditor is required to observe inventory and confirm
accounts receivable. The auditor, when performing client acceptance and continuance procedures,
would most likely have run a background check on the key officers and directors and would have
discovered the unsavory background of Musica, his brothers, and others.
Adapted from Paul M. Clikeman, “The Greatest Frauds of the (Last) Century,” New Accountant, May 2003, www.new
accountantusa.com/newsFeat/wealthManagement/Clikeman_Greatest_Frauds.pdf. This case started in the 1920s.

*
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Analytical Procedures to Detect Inventory
Fraud Schemes
An article in the Journal of Accountancy notes that the following analytical procedures (using
trend analysis—comparing the prior year(s) with the current year) might be indicative of
inventory fraud.21 The author notes that when analyzing a company’s financial statements
over time, the auditor should look for the following trends:
• Lower cost of goods sold
• Higher inventory balance
• Higher net income
• Inventory increasing faster than sales
• Decreasing inventory turnover
• Shipping costs decreasing as a percentage of inventory
• Inventory rising faster than total assets move up
• Falling cost of sales as a percentage of sales
• Cost of goods sold on the books not agreeing with tax returns
Other ratios that might be indicative of inventory fraud are addressed subsequently.

Inventory Turnover22
The inventory turnover ratio is

Inventory Turnover =

Cost of Goods Sold
Average or Current Period Inventory

Note: Some authors suggest adding beginning and ending inventory and dividing by two
to obtain average inventory. This calculation might be misleading as seasonal factors should
be taken into consideration.
If the inventory turnover ratio is lower when compared with the past year, then this indicates that there is an increase in the amount of inventory. This could be a red flag for fraud
(creating fictitious inventory to increase net income) or that the inventory has become obsolete and needs to be written down. Another plausible explanation is that the inventory is not
being sold due to lack of demand caused by a downturn in the economy or other matters.

Joseph T. Wells, “Ghost Goods: How to Spot Phantom Inventory,” Journal of Accountancy (June 2001), www.
journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2001/Jun/GhostGoodsHowToSpotPhantomInventory.htm. Joseph T. Wells
is the founder of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners.
22
The source for the inventory turnover and number of days inventory ratios discussed in this section is
www.bizwiz.ca/number_of_days_inventory.html.
21
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Number of Days Inventory
The number of days inventory ratio is also known as average inventory period and inventory
holding period. It is calculated as follows:

Number of Days Inventory =

365 Days
Inventory Turnover Ratio

A large number (or an increase in this number from the previous years) implies that there
is a low demand for the products.This might be indicative of fraud. As mentioned previously,
an alternative explanation is that the product has become obsolete or demand has decreased.
The reason(s) for the large number should be investigated.
A low number implies that there is not enough inventory on hand to meet demand for
the products.

Retail Inventory Ratios
The following are two retail inventory ratios that can be used to detect fraud.23

Inventory per Square Foot
Inventory per square foot is similar to sales per square foot.This ratio measures how much inventory in dollars is allocated to the gross or net selling square footage within a store. Higher
levels of inventory will raise the amount of inventory per square foot. Thus, the lower the
inventory per square foot allocated the better. This would mean a retailer is tying up fewer
dollars in inventory for the amount of gross or net selling square feet per store. A higher
inventory per square foot might be indicative of inventory overstatement.
This ratio allows for comparison across companies of different sizes.
The amount of inventory per square foot can be compared with industry averages to assess
if the retail store has sufficient physical space to store the amount of inventory that is on the
books. For example, if a retail store has $15 million worth of inventory, and the national average of inventory per square foot is $1,000, then the retail store space allocated to inventory
should be approximately 15,000 square feet. If the store has only 5,000 square feet, then this
discrepancy between what the size of the store is expected to be (15,000 square feet) and the
actual size of the store (5,000 square feet) should be explored.
Another capacity issue is the equipment that is used to move the inventory. For example,
if an inventory of steel beams is recorded as weighing two tons each and the equipment to
move the steel can only lift one ton, then reasons for this anomaly should be investigated.

23

U.S. Business Reporter, “Understanding Retail Inventory,” www.activemedia-guide.com/invstats.htm.
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Inventories-to-Sales Ratio
The inventory-to-sales ratio (ISR) measures the discrepancy of a retailer’s inventory to its
sales volume.The higher the ISR the greater the amount of inventory on hand, which means
that a retailer’s sales are stalling or it is possibly overstating inventory. The ISR is calculated
by dividing a retailer’s average inventories by average sales. This figure can be calculated on
a quarterly or annual basis.
The formula is as follows:

ISR =

Average Inventories
Average Sales

Trend Analysis of Day’s Receipts
A trend analysis could detect the skimming fraud (discussed previously) of a bartender who
purchased his or her own cash register and placed it next to company-owned cash registers
and pocketed the cash sales. A comparison could be made between the current year’s deposit and the previous year’s deposits to discern if there is a decrease in the amount of cash
deposits and also if daily sales have decreased. A decrease in these two trends could indicate
a skimming fraud.
Additionally, if the company had several locations, a comparison of daily cash receipts and
sales could also be made between stores to highlight an anomaly of lower cash deposits at
one or more of the locations. Lower cash deposits at one or more of the locations (when
compared with all other locations) might be indicative of cash skimming.

The Phar-Mor Case—Gross Margin
An example of using the gross margin percentage (gross margin/gross sales) to detect fraud
is illustrated by an article in the CPA Journal and is provided in exhibit 4-4.24
Exhibit 4-4
Phar-Mor and Gross Margin

Inventory at Phar-Mor increased rapidly from $11 million in 1989 to $36 million in 1990 to $153 million in 1991. Phar-Mor’s inventory system did not include a perpetual inventory record. Therefore,
Phar-Mor used the retail method for valuing inventory. Phar-Mor contracted with an outside firm
to physically count and provide the retail price of each item in inventory twice per year. Phar-Mor
would then apply a cost complement to determine the cost of inventory. Phar-Mor’s initial strategy
was to mark all merchandise up 20 percent, resulting in a gross margin of 16.7 percent and a cost
complement of 83.3 percent. However, to be competitive, Phar-Mor lowered the margins on certain
“price sensitive” items to get customers in the door. As a result, Phar-Mor’s overall budgeted gross
margin fell to 15.5 percent, resulting in a cost complement of 84.5 percent.

David M. Cottrell and Steven M. Glover, “Finding Auditors Liable for Fraud: What the Jury Heard in the
PharMor Case,” The CPA Journal (2007), www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/1997/0797/features/f1.htm.
24
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The company’s auditor, Coopers and Lybrand, identified inventory valuation as a high risk area in
its workpapers. As a detailed test of Phar-Mor’s inventory costing, Coopers annually attended the
physical inventory at 4 stores and selected 25–30 items per store to perform price testing. Sample
items were determined by the attending auditor in a haphazard fashion. Purchase invoices were
examined for the items selected and an overall gross margin for the sample was determined. In
the years 1988 through 1991, Coopers’ sample gross margins averaged from 16.1 percent to 17.7
percent. Coopers explained the difference between the expected 15.5 percent gross margin and
the sample gross margin resulted because the sample taken did not include many price sensitive
items and, therefore, the sample gross margin was higher than Phar-Mor’s overall margin. Coopers
concluded the difference noted was reasonable and consistent with its expectations.
After a store had a physical inventory, a gross profit schedule was prepared by Phar-Mor accountants. These schedules compared gross margins based on the physical inventory with the general
ledger for the current and prior year. Coopers tested a sample of these gross profit schedules each
year.
After the fraud was uncovered, it was determined that Phar-Mor’s actual margins were really much
lower than the budgeted 15.5 percent, because the price-sensitive items made up a relatively large
percentage of sales.

Another case in which the gross margin percentage appeared suspicious was in the Crazy
Eddie inventory fraud. In 1984, gross margin was 40 percent, when historically it had never
been more than 25 percent. The gross margin for the last quarter was over 60 percent. The
Crazy Eddie management’s discussions with the auditor never addressed the issue of accounting fraud. Also, in stores that existed between 1987 and 1988 at which the auditors did
not observe inventory, inventory grew by 195 percent—more than double that in the stores
where the auditor observed inventory.25 Certainly these two dramatic increases (gross margin
and inventory percentage increases) should have caused the auditor to extend procedures.

Case
MiniScribe
The following case is from the AICPA Case Development Program and is based upon an
actual inventory fraud case. Consider the following questions while reading the case.26
1. What were the pressures, opportunities, and rationalizations in this case?
2. What were the inventory fraud scheme(s) and any financial ratio(s) red flags that would
indicate the possibility of fraud?

25
26

White Collar Fraud, “Crazy Eddie:The Many Faces of Fraud,” www.whitecollarfraud.com/947660.html.
Zhemin Wang, et al., MiniScribe: A Case of Business Ethics, available at bobbarr.biz/MiniScribe.PDF.
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Part 1
Reggie Lewis started to work for MiniScribe Corporation, a leading supplier of Winchester harddisk drives, in early 1987. Reggie was particularly excited to be working for one of the top growth
companies in the electronics industry and was looking forward to rapid career advancement with
MiniScribe.
Almost immediately after beginning work at MiniScribe, Reggie felt the pressure for sales
growth from the senior management, particularly from Mr. Wiles, the chairman of the board
and chief executive officer (CEO) of MiniScribe. Reggie learned that Mr. Wiles had come to
MiniScribe as its CEO in early 1985 in a financial agreement with Hambrecht & Quist, a venture
capital firm. At that time, MiniScribe, a high-growth company, was in a severe liquidity crisis
and Mr. Wiles, who had a proven track record for turning around ailing companies, was
brought in to fix MiniScribe’s liquidity problem. However, it turned out that Mr. Wiles was more
than interested in merely turning the company around. Instead, he wanted to be remembered
as “the man who made MiniScribe a billion-dollar company,” which was a rather ambitious
goal for a company with sales of $124 million in 1984.
Since Mr. Wiles’ arrival at MiniScribe, sales objectives had become the company’s driving force,
and achieving sales targets became a company-wide obsession. This obsession, along with
Wiles’ aggressive management style, created a “pressure cooker environment.” The environment, however, produced remarkable results. The company returned to profitability shortly after
Wiles’ arrival. Sales increased by 50% in two years, with a reported net income of $22.7 million in
1986.
During the first few months Reggie worked at the corporate controller’s office, he found some of
MiniScribe’s revenue recognition practices troublesome. Specifically, MiniScribe booked sales
at the time goods were shipped. On the surface this practice seemed entirely consistent with the
revenue recognition principles Reggie had learned in his accounting courses. However, in order
to increase reported sales, MiniScribe shipped quantities of goods at year-end that were far in
excess of the amounts ordered by customers. Furthermore, despite this practice, Reggie noticed
that MiniScribe booked sales returns and allowances of only approximately 1% of total sales while
4% to 10% was typical in the industry. Finally, Reggie was very uncomfortable with MiniScribe’s
practice of “bill and hold.” MiniScribe owned several warehouses around the country and in
Canada as “just-in-time” suppliers for distributors. Under a bill and hold transaction, MiniScribe
booked sales when goods were shipped to the warehouses rather than when they were shipped
to customers. Consequently, MiniScribe was able to increase sales by simply shipping goods to its
own warehouses. These aggressive accounting practices helped MiniScribe report sales of $362
million in 1987, a 95% increase over the previous year. Growth was so rapid that Electronic Business
Magazine named MiniScribe one of the top growth companies in the electronics industry.
Reggie reviewed the relevant literature regarding revenue recognition and concluded that the
above practices were not consistent with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
He decided to discuss this with his superior in the corporate controller’s office of MiniScribe.
However, he was told that MiniScribe’s practices were consistent with GAAP and were common
in the industry. At the end of the conversation, he was also reminded how important it was for
everyone at MiniScribe to be a team player.
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Part 2
Several months later, Mr. Wolfe, the corporate controller of MiniScribe, was replaced by Mr.
Huff. With the arrival of the new controller, Reggie was hopeful that corrective actions would be
taken to straighten out the company’s problematic revenue recognition practices before financial
statements were released. However, Reggie was disappointed to see that, despite the change in
controllership, the company continued to be aggressive in accounting practices and often went
to great lengths to increase its sales and profits. The company dramatically increased the shipments of inventory to its warehouses and recorded those shipments as sales. The company also
accumulated scrap that had been written off the company’s books, and, instead of discarding it,
repackaged it and counted it as good inventory. Furthermore, millions of dollars of false inventory
were generated by packaging bricks as finished products and shipping them to distributors at
the end of the year. In addition, Reggie learned in conversations with his colleagues that Owen
Taranto, the Chief Financial Officer, was creating a software program called “Cook Book” to produce false sales transactions. While clearly troubled by “Cook Book,” he also heard that some
of his superior officers had even gone as far as breaking into the company’s auditors’ trunks to
obtain copies of the list of inventory items that had been test-counted by the auditors, so that
they could inflate the number of inventory items that the auditors had not sampled.
Reggie sadly learned that a substantial number of company personnel knowingly assisted with
the tactics used to conceal the inventory shortfall and to inflate the reported profits. Reggie also
discovered that the Board of Directors had been restructured by Mr. Wiles to include a majority
of directors who either worked for or were otherwise affiliated with Mr. Wiles and the Hambrecht
& Quist group. Furthermore, the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors usually met only twice
a year and had never challenged management financial representations.
Witnessing all these fraudulent reporting practices, Reggie felt he could not see all this happening and do nothing about it.
Part 3
In February 1989, Mr. Wiles resigned. Mr. Rifenburgh, the company’s new CEO, publicly admitted
that the financial statements for the previous three years were misstated. In fact, the internal
control system, the existed records, and documentation were so inadequate that it was almost
impossible for a specially appointed independent evaluation committee to produce reliable
financial statements for those years, and, consequently, it could not quantify and correct the
overstatements of assets for those periods. By mid-1989, the price of MiniScribe stock fell to $1
per share. In January 1990, the company filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the federal
bankruptcy code, but fraud allegations and the large number of lawsuits against the company
and its top executives made it impossible to reorganize the company. The case was converted to
a liquidation proceeding and the assets of the bankrupted MiniScribe were auctioned off to the
Maxtor Corporation of San Jose, California, to pay off its creditors.
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Wiles, Wolfe, Huff and thirteen other corporate officers were charged by the SEC with falsifying
MiniScribe’s financial records and concealing the company’s sagging revenue in the late 1980s.
Plaintiffs in other lawsuits, including shareholders and creditors, sought damages up to $1 billion.
Wiles paid $9.7 million to settle the various civil claims against him. He was also convicted on
three federal criminal charges in July of 1994 and was sentenced to three years in prison. The
charges involved (1) his filing of a false annual report with the SEC; (2) his insider trading of $1.7
million of MiniScribe stock; and (3) his use of false financial statements to obtain a $90 million
loan for MiniScribe from Standard Chartered Bank. As of this writing, Wiles is still appealing his
three-year prison sentence. Wolfe and Huff were both fined and barred permanently from practicing accounting before the Commission which means, in most states, that their CPA licenses
would automatically be revoked permanently. Hambrecht & Quist, the company’s investment
banker, agreed to pay $21.5 million in settlement. The company’s former auditor, Coopers and
Lybrand, agreed to pay a total of $140 million for failing to detect the financial fraud committed by
MiniScribe, which was one of the largest amounts paid by an accounting firm to settle a professional liability case.
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Accounts Receivable Fraud
Schemes
Overview
Accounts receivable fraud schemes were selected to be among the top 10 most common
frauds for several reasons. First, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) Report
on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1998-2007 found that the accounts receivable account had
the second largest number of misstatements among the sample companies included in the
study.1 Second, accounts receivable is a pervasive account. A misstatement in accounts receivable can affect both balance sheet (allowance for doubtful accounts and inventory) and income statement accounts (revenue, cost of goods sold, and net income).Third, misstatements
in accounts receivables due to fraud can be classified as both fraudulent financial reporting
and misappropriation of assets.
Red flags (risks) and other general characteristics of fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets (including preventive and detective controls) are addressed in the
first two chapters of this book. Therefore, the characteristics that are applicable to all types
of financial reporting and misappropriation of assets frauds are also applicable to accounts
receivable fraud and will not be repeated in this chapter.
This chapter will address specific types of accounts receivable fraud schemes (overstatement of assets, improper estimates, lapping, and so on), red flags, and methods to prevent and
detect these schemes. This chapter is based upon a review of material and practical advice
that exists in both the professional literature and professional standards.
Three of the top 10 most common fraud schemes that are addressed in this chapter and
their use to perpetrate fraud in the accounts receivable account include misappropriation of
assets, overstatement of assets, and use of fraudulent journal entries.

1

The entire report is available at www.coso.org/documents/COSOFRAUDSTUDY2010_001.pdf.
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Accounts Receivable Fraud Schemes
Why is there a focus on accounts receivable fraud schemes? Perhaps Barry Minkow, mastermind of the ZZZZ Best fraud, can best sum it up:
Indeed, in a prison interview videotaped in 1992, convicted swindler Barry
Minkow of the infamous ZZZZ Best case said, ‘Accounts receivable are a wonderful thing for a fraudster like me. They immediately increase profits. But they also
do something else—they explain why my company doesn’t have any cash; it’s all
tied up in accounts receivable.’2
The fraud was executed by setting up a number of fictitious shell companies.
Minkow and his associates filtered portions of the newly invested cash inflow to
make it appear as if the shell companies were paying off their receivable accounts to
ZZZZ Best.This technique fooled many people for years; after all, what better way
to show a receivable’s validity and authenticity than to show actual cash payments
being made on the outstanding balances!3

Overstatement of Assets Fraud Schemes
Creating Fictitious Customers and Accounts Receivable
A common accounts receivable or revenue scheme is to increase revenue by recording a
credit sale to a fictitious customer. (Other accounts are also affected by this scheme—including inventory and cost of goods sold.) This type of scheme is generally perpetrated by
management with the objective of increasing net income in order to increase the entity’s
stock price—and management’s wealth. Nonpublic entities also employ this scheme in order
to meet debt covenant requirements.
In order to create a fictitious credit customer the perpetrator must be able to establish a
customer record that includes relatively permanent information (address, and so on) and the
credit limit.This scheme is often perpetrated in smaller businesses by the bookkeeper, and in
larger businesses, management puts pressure on employees to create the fictitious customer.
There could also be collusion among employees to accomplish this scheme. After the fake
customers are established, then “sales” are made to these customers. During an audit, the
auditors will send confirmations (this is addressed more fully later in the section titled “The
Confirmation Process,” in this chapter) to the customers as evidence that the customer exists and the amounts owed the entity are valid. Normally, the scheme would be detected at
this point; however, in the Equity Funding case (discussed subsequently), a large number of
fictitious policyholders were fabricated and not detected by the auditor.
On November 1, 1973, a Federal grand jury in California indicted 22 Equity
Funding executives and employees, including Mr. Goldblum, the chairman and
Joseph T. Wells, “Follow Fraud to the Likely Perp,” Journal of Accountancy (March 2001), www.journalof
accountancy.com/Issues/2001/Mar/FollowFraudToTheLikelyPerp.htm.
3
Ron Marden, “Why receivables are wonderful things,” National Public Accountant, January 1997.
2

94

CommonFraud-2012.indb 94

3/19/2012 11:34:53 AM

Chapter 5: Accounts Receivable Fraud Schemes

chief executive officer. The grand jury said that Mr. Goldblum wanted to achieve
a level of growth that was not attainable through legitimate business operations.
According to the indictment, Mr. Goldblum arranged for various officers and employees to make fictitious bookkeeping entries to inflate the company’s income
and assets. He also directed employees to create fictitious insurance policies. On
November 2, 1970, an employee was instructed to write a computer program
creating fictitious policies with a face value of $430 million and a total yearly
premium of $5.5 million. In 1971, phony policies were reinsured and employees
were instructed to create death claims on some of the policies. (Other insurance
companies purchased some of Equity Funding’s fictitious policyholders’ policies.
Equity Funding “killed” the fictitious policyholders and collected the death benefits which were paid by the other insurance companies.)
This was not the only time the auditors were duped. One night, an auditor left
his briefcase unlocked. An Equity Funding executive, in full sight of others, opened
the case, took the audit plan, and was able to anticipate the auditor’s next steps.
At another time, when the auditors sent out policy confirmations to a sample of
policyholders, Equity Funding officials, eager to help, did some clerical chores for
the auditor. As a result, letters were sent to branch sales managers and agents, who
dutifully filled out the forms for the fictitious policyholders.4

There are several types of controls that can be established to prevent and detect the establishment of fictitious customers.There should be access rights established so that only authorized employees can input data for new customers after approval has been made by a separate
credit granting department (preventive control). The separate credit granting department or
originating department should review reports of all changes to the customer database for
addition or deletion of customers, changes in credit limit, and changes in critical fields, such
as address, to provide assurance that changes were appropriately made (detective control).
Additional procedures could be performed by internal audit or management to validate the
customer’s existence. Outside sources should be used when possible. For example, a customer’s
company should be listed with the Secretary of State.The Secretary of State records should be
reviewed to obtain assurance that the company is indeed registered. The names of the officers
and directors listed with the Secretary of State should be reviewed to determine if they have
the same last name or a common name (“Smith” or “Jones”).This might be indicative of sloth
on the part of the perpetrator(s) who register a fake corporation with the state but who make
the mistake of using common names for all officers and directors or worse yet, provide the
same last name for all officers and directors. (Note that legitimate instances exist when all officers and directors would have the same last name as in the case of a family-owned business.)
Background checks can be obtained fairly quickly and inexpensively and should be a
consideration. Additionally the customer’s address should be compared with real property
records and mapping programs to provide assurance that there is an actual building.This step
David R. Hancox, “Could the Equity Funding scandal happen again? Auditors need to guard against the
scenario that led to one of auditing’s darkest hours,” Internal Auditor, October 1997, available at findarticles.
com/p/articles/mi_m4153/is_n5_v54/ai_20057314/pg_3/?tag=content;col1.
4
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could possibly identify related parties (real property records shows who owns the property—
which, for example, could be an entity owned by one of the officers or directors). The street
address and city and state should be referenced to the www.usps.com website to determine if
the correct zip code is being used.The phone number (most companies still have a land line)
can be reversed searched at www.whitepages.com to determine if the phone number is consistent with the address.These procedures should also be performed on the “ship to” address.
The sales tax rate for the items sold should be reviewed to determine if it is the appropriate
rate for the locality. Additionally, the goods sold should be reviewed for reasonableness—that
is, is it normal for a doctor’s office to be purchasing 500 laptops?
Finally, external auditors, internal audit, or management should review subsequent cash
receipts as evidence that particular accounts receivables at period-end were indeed valid and
not fictitious.

Factoring Fictitious Accounts Receivable
If an entity needs cash, then accounts receivable could be fabricated and factored at a bank
or financing company to generate the needed cash. If the accounts receivable are sold without recourse, then the bank or financing company will assume the risk of bad debts. If the
accounts receivable are sold with recourse, then the manufacturing entity is liable to the
bank or financing company if a customer defaults on the accounts receivable. Additionally, if
the accounts receivable are sold with recourse, then the seller has a contingent liability that
should be disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements.
The company will receive cash from the bank or financing company in an amount less
than the sum of the balances of the factored accounts receivable. The bank or financing
company charges a fee for this factoring service and a larger fee is charged if the accounts
receivable are factored without recourse as there is greater risk to the bank or financing
company. A recent case that provides an example of this type of accounts receivable fraud
scheme committed by several flimflam artists is provided in exhibit 5-1.
Exhibit 5-1
Fictitious Accounts Receivable Factoring Fraud Scheme*

Three men were charged with posing as government contractors in their scheme to fraudulently
finance $4 million of false receivables. According to a 19-count indictment, Federal National
Payables, Inc. (FNP) and Associated Receivables Funding, Inc. (ARF) were accounts receivables
finance companies (the factoring companies) that purchased account receivables from these phony
government contractors.
From November 2007 to July 2009, defendants Rafael C. Simmons, age 30, of Laurel, Maryland, and
of Texas; Rodney A. Mathis, age 33, of Stafford, Virginia; and Dejuan A. Fountain, age 38, of Douglasville, Georgia, falsely represented to the factoring companies and other finance companies that
business entities associated with Simmons had obtained legitimate multi-million dollar government
contracts.
The business entities associated with Simmons allegedly supplied telecommunications services,
IT support services, and other services to the United States government. The defendants caused
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the factoring companies to agree to make partial advance payments to the business entities on
the false pretense that the businesses had assigned their purported “interest” in U.S. government
contract claims to those factoring companies. Payments made by the factoring companies were
directed to bank accounts controlled by the defendants.
According to the indictment, Mathis falsely held himself out as the contracting officer for the U.S.
Army in order to convince the factoring companies that a genuine government contract existed and
that government payments would be made to the factoring companies. Fountain, who was an active
duty Army warrant officer responsible for communications security, also falsely held himself out as
a financial officer for the Army and as a secretary and CEO of a business entity associated with Simmons, in order to entice the factoring companies to make advance payments. Simmons and Mathis
allegedly caused payments to be made to the factoring companies from bank accounts controlled
by the defendants, and made such payments appear as if they were from the government, thereby
deceiving the factoring companies into believing that legitimate government contracts existed.
Fountain and Mathis allegedly used Army e-mail addresses to falsely represent to factoring companies that government payments on the “government contract” were delayed or misdirected. The
indictment seeks forfeiture of $4,022,263.16 and two vehicles in connection with the fraud scheme.
* Adapted from FBI, Baltimore Division, “Army Officer and Two Civilians Charged in Two-Year Scheme to Defraud Several
Companies,” news release, August 24, 2009, www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2009/ba082409.htm.

Manipulating the Allowance for Doubtful Accounts
In order to increase the net realizable value of accounts receivable, a perpetrator will understate the allowance for doubtful accounts. This scheme might be pursued in order for
the company to meet certain financial ratio requirements contained in debt covenant requirements. The allowance for doubtful accounts is typically determined by aging accounts
receivable and having appropriate personnel review the aging.5 Perpetrators can change the
aging and make accounts seem more current in order to decrease the balance in the allowance account and make net accounts receivable larger. Because of this, auditing standards
encourage the auditor to test the aging schedule. Paragraph .07 of AU section 326, Audit Evidence (AICPA, Professional Standards), states that the auditor may analyze the aging of accounts
receivable and the subsequent collection of receivables to obtain audit evidence relating to
the valuation of the allowance for doubtful accounts.
Additionally, paragraph .39 of AU section 326 states that reperformance is the auditor’s
independent execution of procedures or controls that were originally performed as part of
the entity’s internal control, either manually or through the use of computer-assisted audit
techniques (CAATs), for example, reperforming the aging of accounts receivable.
The reperformance of the aging of receivables is important as there have been cases when
the aging schedule was manipulated to hide the fact that related parties were not current in
their payments. In an actual case, the vice president of loans at a financial institution manipulated the “slow loan payment” report program so that none of his relatives appeared on the
report. If the report was executed by an independent employee or if CAATs were used by
the auditor to generate the report, then the discrepancy between the report the vice presiThere are other methods of determining doubtful accounts (such as percentage of credit sales) and of
determining bad debts expense (such as direct write-off).
5
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dent of loans produced and the reports prepared either by the independent employee or the
auditor would have been discovered.

Recording More Than Was Actually Shipped
Another scheme is to increase accounts receivable and revenue for goods that were not actually shipped. The customer is invoiced for the additional fictitious goods. If the customer
does not complete a receiving report (as is often done in smaller businesses), then the customer may pay in full a vendor’s invoice for an amount that includes the goods that were
never shipped. If the customer detects that they are being overbilled, then the customer will
contact the vendor’s accounts receivable department and complain.The vendor’s account receivable department will then make a credit to the customer’s accounts receivable and claim
this was a bookkeeping error.
This scheme of recording more than was actually shipped can be detected by using analytical review procedures, such as calculating ratios like day’s sales in accounts receivable and
accounts receivable turnover. These and other analytical tools are addressed in the analytical
procedures section later in this chapter.
Another detective control is the performance of the annual inventory by independent
employees (independent of the warehousing, receiving, and shipping functions). If more inventory exists than what is recorded on the books, then this could be an indication that the
entity is billing for more goods than were actually shipped.
A preventive control is to maintain a policy that directs all customer complaints to a
separate customer service department where credit memos should be initiated and then
precludes the accounts receivable clerk from initiating credit memos or journal entries to
write-off accounts receivable.

Channel Stuffing Schemes
This is a scheme whereby customers are shipped goods that they did not order in order to
inflate accounts receivable. Accounts receivable and revenue at period-end are overstated
by the amount of the goods shipped but not ordered. Hence, receivables and revenue are
both overstated.6 In this scheme customers tend to return a large amount of goods after the
period-end reporting that they did not order the goods.
This scheme is detected using an analytical review procedure of comparing sales returns
this year with prior year(s). Another control is to have the goods returned to a separate customer service department that will accumulate reasons for returns and report the reasons to
management.

6

Other accounts are also affected, including inventory and cost of goods sold.
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Misappropriation of Assets Fraud Schemes
Lapping
Lapping (a form of skimming) occurs when the person who has access to cash receipts (access to assets) also performs bookkeeping duties. Lapping can also be categorized as a fictitious journal entry scheme. Refer to exhibit 5-2 for an illustration of the following example.
Customer A owes the company $500, Customer B owes $400, and Customer C owes
$300. When Customer A sends in a payment of $500, the bookkeeper pockets the $500.
Customer B then sends in $400 and then the bookkeeper credits Customer A’s account $400
(transaction a). When Customer C sends in a payment of $300, then Customer A’s account
is credited for $100, and Customer B’s account is credited $200 (transaction b). The books
indicate that Customer A’s account balance is $0, which is correct, and Customers B’s and
C’s account balances are $200 and $300 respectively—which are incorrect as these balances
should also be $0.
Exhibit 5-2
Lapping Example
Customer A

500

Customer B

400

Customer C

300

(a) 400
100
(b) 100
0

(b) 200
200

300

Generally, when this scenario happens, and the customer receives a monthly statement that
shows no payment or only a partial payment, the customer will be referred to the bookkeeper who will state that there was a posting error, and the problem will be corrected by
the next statement.
This fraud can be prevented with separation of duties and by having a separate customer
service department handle customer inquiries related to billing and payments. A common
means of separating cash receipts and accounts receivable duties in today’s world is by utilizing a bank lock box. This would prevent lapping as cash is never sent to the company and
the bank provides a list of customer cash remittances to the company for posting to the
subsidiary accounts receivable. In the instances when a bank lock box is not used, this fraud
can be prevented in house with a separation of duties. The person opening the mail should
make a listing of the cash received and then give the cash to the cashier for deposit and the
listing of cash receipts along with any remittance advices included with the customer cash
payment to the bookkeeper for posting to the subsidiary ledger. Reconciliation of the bank
statement should be performed by a person independent of the previously mentioned duties.
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Lapping is not a preferred method of embezzlement because in order for this scheme to
work, the bookkeeper will have to continuously make transactions to hide the theft. It is
likely that the lapping scheme will be detected because of both the high number of entries
and customer complaints. A more common means would be to steal the $500 and let the account age while informing the customer of continuing “computer problems” which will be
corrected in the near future.Then write-off the $500 amount with a journal entry. Only one
journal entry is needed to steal the $500 versus potentially hundreds of journal entries that
are needed to employ a lapping scheme.There is a very low likelihood that this fraud scheme
would be detected—especially in an entity with a large number of accounts receivable.
Therefore, as previously mentioned, it is important to maintain a procedure that requires
management approval for all write-offs and that reports of these write-offs and credit memos
be periodically reviewed by management. A list of lapping red flags and a real world example
of lapping are provided in exhibits 5-3 and 5-4.
Exhibit 5-3
Lapping Red Flags*

• Excessive billing errors
• Slowing accounts receivable turnover
• Excessive write-offs of accounts receivable
• Delays in posting customer payments
• Accounts receivable detail does not agree with general ledger
• A trend of decreasing payments on accounts receivable
• Customer complaints
* Joseph T. Wells, “Lapping It Up,” Journal of Accountancy (February 2002), www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2002/
Feb/LappingItUp.

Exhibit 5-4
Lessons Learned from Real World Frauds*

Located in an extinct volcano basin at 9,000 feet in the Rocky Mountains is a small town I’ll call
“Gold Mine City.” The places and people described here are real, but their names have been
changed to protect the innocent, and the guilty! Since the 1860s, a bank operated in this town to
serve the needs of gold miners, businesses, and individuals. Quite large in its early years, the size of
the bank had dwindled nearly to extinction in the middle to late 1900s.
The bank was operated for its shareholders by three employees; a vice-president, a cashier, and a
person that served as a teller and a secretary. A small board of directors located in a nearby town
had oversight responsibility. In addition to semi-annual visits by auditors from the Controller of the
Currency and the FDIC, a CPA firm was hired to perform annual agreed-upon procedures on behalf
of the directors. I was the auditor that performed two such “directors’ examinations.”
Shortly after the last directors’ exam, the town was stunned when the vice-president and cashier
were found dead on a hillside overlooking the city. Their suicide note confessed nearly ten years of
using bank assets to help needy ranchers, widows, and poor people in the community! Aside from
some operating cash, almost no bank assets remained!
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Years of audits had been conducted by regulatory auditors along with directors’ exams performed
by myself and other CPA firm employees. Notes were confirmed, loan files examined, cash accounts
confirmed and reconciled, customer deposits were confirmed and supporting ledgers were reconciled by my team revealing only minor discrepancies.
So how did they these men perpetrate this fraud? First of all, many records were fabricated. Perfect
loans files were constructed for each fictitious loan. Many loan disbursements and collections were
fictitious, the product of a lapping scheme. However, collection systems were established to receive, sign and return all confirmation requests, most in very short turn-around times. Two complete
sets of general ledger and supporting records were maintained; auditors saw only the fabricated
set. These uneducated mountain folk were very smart!
You are probably asking, how did all the auditors fail to detect this massive fraud? I don’t know
about the regulatory people but I can answer for myself. I fell prey to the “familiarity threat” recently
discussed in the AICPA’s Conceptual Framework on Independence. Essentially, this threat occurs
when an auditor becomes overly familiar with a client’s management or staff personnel. It can
happen when a CPA serves a client for a prolonged period of time. As in my case, I liked the bank
employees and had developed a personal relationship with them. Because I liked and trusted these
men, my professional skepticism was severely diminished. I should have asked some obvious questions:
1. How can any small bank have perfect loan files?
2. How can almost all notes and deposits confirmations be returned without exception?
3. How can such a small bank have very few loan collection deficiencies?
4. How can there be almost no discrepancies from all the procedures performed by auditors?
SAS No. 99 (AU 316) and Practice Alert 98-3 reinforced many lessons learned the hard way by some
of us. Auditors must look beyond what we see. We must evaluate what we see with objectivity and
high levels of professional skepticism. A challenging, questioning attitude can be our greatest defense. Some call it the auditor’s sixth sense. Let down one’s guard and there may be no sense at all.
* Cpapastr, “Lessons Learned from Real World Frauds,” Accounting WEB U.S. Blogs, July 9, 2010, www.accountingweb.
com/blogs/cpapastr/today039s-world-audits/lessons-learned-real-world-frauds.

Early Discount Skimming
Many companies provide their customers with a substantial discount if an invoice payment
is made in a timely manner. The terms 2/10 net 30 means that the customer will get a 2
percent discount if the balance is paid within 10 days. If payment is not made within 10 days,
then the balance is due in 30 days. There is a substantial savings to pay within the discount
period as the effective interest rate if the balance is not paid within 10 days is 36 percent
(360/20 × 0.02).
This scheme is accomplished when a person with access to cash receipts states that the
customer did pay within the discount period and then pockets the 2 percent early payment
bonus. The payment is then taken to the bank and the deposit ticket is filled out with “cash
back” in the amount of the 2 percent discount. The cash back is kept by the perpetrator.
This scheme can be prevented much in the same manner as the lapping scheme discussed
previously by segregation of duties.
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Other Accounts Receivable Fraud Schemes
Embezzling Write-Offs
A company, after unsuccessful attempts to collect cash from delinquent accounts, will oftentimes refer the account to a collection agency. A collection agency might collect all or some
of the delinquent account’s balance but not notify the company that the amount was collected. A way to detect this scheme is to review the collection agency’s percentage realization
rate with historical experience and with other collection agencies.

Unapplied Cash Scheme
The timing of when invoices are sent and then posted to accounts receivable is important.
For example, in an actual case, a major state university sent invoices for summer school
tuition on June 1st with a due date of June 30th.7 Some students would pay the invoice
promptly and not wait until the end of the month. The university did not establish accounts
for new students until the end of the month. Specifically, those new students who paid their
tuition before June 30th did not have a subsidiary accounts receivable established.Their payments were credited to the last student’s account (alphabetically). This student had a credit
balance of over $80,000. (That student was hopeful that the university would follow generally accepted accounting principles and reclassify this credit balance in accounts receivable as
a payable and then pay her the $80,000!)
Was this an error? Was this a lapping scheme? These questions cannot be answered as the
problem was never investigated.
How is this error or fraud detected? Management should review credit balances in accounts receivable and make an assessment about whether these are true credit balances that
should be reclassified as a payable or determine if the credit balance is a result of unapplied
cash or other reasons. Another detective control is to send customers monthly statements.
If customers are sent monthly statements, then the customers would complain of the discrepancy between what the customers owe and the higher amount that the company has
recorded in its accounts receivable.

Credit Limit and Interest Rate Schemes
Another accounts or loan receivable scheme is for the credit department to increase a friend’s
credit limit or lower the friend’s interest rate within the computer system and then charge
the friend a “fee” for providing this service. A preventive control is to provide appropriate
access rights over these fields. A detective control is for management to review reports of
these changes.
Alternatively, there are software utility programs that can be used to make changes to data
without using the appropriate application program to make the changes. Changes to critical
fields, such as credit limit and interest rate, can be made by IT or other personnel. AppropriThe author was one of the new students. He could not obtain his fellowship funds for the fall semester
until he paid his summer school tuition—which had already been paid.
7
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ate access rights to these utility programs should also be established, and reports of the use of
these utility programs should be provided to management. In addition, unsuccessful efforts
to access this software should also be reported to management.

Internal Controls
Sales Cut-off Tests—Detective Control
A sales cut-off test is performed to provide assurance that the completeness assertion has
been achieved. That is, all transactions that should have been recorded have been recorded
and in the proper period. All shipping documents should be sequentially numbered and a
list of the shipping documents several days before and after period-end is created. The goods
are shipped with the terms of either free on board (FOB) destination or FOB origination.8
Title transfers to the customer, and the customer bears liability for the goods when goods are
shipped FOB origination. FOB destination means the seller maintains title and responsibility
for the goods until the goods are delivered to the customer.
It is important to review the shipping terms in order to know whether or not sales and accounts receivable are being properly recorded. A receivable should be recorded when goods
are delivered if the shipping terms are FOB destination. A receivable should be recorded
when the goods are obtained by the common carrier at the selling company’s dock if the
shipping terms are FOB origination.
These shipping terms should be reviewed to assess, for example, if goods shipped FOB
destination two days before period-end should be recorded as a sale in the current period
or not. The entity should account for the numerical sequence of shipping documents and

Per www.shipnorthamerica.com/htmfiles/gloss_shipterms_foborig.htm, FOB destination is defined as
follows:
8

Title of the goods passes at destination, and seller has total responsibility until shipment is delivered. Ownership (title and control) remains with seller until goods are delivered. It is expected that the supplier will make
all of the transportation arrangements. This policy recognizes that the supplier may be in a position to handle
transportation more economically than the customer or that the customer does not possess the desire or expertise to make such arrangements. The Seller files claims (if any).
• If the terms agreed on are FOB Origin or Destination Freight Prepaid—The seller pays and bears the
freight charges
• If the terms agreed on are FOB Origin or Destination Freight Prepaid and Charged Back—The seller
pays the freight charges but charges them back to the buyer in the invoice.
• If the terms agreed on are FOB Origin or Destination Freight Collect—The buyer pays and bears the
freight charges.
• If the terms agreed on are FOB Origin or Destination Freight Collect and Allowed—The buyer pays
the freight charges, but the seller bears the charges in the invoice.

Additionally, the website provides the following definition for FOB origination:
Title passes at origin, and buyer has total responsibility over the goods while in shipment. Customer takes
ownership (title and control) of the goods at the origin (when the carrier signs for goods) and is responsible
for transportation of the goods beyond this point. The customer files claims (if any).

103

CommonFraud-2012.indb 103

3/19/2012 11:34:53 AM

Common Fraud: A Guide to Thwarting the Top Ten Schemes

review shipping terms to assess if the goods were scheduled to be delivered in the current
period. If not, then a sale should not be recorded and a receivable should not be booked.
A similar procedure is performed for goods that are shipped FOB origination. An accounting for the numerical sequence of shipping documents is performed and the shipping
terms are reviewed to provide assurance that for goods shipped after period-end, sales and
accounts receivable have not been recorded.

Confirmations—Detective Control
It is relevant to review the professional standards concerning confirmations as external auditors, with few exceptions, are required to confirm accounts receivable.9 There have been
numerous fraud cases (Equity Funding, among others) when auditors have been fooled into
relying upon forged or fictitious receivables confirmations.
For the purpose of this section, accounts receivable means
a.

the entity’s claims against customers that have arisen from the sale of goods or services
in the normal course of business, and
a financial institution’s loans.

b.

Confirmation of accounts receivable is a generally accepted auditing procedure. It is generally presumed that evidence obtained from third parties will provide the auditor with
higher-quality audit evidence than is typically available from within the entity. Thus, a presumption exists that the auditor will request the confirmation of accounts receivable during
an audit unless one of the following is true:
• Accounts receivable are immaterial to the financial statements.
• The use of confirmations would be ineffective.10
As an example of the use of confirmation being ineffective, an entry-level auditor sent out
positive confirmation requests to former hospital patients. Many of the former patients sent
the confirmation requests back with cash. It was evident that the former patients thought
that the auditors were a collection agency and the respondents did not understand the purpose of the confirmation.
The standard further states that an auditor who has not requested confirmations in the examination of accounts receivable should document how he or she overcame this presumption.

The McKesson & Robbins case caused the AICPA to form a professional committee to issue auditing
procedures. The first standard issued by the committee addressed the requirement and addressed issues concerning confirmations as a generally accepted auditing procedure.
10
For example, if, based on prior years’ audit experience or on experience with similar engagements, the
auditor concludes that response rates to properly designed confirmation requests will be inadequate, or if
responses are known or expected to be unreliable, the auditor may determine that the use of confirmations
would be ineffective.
9
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AU Section 33011
Confirmation is undertaken to obtain evidence from third parties about financial statement
assertions made by management. AU section 326 states that, in general, it is presumed that
audit evidence is more reliable when it is obtained from knowledgeable independent sources
outside the entity.
The greater the combined assessed level of inherent and control risk, the greater the assurance that the auditor needs from substantive tests related to a financial statement assertion.
Consequently, as the combined assessed level of inherent and control risk increases, the auditor designs substantive tests to obtain more or different evidence about a financial statement
assertion. In these situations, the auditor might use confirmation procedures rather than or in
conjunction with other tests directed toward documents or parties within the entity.
The auditor should assess whether the evidence provided by confirmations reduces audit
risk for the related assertions to an acceptably low level. In making that assessment, the auditor should consider the materiality of the account balance and his or her inherent and control risk assessments. When the auditor concludes that evidence provided by confirmations
alone is not sufficient, additional procedures should be performed. For example, to achieve
an appropriately low level of audit risk related to the completeness and existence assertions
for accounts receivable, an auditor may perform sales cut-off tests in addition to confirming
accounts receivable.
The lower the combined assessed level of inherent and control risk, the less assurance the
auditor needs from substantive tests to form a conclusion about a financial statement assertion. Consequently, as the combined assessed level of inherent and control risk decreases for
a particular assertion, the auditor may modify substantive tests by changing their nature from
more effective (but costly) tests to less effective (and less costly) tests. For example, the auditor
might send negative instead of positive confirmations.

Assertions Addressed by Confirmations
For the audit evidence obtained to be appropriate, it must be reliable and relevant. Factors
affecting the reliability of confirmations are as follows. The relevance of audit evidence depends on its relationship to the financial statement assertion being addressed. AU section 326
classifies financial statement assertions into five categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Existence or occurrence
Completeness
Rights and obligations
Valuation or allocation
Presentation and disclosure

Confirmation requests, if properly designed by the auditor, may address any one or more of
those assertions. However, confirmations do not address all assertions equally well. Accounts
AU section 330, The Confirmation Process (AICPA, Professional Standards), has been adapted to stress receivables confirmations. Author’s comments are also included in this section.
11
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receivable confirmations are likely to be more effective for the existence assertion than for
the completeness and valuation assertions. Thus, when obtaining evidence for assertions not
adequately addressed by confirmations, auditors should consider other audit procedures to
complement confirmation procedures or to be used instead of confirmation procedures.
Confirmation requests can be designed to elicit evidence that addresses the completeness
assertion; that is, if properly designed, confirmations may provide evidence to aid in assessing
whether all transactions and accounts that should be included in the financial statements are
included. Their effectiveness in addressing the completeness assertion depends, in part, on
whether the auditor selects from an appropriate population for testing.

The Confirmation Process
The auditor should exercise an appropriate level of professional skepticism throughout the
confirmation process (see AU section 230, Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work
[AICPA, Professional Standards]). Professional skepticism is important in designing the confirmation request, performing the confirmation procedures, and evaluating the results of the
confirmation procedures.

Designing the Confirmation Request
Confirmation requests should be tailored to the specific audit objectives.Thus, when designing the confirmation requests, the auditor should consider the assertion(s) being addressed
and the factors that are likely to affect the reliability of the confirmations. Factors such as
the form of the confirmation request, prior experience on the audit or similar engagements,
the nature of the information being confirmed, and the intended respondent should affect
the design of the requests because these factors have a direct effect on the reliability of the
evidence obtained through confirmation procedures.

Form of Confirmation Request
There are two types of confirmation requests: the positive form and the negative form.
Some positive forms request the respondent to indicate whether he or she agrees with the
information stated on the request. Other positive forms, referred to as blank forms, do not
state the amount (or other information) on the confirmation request, but request the recipient to fill in the balance or furnish other information. Positive forms provide audit evidence
only when responses are received from the recipients; nonresponses do not provide audit
evidence about the financial statement assertions being addressed and alternative procedures
are required.
Because there is a risk that recipients of a positive form of confirmation request with the
information to be confirmed contained on it may sign and return the confirmation without
verifying that the information is correct, blank forms may be used as one way to mitigate this
risk. Thus, the use of blank confirmation requests may provide a greater degree of assurance
about the information confirmed. However, blank forms might result in lower response rates
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because additional effort may be required of the recipients; consequently, the auditor may
have to perform more alternative procedures.
Because payments could be in transit between the company’s customers and the company,
it might be helpful to list the invoices that comprise the balance that is being confirmed.
That way a customer can indicate that a particular invoice was paid even if it was still outstanding on the company’s books when the confirmation was prepared. The auditor would
perform follow-up procedures, such as reviewing the remittance, to obtain assurance that a
particular invoice was indeed paid.
Negative confirmations request that the recipient to respond only if he or she disagrees
with the information stated on the request. Negative confirmation requests may be used to
reduce audit risk to an acceptable level when (a) the combined assessed level of inherent and
control risk is low, (b) a large number of small balances are involved, and (c) the auditor has no
reason to believe that the recipients of the requests are unlikely to give them consideration.
For example, in the examination of demand deposit accounts in a financial institution, it may
be appropriate for an auditor to include negative confirmation requests with the customers’
regular statements when the combined assessed level of inherent and control risk is low and
the auditor has no reason to believe that the recipients will not consider the requests. The
auditor should consider performing other substantive procedures to supplement the use of
negative confirmations.
Negative confirmation requests may generate responses indicating misstatements, and are
more likely to do so if the auditor sends a large number of negative confirmation requests
and such misstatements are widespread. The auditor should investigate relevant information
provided on negative confirmations that have been returned to the auditor to determine
the effect such information may have on the audit. If the auditor’s investigation of responses
to negative confirmation requests indicates a pattern of misstatements, the auditor should
reconsider his or her combined assessed level of inherent and control risk and consider the
effect on planned audit procedures.
Although returned negative confirmations may provide evidence about the financial statement assertions, unreturned negative confirmation requests rarely provide significant evidence concerning financial statement assertions other than certain aspects of the existence
assertion. For example, negative confirmations may provide some evidence of the existence
of third parties if they are not returned with an indication that the addressees are unknown.
However, unreturned negative confirmations do not provide explicit evidence that the intended third parties received the confirmation requests and verified that the information
contained on them is correct.
Oftentimes auditors send a combination of types of confirmations. Many accounting
populations are skewed—with a large number of accounts with small balances and a small
number of accounts with large balances. The auditor might consider sending negative confirmations to a sample of accounts with small balances and sending positive confirmations to
the entire population of accounts that have large balances.
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Prior Experience
In determining the effectiveness and efficiency of employing confirmation procedures, the
auditor may consider information from prior years’ audits or audits of similar entities. This
information includes response rates, knowledge of misstatements identified during prior
years’ audits, and any knowledge of inaccurate information on returned confirmations.

Nature of Information Being Confirmed
When designing confirmation requests, the auditor should consider the types of information
respondents will be readily able to confirm, since the nature of the information being confirmed may directly affect the competence of the evidence obtained as well as the response rate.
For example, certain respondents’ accounting systems may facilitate the confirmation of single
transactions rather than of entire account balances. In addition, respondents may not be able to
confirm the balances of their installment loans, but they may be able to confirm whether their
payments are up-to-date, the amount of the payment, and the key terms of their loans.
The auditor’s understanding of the client’s arrangements and transactions with third parties is key to determining the information to be confirmed. The auditor should obtain an
understanding of the substance of such arrangements and transactions to determine the appropriate information to include on the confirmation request. The auditor should consider
requesting confirmation of the terms of unusual agreements or transactions, such as bill and
hold sales,12 in addition to the amounts. The auditor also should consider whether there
may be oral modifications to agreements, such as unusual payment terms or liberal rights of
return. When the auditor believes there is a moderate or high degree of risk that there may
be significant oral modifications, he or she should inquire about the existence and details of
any such modifications to written agreements. One method of doing so is to confirm both
the terms of the agreements and whether any oral modifications exist.

Respondent
The auditor should direct the confirmation request to a third party who the auditor believes
is knowledgeable about the information to be confirmed. For example, to confirm a client’s
oral and written guarantees with a financial institution, the auditor should direct the request
to a financial institution official who is responsible for the financial institution’s relationship
with the client or is knowledgeable about the transactions or arrangements.
If information about the respondent’s competence, knowledge, motivation, ability, or willingness to respond, or about the respondent’s objectivity and freedom from bias with respect
to the audited entity comes to the auditor’s attention, the auditor should consider the effects
of such information on designing the confirmation request and evaluating the results, including determining whether other procedures are necessary. In addition, there may be circumstances (such as for significant, unusual year-end transactions that have a material effect
on the financial statements or when the respondent is the custodian of a material amount
Bill and hold sales are sales of merchandise that are billed to customers before delivery and are held by the
entity for the customers.
12
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of the audited entity’s assets) in which the auditor should exercise a heightened degree of
professional skepticism relative to these factors about the respondent. In these situations, the
auditor should consider whether there is sufficient basis for concluding that the confirmation request is being sent to a respondent from whom the auditor can expect the response
will provide meaningful and appropriate audit evidence.

Performing Confirmation Procedures
During the performance of confirmation procedures, the auditor should maintain control
over the confirmation requests and responses. Maintaining control13 means establishing direct communication between the intended recipient and the auditor to minimize the possibility that the results will be biased because of interception and alteration of the confirmation requests or responses.
There may be situations in which the respondent, because of timeliness or other considerations, responds to a confirmation request other than in a written communication mailed
to the auditor. When such responses are received, additional evidence may be required to
support their validity. For example, facsimile responses involve risks because of the difficulty
of ascertaining the sources of the responses. To restrict the risks associated with facsimile responses and treat the confirmations as valid audit evidence, the auditor should consider taking certain precautions, such as verifying the source and contents of a facsimile response in
a telephone call to the purported sender. In addition, the auditor should consider requesting
the purported sender to mail the original confirmation directly to the auditor. Oral confirmations should be documented in the workpapers. If the information in the oral confirmations
is significant, the auditor should request the parties involved to submit written confirmation
of the specific information directly to the auditor.
When using confirmation requests other than the negative form, the auditor should generally follow up with a second and sometimes a third request to those parties from whom
replies have not been received.

Alternative Procedures
When the auditor has not received replies to positive confirmation requests, he or she should
apply alternative procedures to the nonresponses in order to obtain the evidence necessary
to reduce audit risk to an acceptably low level. However, the omission of alternative procedures may be acceptable (a) when the auditor has not identified unusual qualitative factors or
systematic characteristics related to the nonresponses, such as that all nonresponses pertain to
year-end transactions, and (b) when testing for overstatement of amounts, the nonresponses
in the aggregate, when projected as 100 percent misstatements to the population and added

The need to maintain control does not preclude the use of internal auditors in the confirmation process.
AU section 322, The Auditor’s Consideration of the Internal Audit Function in an Audit of Financial Statements
(AICPA, Professional Standards), provides guidance on considering the work of internal auditors and on using
internal auditors to provide direct assistance to the auditor.
13
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to the sum of all other unadjusted differences, would not affect the auditor’s decision about
whether the financial statements are materially misstated.
Alternative procedures may include examination of subsequent cash receipts (including
matching such receipts with the actual items being paid), shipping documents, or other client
documentation to provide evidence for the existence assertion.

Evaluating the Results of Confirmation
Procedures
After performing any alternative procedures, the auditor should evaluate the combined audit evidence provided by the confirmations and the alternative procedures to determine
whether sufficient audit evidence has been obtained about all the applicable financial statement assertions. In performing that evaluation, the auditor should consider (a) the reliability
of the confirmations and alternative procedures; (b) the nature of any exceptions, including
the implications, both quantitative and qualitative, of those exceptions; (c) the audit evidence
provided by other procedures; and (d) whether additional audit evidence is needed. If the
combined audit evidence provided by the confirmations, alternative procedures, and other
procedures is not sufficient, the auditor should request additional confirmations or extend
other tests, such as tests of details or analytical procedures.

Confirmation of Accounts Receivable—
AU Section 9330
It is relevant to address interpretations of the professional standards concerning the use of
electronic confirmation since many public accounting firms are now obtaining and relying
upon electronic, rather than paper, confirmations.
Use of Electronic Confirmations
Question—AU section 330, The Confirmation Process (AICPA, Professional Standards),
uses phrases such as written communication and mail the original confirmation when
describing the confirmation process. Increasingly, there are situations in which
the auditor transmits, or the respondent responds to, a confirmation request other
than in a written communication mailed directly between the respondent and
the auditor. For example, the auditor may transmit the confirmation request via
e-mail using a scanned electronic copy of a document that has been signed by a
client either physically on the original document or with an electronic signature.
The response to a confirmation request may also be facilitated through a process
whereby a respondent provides the auditor access to a secure website, hosted either
by the respondent or by a third party, where the requested information about a
particular item affecting financial statement assertions has been made available by
the respondent. Therefore, the following questions arise:
• Can the auditor transmit a confirmation request electronically?
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• Can information obtained electronically from third parties, sometimes referred to as an electronic confirmation, be considered to be reliable audit
evidence?
Interpretation—Yes. The transmission or receipt of electronic confirmations or the
use of an electronic confirmation process is not precluded by AU section 330.
The auditor’s consideration of the reliability of the information obtained
through the confirmation process to be used as audit evidence includes consideration of the risks that
• the information obtained may not be from an authentic source;
• a respondent may not be knowledgeable about the information to be confirmed; or
• the integrity of the information may have been compromised.
No confirmation process with a third party is without some risk of interception
or alteration, including the risk that the confirmation respondent will not be the
intended respondent. Such risk exists regardless of whether a response is obtained
in paper form, by electronic correspondence, or through some other medium. Factors that may indicate increased risk relating to the reliability of a response include
that it
• was received by the auditor indirectly; or
• appeared not to come from the originally intended confirming party.
Responses received electronically, for example by facsimile or e-mail, involve
risks relating to reliability because proof of origin and knowledge of the respondent may be difficult to establish and alterations may be difficult to detect. An
electronic confirmation process that creates a secure confirmation environment
may mitigate the risks of interception or alteration. The key to creating a secure
confirmation environment lies in the process or mechanism used by the auditor
and the respondent to minimize the possibility that the results will be compromised because of interception or alteration of the confirmation.
Paragraph .04 of AU section 330 discusses the confirmation process, which includes the auditor’s communication of the confirmation request to the appropriate third party. Paragraph .28 states that the auditor should maintain control over
the confirmation requests and responses. Maintaining control includes performing
procedures to verify that the confirmation is being directed to the intended recipient. For example, just as the auditor might perform procedures to verify the physical address of a recipient for a confirmation to be sent through the postal service,
the auditor would perform similar procedures to verify the e-mail address supplied
by the auditor’s client for a confirmation request to be sent to that recipient’s email address. If another electronic process is used, the auditor may perform other
procedures to determine that the request is directed to the intended recipient.
Paragraph .09 of section 326 states that the auditor should consider the reliability
of the information to be used as audit evidence. Confirmations obtained electroni-
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cally can be considered to be reliable audit evidence if the auditor is satisfied that
(a) the electronic confirmation process is secure and properly controlled, (b) the
information obtained is a direct communication in response to a request, and (c)
the information is obtained from a third party who is the intended respondent.
Various means might be used to validate the source of the electronic information
and the respondent’s knowledge about the requested information. For example, the
use of encryption,14 electronic digital signatures,15 and procedures to verify website
authenticity16 may improve the security of the electronic confirmation process.
If a system or process that facilitates electronic confirmation between the auditor
and the confirmation respondent is in place and the auditor plans to rely on such a
system or process, an assurance trust services report (for example, SysTrust), or another auditor’s report on that process, may assist the auditor in assessing the design
and operating effectiveness of the electronic and manual controls with respect to
that process. Such a report would usually address the risks relating to the reliability
of a response. If these risks are not adequately addressed in the report, the auditor
may perform additional procedures to address those risks.
In some cases, the auditor may determine that it is appropriate to address the
risks related to the reliability of the information received electronically by directly
contacting the purported sender (for example, by telephone) rather than by using alternative means to validate the source of the electronic information. For
example, if significant information is provided via an e-mail response, the auditor
may perform alternative procedures, including procedures to verify the authenticity of information such as the e-mail address of the purported sender. The auditor
may also contact the purported sender directly by telephone to verify that the
information received by the auditor was sent by the confirming party and also that
what was received by the auditor corresponds to the information transmitted by
the purported sender. The auditor’s determination of procedures appropriate in
the circumstances depends on the auditor’s assessment of the risks concerning the
reliability of a response.

Encryption is the process of encoding electronic data in such a way that it cannot be read without the
second party employing a matching encryption key. Use of encryption reduces the risk of unintended intervention in a communication.
15
Digital signatures may use the encryption of codes, text, or other means to ensure that only the claimed
signer of the document could have affixed the symbol. The signature and its characteristics are uniquely
linked to the signer. Digital signature routines allow for the creation of the signature and the checking of
the signature at a later date for authenticity.
16
Website authenticity routines may use various means, including mathematical algorithms to monitor data
or a website, to ensure that its content has not been altered without authorization. WebTrust or VeriSign
certifications may be earned and affixed to a website, indicating an active program of protecting the underlying content of the information.
14
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Accounts Receivable Ratios to Detect Fraud
Accounts Receivable Turnover and Number of
Days in Receivables
Ratio analysis can be used to tell how well you are managing your accounts receivable. Ratio
analysis can also assist in detecting accounts receivable fraud. The two most common ratios
for accounts receivable are accounts receivable turnover and number of days in receivables.
Examples:

Accounts Receivable Turnover =

Credit Sales
Average Receivable Balance

Annual credit sales were $400,000, beginning balance for accounts receivable was $80,000,
and the year-end balance was $120,000.The turnover rate is 4, calculated as follows: Average
receivable balance is $100,000 ($ 80,000 + $120,000)/2. The turnover ratio is $400,000/
$100,000. This indicates that receivables were converted into cash 4 times during the year.

Number of Days in Receivables =

365 Days in the Year
Turnover Ratio

Using the data from the previous example indicates that it takes 91 days on average to collect the accounts receivable (365/4).
A decrease in the accounts receivable turnover ratio and an increase in the number of
days in receivable might be indicative of the client fabricating both credit sales and accounts
receivable. These ratios should be compared in a trend analysis and with industry averages.

Sales Variables Index Ratio
An article in the Journal of Accountancy summarizes the work of Messod D. Beneish, Ph.D.,
Indiana University accounting professor, regarding ratios that can be used to detect financial
statement fraud due to revenue and other types of financial statement fraud.17 Exhibit 5-5
documents the results of applying Beneish’s Day’s Sales in Receivables Index to the fraud at
ZZZZ Best.

Joseph T.Wells, “Irrational Ratios,” Journal of Accountancy (August 2001), www.journalofaccountancy.com/
Issues/2001/Aug/IrrationalRatios.htm.
17
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Exhibit 5-5
Sales Variables Index
(Days Sales in Receivables Index)

Applied to ZZZZ Best
The sales variable index (or ratio) measures whether receivables and revenues are in or out of
balance in two consecutive reporting periods.* A material increase in the index could indicate company’s receivables are phony. That was exactly the situation with ZZZZ Best. By creating counterfeit
documents, ZZZZ Best’s employees manufactured receivables and sales out of thin air.
Professor Messod D. Beneish determined that companies that had not manipulated sales (nonmanipulators) had a mean index of 1.031; companies that had manipulated sales (manipulators) had
a mean index of 1.465, a 42 percent increase. In the case of ZZZZ Best, the index was a whopping
177,622. The reason for this huge difference is that in year one, ZZZZ Best had no accounts receivable but in year two it had nearly $700,000—all fictitious. The calculation for the ZZZZ Best case is:
The formula for the days’ sales in receivables index is

Accounts Receivablet
Salest
Accounts Receivablet–1

= Days’ Sales in Recivables Index

Salest–1
(Note. Current-year income statement and balance-sheet items are indicated with a subscript t and
prior year items have a t–1 subscript. The change in account balances from one yearend to the next is
denoted by ∆, delta. Delta is used to calculate total accruals.)
Using numbers from the ZZZZ Best financials, the index is calculated as follows:

693,773
4,845,347
1

= 177,622

1,240,524
* Messod D. Beneish, The Detection of Earnings Manipulation, www.bauer.uh.edu/swhisenant/beneish%20earnings%20
mgmt%20score.pdf. Note that Beneish’s paper on these ratios uses the term Days’ Sales in Receivables Index—not Sales
Variables Index (the term given the formula in the text of the Journal of Accountancy article).

Other Trends
An article in the CPA Journal notes the following trends that might be indicative of receivables fraud:18

Joseph T.Wells, “Skimming:The Achilles’ Heel of the Audit?” CPA Journal (June 2007), www.nysscpa.org/
cpajournal/2007/607/essentials/p60.htm.
18

114

CommonFraud-2012.indb 114

3/19/2012 11:34:53 AM

Chapter 5: Accounts Receivable Fraud Schemes

• Flat or declining revenues—If other businesses in the same industry are experiencing
growth, however slight, then flat or declining revenues can be an indication of skimming.
• Increasing cost of sales—If reduced sales are not accompanied by reduced costs, then
the ratio of cost of sales to total revenues will rise.
• Decreasing ratio of cash sales to credit card sales—Should an employee be pocketing cash,
the ratio of cash sales to credit sales will decrease.
• Decreasing ratio of cash sales to total sales—Similarly, a decrease in the ratio of cash sales
to total sales might indicate revenue skimming.
• Discrepancies between customer receipts and the company records—This could indicate that
an employee is skimming part of the funds from sales or accounts receivable.
• Ratio of gross sales to net sales is increasing—If a dishonest worker is stealing refunds
owed to the company, this can be indicated by an increase in the ratio of gross sales
to net sales.

Inquiry to Find Accounts Receivable Fraud
AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards), requires the auditor to perform inquiry of management and others within the entity
concerning fraud. An article in the Journal of Accountancy provides examples of questions that
could be asked to determine if the entity had created fictitious receivables and credit sales.19
Detecting fictitious sales and receivables involves comparing financial statements over a period of time. In the questions that follow, the more “yes” answers, the more likely fraud is a
factor.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Is the company negotiating financing based on receivables?
Have receivables grown significantly?
Have receivables increased faster than sales?
Is the ratio of credit sales to cash sales growing?
Compared with sales and receivables, has cash decreased?
Compared with sales, has the cost of sales fallen?
Have shipping costs dropped, compared with sales?
Has accounts receivable turnover slowed?
Are there unusually large sales toward the end of the period?
Have there been substantial sales reversed in the first period following the increase?

Joseph T. Wells, “Follow Fraud to the Likely Perp,” Journal of Accountancy (March 2001), www.journalof
accountancy.com/Issues/2001/Mar/FollowFraudToTheLikelyPerp.htm.
19
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What Is Your Fraud IQ?
The Journal of Accountancy has a recurring column, “What’s Your Fraud IQ?” Questions
concerning receivables fraud from that column are in exhibit 5-6. The answers are in exhibit 5-7.20,21

Andi McNeal, “What’s Your Fraud IQ,” Journal of Accountancy (January 2010), www.journalofaccountancy.
com/Issues/2010/Jan/20092091.htm.
21
Joseph T. Wells, “What’s Your Fraud IQ,” Journal of Accountancy (May 2007), www.journalofaccountancy.
com/Issues/2007/May/WhatIsYourFraudIq.
20
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Exhibit 5-6
What’s Your Fraud IQ?

Questions
1. During the annual audit of Carp Pharmaceuticals Inc.’s financial statements, Cory Bishop, the
company’s auditor, came across some fishy findings. The company’s accounts receivable were
higher than expected, and, upon further investigation, Bishop discovered that the company
recorded several unusually large sales at the end of the fiscal year, all with extended payment
terms and generous return policies. Since the company has been experiencing some serious
financial challenges, Bishop is suspicious of these transactions. Based on these findings, which
of the following types of financial statement fraud schemes might be occurring?
a.

Expense omission

b.

Channel stuffing

c.

Unrecorded warranties

d.

Factoring fraud

2. An unusual growth in the number of days’ sales in accounts receivable can be a red flag for
which of the following financial statement fraud schemes?
a.

Improper asset valuation

b.

Timing differences

c.

Fictitious revenues

d.

All of the above

3. ___________ is the crediting of one account through the abstraction of money from another
account.
a.

Skimming

b.

Lapping

c.

Rigging

d.

Padding

4. A fictitious accounts receivable scheme almost always involves which of the following?
a.

Fictitious inventory

b.

Fictitious sales

c.

Fictitious credit memos

d.

Both b and c
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Exhibit 5-7
What’s Your Fraud IQ?

Answers
1. (b) The practice of encouraging customers to purchase more than they can use, often by offering deep discounts or extending payment terms, to prop up current earnings is known as
channel stuffing. Often, the purchasers return the excess goods later after the company has
recorded the profits from the sale. In some egregious instances of channel stuffing, companies
have shipped products to customers without their knowledge, consent, or desire for the goods,
all for the purpose of increasing reported revenues in the current period. Although many channel stuffing schemes fall into that gray area between aggressive earnings management and
outright fraud, the tactics involved in channel stuffing enhance current earnings at the expense
of future sales, which leads to a slippery slope of needing to artificially boost future earnings as
well.
2. (d) The number of days’ sales in accounts receivable (also called days’ sales outstanding or the
collection ratio) indicates how long it takes the company, on average, to collect on its receivables. This ratio is calculated as: (average accounts receivable during period divided by credit
sales for period) multiplied by the number of days in period. Any manipulation that causes an
increase in the accounts receivable balance or a decrease in the reported credit sales for the
period will artificially inflate this ratio. Thus, an improper asset valuation scheme that involves
an overstatement of accounts receivable will cause an unusual growth in the number of days’
sales in accounts receivable, as will a fictitious revenues scheme in which the fake sales
are left to linger in accounts receivable at the end of the period. Similarly, timing differences
schemes—for example, inappropriately accelerating revenues into an earlier period—may
skew either accounts receivable or sales, depending on how the scheme is affecting the current
period. Consequently, if a CPA encounters an unexpected or unexplainable value for this ratio,
he or she should consider whether other red flags or fraud risks indicate which area may be at
risk for misstatement.
3. (b) Lapping customer payments is one of the most common methods of concealing skimming,
and it may be particularly useful to employees who skim receivables. Lapping is the crediting of
one account through the abstraction of money from another account.
4. (d) The typical entry for fictitious accounts receivable is to debit accounts receivable and credit
sales. Fictitious accounts receivable schemes are prevalent in companies experiencing financial difficulties and for companies in which managers receive a commission based on sales. In
those cases, management tends to create fictitious accounts receivable toward the end of the
year to overstate sales. In the following year, management might reverse the phony sales using
fictitious credit memos.
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Property, Plant, and Equipment
and Estimation Fraud Schemes
Overview
Property, plant, and equipment fraud schemes were selected to be among the top 10 most
common fraud schemes as the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations’ Report on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, 1998-2007 found that the property, plant, and equipment was the third
most misstated asset account.1 Estimates were also selected as one of the top 10 fraud schemes
as they are based upon management’s subjective judgment. Numerous financial statement
frauds have been perpetrated by management using either conservative or aggressive estimates to manipulate net income. Many estimates are pervasive and affect both balance sheet
and income statement accounts. For example, depreciation expense affects the income statement and also the contra-asset account, accumulated depreciation. Additionally, estimates are
specifically referenced in AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
(AICPA, Professional Standards), as a possible fraudulent financial reporting fraud risk.
Red flags (risks) and other general characteristics of fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets (including preventive and detective controls) are addressed in
chapter 2, “Fraud: Red Flags, Rules, and the Expectations Gap.”Therefore, the characteristics
that are applicable to all types of financial reporting and misappropriation of assets frauds are
also applicable to property, plant, and equipment and estimation fraud schemes and will not
be repeated in this chapter.
This chapter will address specific types of property, plant, and equipment and estimation
fraud schemes, red flags, and methods to prevent and detect these schemes. This chapter is
based upon a review of material and practical advice that exists in both professional literature
and standards.
Three of the top 10 most common fraud schemes that are addressed in this chapter and
their use to perpetrate fraud in the property, plant, and equipment accounts include misap-

The entire report is available at www.coso.org/documents/COSOFRAUDSTUDY2010.pdf. Also,
software (intangible asset) that is used in the normal operations of the business is included in this chapter
in the discussion of property, plant, and equipment fraud.
1
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propriation of assets, overstatement of assets, and use of fraudulent journal entries. Examples
are also provided in the separate estimation fraud schemes section of the chapter.

Overstatement of Assets Schemes
Capitalization of Repairs and Maintenance
Expense
One financial statement fraud scheme that can be employed to overstate both property, plant,
and equipment and net income is to capitalize repairs and maintenance expenses.2 Definitions of costs that should be charged to repairs and maintenance and those that should be
capitalized are provided as follows:
• Ordinary repairs—Normal, scheduled repairs to keep plant assets in operating condition are a period expense (charged in the period incurred), because the main benefit
of the repairs and maintenance is in that period. These are the costs incurred to
bring an asset back to an earlier condition or to keep the asset operating at its present condition (as opposed to improving the asset). For example, a routine oil change
to a company vehicle would be considered an ordinary repair.3
• Extraordinary repairs—If the repair is of a material nature—a major overhaul, or the
repair of a major component of a machine—the amount is capitalized (added to the
machine cost) because the benefit is for more than the current period. For example,
if an expenditure is made to improve a truck, such as adding a hydraulic lift to the
truck or if an expenditure is a major repair that extends an asset’s useful life, the
amount is not expensed immediately; rather, the amount is recorded as an asset and
is then depreciated over the truck’s remaining useful life.4
The most common control over whether to capitalize or expense costs is for the entity
to establish a capitalization policy in accordance with an established accounting framework.
For example, the Department of Energy’s capitalization policy is in accordance with the
Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards; a portion of this policy is provided in
exhibit 6-1.5 Another control is for all journal entries above a certain stated amount that are

The capitalized repairs and maintenance expenses will be ultimately written off as depreciation expense.
However, most of the expense is deferred to future years.
3
Investopedia, s.v. “extraordinary repairs,” www.investopedia.com/terms/e/extraordinary-repairs.asp#axzz
1lvVZRwuJ.
4
AccountingCoach, s.v. “repairs and maintenance expense,” www.accountingcoach.com/terms/R/repairsand-maintenance-expense.html.
5
Department of Energy, “Property, Plant, and Equipment,” in DOE Financial Management Handbook
(2011), available at www.cfo.doe.gov/policy/actindex/chap10.pdf. Also, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, International Financial Reporting Standards, and IRS have rules on capitalization of repairs
and maintenance expenses.
2
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made to capitalize repairs and maintenance expenses should be reviewed by another competent and objective employee.
Exhibit 6-1
Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards
Selected Parts of the Department of Energy’s Capitalization Policy*

Capitalization Criteria
(1) Capitalize individual property, plant, and equipment items that are purchased, constructed, or
fabricated in-house, including major modifications or improvements to any of these items, if they
have an anticipated service life of two years or more and if they cost $50,000 or more, regardless
of funding sources. The only exceptions are items that are inherently experimental, used as special tools, or, by nature of their association with a particular scientific experiment, not expected
to have an extended useful service life or an alternative future use. Notwithstanding the accounting threshold for physical accountability/control purposes, personal property records are
required for items of personal property with an acquisition cost of $5,000 or more. Data about
real property, regardless of value, should be retained in the Facility Information Management
System (FIMS) required per Title 41 CFR 101-47.201.2.
(a) Purchased Assets—Generally, costs should be recorded net of purchase discounts taken. Purchase discounts lost and late-payment penalties should not be included as costs
of assets, but should be written off as an operating expense. Capitalized cost includes all
costs to convert or to make the facilities or equipment ready for use, for example, invoice
price, transportation, and installation costs. As a general rule, indirect costs associated
with the purchase of the item are not capitalized.
(b) Constructed Assets—When an entity constructs a depreciable asset for its own use, all
direct costs are included in the total cost of the asset. Constructed capital assets must
receive their allocable share of all indirect costs (CAS 404).
(c) Purchased Asset Improvements—When the expenditures that increase the capacity or
operating efficiency or extend the useful life of an asset are substantial, expenditures
are capitalized. Capitalized cost includes all costs to convert or to make the facilities
or equipment ready for use, for example, invoice price, transportation, and installation
costs. Minor expenditures usually are treated as period costs even though they may
have the characteristics of capital expenditures.
(2) Capitalize automated data processing software (programs, routines, or subroutines) valued
at $50,000 or more and with a useful life of at least two years. This criterion is only applicable
to the operating system, or that software necessary for the computer to operate and process
other applications software. Software for any operation in addition to the basic operation of the
computer should be expensed, even if purchased with the computer.
(3) Capitalize and group in a separate asset-type account related items that individually cost less
than $50,000 but that collectively cost $50,000 or more, such as the initial complement of equipment (for example, office equipment) for a building, if current costs would be distorted in a
given period by charging such items to expense accounts. The initial complement of equipment
of insignificant value relative to total project cost is generally distributed over the cost of the
property record units to which it is related.

121

CommonFraud-2012.indb 121

3/19/2012 11:34:54 AM

Common Fraud: A Guide to Thwarting the Top Ten Schemes

(4) Capitalize property, including assets acquired through installment contracts and lease purchases, as described in this chapter.
* Department of Energy, “Property, Plant and Equipment,” in Department of Energy Accounting Handbook (July 18, 2011),
10-2–10-3, available at www.mbe.doe.gov/policy/actindex/chap10.pdf.

The Waste Management Fraud, addressed in exhibit 6-2, improperly capitalized expenses
to manipulate net income, which was one of many of the fraud schemes committed in this case to perpetrate fraudulent financial reporting.

Depreciation Manipulation and Failure to
Recognize Asset Impairment
There are numerous ways to compute depreciation under generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP). GAAP allows management to estimate salvage value, estimated useful
life, and depreciation method. Depreciation expense can be understated (thereby overstating
net income and the net realizable value of property, plant, and equipment) by management
estimating a longer than realistic estimated useful life, using unrealistic depreciation methods,
or estimating a larger than realistic salvage value. Further, GAAP requires that property, plant,
and equipment be written down for decreases in value (asset impairment).
The notorious Waste Management case involved these depreciation schemes (and several
more schemes). See exhibit 6-2 for a description of the fraud schemes.
Exhibit 6-2
Waste Management Fraud Schemes

The complaint (by the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]) alleges that defendants fraudulently manipulated the company’s financial results to meet predetermined earnings targets. The
company’s revenues were not growing fast enough to meet these targets, so defendants instead
resorted to improperly eliminating and deferring current period expenses to inflate earnings. They
employed a multitude of improper accounting practices to achieve this objective. Among other
things, the complaint charges that defendants*
• avoided depreciation expenses on their garbage trucks by both assigning unsupported and
inflated salvage values and extending their useful lives,
• assigned arbitrary salvage values to other assets that previously had no salvage value (overstatement of assets),
• failed to record expenses for decreases in the value of landfills as they were filled with waste
(asset impairment),
• refused to record expenses necessary to write off the costs of unsuccessful and abandoned
landfill development projects (asset impairment),
• established inflated environmental reserves (liabilities) in connection with acquisitions so that
the excess reserves could be used to avoid recording unrelated operating expenses (understated
expenses),
• improperly capitalized a variety of expenses (overstated assets), and
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• failed to establish sufficient reserves (liabilities) to pay for income taxes and other expenses
(understated liabilities).
Defendants were allegedly aided in their fraud by the company’s long-time auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, which repeatedly issued unqualified audit reports on the company’s materially false and
misleading annual financial statements. At the outset of the fraud, management capped Andersen’s
audit fees and advised the Andersen engagement partner that the firm could earn additional fees
through “special work.” Andersen nevertheless identified the company’s improper accounting
practices and quantified much of the impact of those practices on the company’s financial statements. Andersen annually presented company management with what it called Proposed Adjusting
Journal Entries (PAJEs) to correct errors that understated expenses and overstated earnings in the
company’s financial statements.
Management consistently refused to make the adjustments called for by the PAJEs, according to
the complaint. Instead, defendants secretly entered into an agreement with Andersen fraudulently
to write off the accumulated errors over periods of up to 10 years and to change the underlying
accounting practices, but to do so only in future periods, the complaint charges. The signed, 4-page
agreement, known as the Summary of Action Steps (attached to the Commission’s complaint),
identified improper accounting practices that went to the core of the company’s operations and prescribed 32 “must do” steps for the company to follow to change those practices. The action steps
thus constituted an agreement between the company and its outside auditor to cover up past frauds
by committing additional frauds in the future, the complaint charges.
The defendants’ scheme eventually unraveled. In mid-July 1997, a new CEO ordered a review of the
company’s accounting practices. That review ultimately led to the restatement of the company’s
financial statements for 1992 through the third quarter of 1997. When the company filed its restated
financial statements in February 1998, the company acknowledged that it had misstated its pre-tax
earnings by approximately $1.7 billion. At the time, the restatement was the largest in corporate
history.
Waste Management—the Epilogue†
The company and its auditing firm, Andersen, agreed to pay $229 million to settle another classaction suit about questionable accounting practices. (This was in the summer of 2000.)
Chicago-based Andersen will also pay Waste Management $20 million as part of a malpractice
settlement. Andersen also agreed to pay a $7 million civil fine after the SEC accused it of “knowingly or recklessly” issuing false and misleading audit reports for Waste Management for the years
1993–96 that inflated the company’s earnings by more than $1 billion. The company also said it will
recommend to shareholders that its board be up for election each year.
Implementation of the following controls could have prevented this fraud: A whistleblower hotline. Indeed, regulations for publicly held companies adopted after the Waste Management fraud
scheme would require a whistleblower hotlines for employees to report inappropriate behavior.
Secondly, an independent audit committee, consisting of board members who are not also members
of management, would have increased the likelihood that management would not have offered the
auditing firm “special work.” It should be noted that subsequent legislation would prohibit nearly all
consulting services that a CPA firm could provide for a publicly held client so that the firm would not
be tempted to avoid inappropriate accounting in exchange for a lucrative consulting engagement.
* Securities and Exchange Commission, “Waste Management Founder, Five Other Former Top Officers Sued for Massive
Fraud,” news release, March 26, 2002, www.sec.gov/news/headlines/wastemgmt6.htm.
† “Waste Management settles,” CNNMoney, November 7, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/2001/11/07/news/waste_mgt/index.htm.

123

CommonFraud-2012.indb 123

3/19/2012 11:34:54 AM

Common Fraud: A Guide to Thwarting the Top Ten Schemes

Misappropriation of Assets Schemes
Skimming Using Existing Property, Plant, and
Equipment and Software
An example of skimming using valid sales registers and a computer program (the sales register is a type of property, plant, and equipment—the computer program is an intangible asset
used in the company’s operations) is provided in exhibit 6-3. In this case, the totals from the
sales registers were altered downwards by company management using a computer program,
and the difference between the higher sales per the sales registers and the lower amount
recorded on the books was embezzled by management.
Exhibit 6-3
Stew Leonard

They say Wednesday is a slow day in the grocery business, but you would never know it prowling
the aisles at the original Stew Leonard’s store in Norwalk, Connecticut. Employees in duck suits and
cow costumes mingle in a packed procession of wide-eyed shoppers who make their way along a
single serpentine aisle that winds through more than 100,000 square feet of thrill-packed, aromatic
selling space. It is filled with milk and dairy, which is how it all started back in 1969 (a bottling plant
is on the premises, and you can watch all the foamy action through a plate-glass window), but also
meat and fish, fruits and vegetables, bread and cookies (baked on site), and a salad bar from vegan
heaven.
It did not appear that this business would be the focus of a major skimming operation, but it was.
The scam was perpetrated by Stew Leonard, Sr., Stew Leonard, Jr., and several others.
Although court documents make it clear that Stew Jr. played a role in the $17 million skim, his official record is clean. For that, he is in debt to his dad, who admits his own guilty plea was contingent
on a pledge by the feds to leave Stew Jr. out of it.
By protecting his son, Stew, Sr. was also protecting his business. Someone had to mind the store
while Stew Sr. was away (in prison), and Stew Jr.—with his MBA from UCLA and his special status
within the Leonard clan as Stew Sr.’s chosen successor—was the obvious choice.*, †
One aspect of Stew Leonard’s operation that author Tom Peters had singled out for praise was his
sophisticated use of technology.‡ “His customer orientating, through people, is matchless,” Peters
wrote in 1987’s Thriving on Chaos, “but he was also one of the first grocers, small or large, to do
daily computer analysis of the profitability of every item he sold.” True, but what Peters didn’t know
was that as early as 1981, Leonard was using those same computers—running a custom-designed
program dubbed Equity—to skim a portion of each day’s receipts without creating a paper trail (at
least not one that was visible to Stew Leonard’s accounting firm, Arthur Andersen). The deception
had begun, according to Leonard, with an innocent request from a longtime employee who had
injured himself on the job. He needed more than he was getting from workers’ compensation. “I just
went in the register and gave him the cash,” he claims. Over time, the undocumented withdrawals
grew larger and more frequent. Stew Leonard’s was always remodeling, adding a new wing here, a
petting zoo there, and a garden center. When contractors offered to do the work for 20 percent less
if Leonard paid cash, he paid cash and saved money on both sides of the transaction.
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The Equity software examined which items were the day’s biggest sellers—at one point the cutoff
was 200 units; later it was lowered to 50 to spread the skim more widely throughout the store—
and wiped out, for the record, a percentage of those sales. According to court documents, “The
program left no audit trail or any trace that it had been run. It did not create a second set of data, but
rather wrote over the existing data. On the first day of each accounting week, Frank Guthman (Leonard’s brother-in-law and the vice president for operations), or in his absence Stew, Jr., executed
the Equity program and altered the previous week’s sales and financial data.” Between executions,
the software was sometimes stored in a hollowed-out edition of the 1982–83 New England Business
Directory.
With the Equity software skimming often thousands of dollars a day, the conspirators were constantly on the lookout for large bills, the easier to conceal and transport the loot. One scheme they
perpetrated was to require organizations buying batches of Stew Leonard’s gift certificates—such
as schools and churches, which bought them for 90 cents on the dollar and used them for fundraising—to pay cash. Usually that meant $50 and $100 bills.
Some of the money they took went to pay contractors, presumably. Some was stored in a safe
hidden in the wall by the fireplace in Stew Leonard’s office. Nearly half a million dollars was later
found in Frank Guthman’s basement (This was news to Stew Leonard; he hadn’t known that his own
brother-in-law was skimming the skim.). And a “significant portion,” according to the government,
was carried out of the country by Stew Sr. and others “in suitcases or in boxes and ... sometimes
even disguised as baby gifts” during frequent visits to Leonard’s “expansive and palatial” vacation home in St. Martin, aptly named Carpe Diem.║ On June 20, 1991, Stew Sr. was detained by U.S.
customs officials as he was boarding a flight on his way to St. Martin. A subsequent search turned
up $20,000 on Leonard’s person and $50,000 in his luggage. Two years of messy public revelations
culminated in his conviction.
He was sent to the minimum-security federal prison in Bradford, Pennsylvania, after pleading guilty
in 1993 to conspiracy to impede the IRS. Court papers describe an elaborate scheme to divert more
than $17 million in cash register receipts over a 10-year period, resulting in $6.8 million in unpaid
taxes. For his role as mastermind, Stew Leonard was sentenced to 52 months, plus 3 years of supervised probation, and ordered to pay $15 million in back taxes, penalties, and interest; a $650,000 fine;
and $97,000 to cover the cost of his incarceration. Two brothers-in-law and a longtime employee
received lesser sentences. At the time the IRS called it “the largest such case in the country in
which a computer was used.” #
* Author’s note: Bernie Madoff’s sons stated they were unaware of their father’s Ponzi scheme.
† Connecticut had just gone public with its own investigation into charges that Stew Leonard’s was skimming customers
with faulty weights and measures (The Leonards deny any wrongdoing, and the charges were later dropped.).
‡ Stew Leonard was famously featured in A Passion for Excellence, a bestseller by Tom Peters and Nancy K. Austin, who
in 1984 summed up Stew Leonard’s adoringly as a “celebration of imagination and excellence.”
Carpe means “pluck,” “pick,” “pluck off.”
# Adapted from David Whitford, “Back From The Brink Everybody knew grocer Stew Leonard as America’s king of customer service--crowned by none other than Tom Peters. But Leonard went to jail for tax fraud. Now, for the first time, he
talks about what everybody didn’t know and what he’s learned from his ordeal,” CNNMoney, November 1, 2002, http://
money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2002/11/01/331999/index.htm. The author visited the main Norwalk, Connecticut, store in 2010.

║

What types of controls could be put in place to prevent or detect this widespread management fraud? The company should have an independent audit committee to oversee relations
with the external auditor and provide a monitoring function. The company should have
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established a whistleblower hotline for employees to report suspicious behavior by other
employees, supervisors, and management. The company should have established an antifraud
program, had indoctrination sessions for new employees concerning the entity’s ethics, and
required all employees to sign-off annually that they understood both the company’s policies
and disciplinary action for failure to comply with the company’s policies.
With regard to software changes, the company should have implemented access controls to
software and follow a systems development methodology (including appropriate approvals)
before changes are allowed to be made to software.

Personal Use of the Entity’s Property, Plant, and
Equipment Schemes
Another common fraud scheme is the use of the entity’s property, plant, and equipment
for personal purposes. At a fraud seminar in Maryland, a county official noted that when it
snowed, county owned snow removal trucks would oftentimes be used to clean the driver’s
and the driver’s relatives’ and friends’ driveways in addition to the county roads.This practice
was contrary to county policy which was required to be read and signed-off by all county
employees. (Policies are a preventive control as policies state acceptable and unacceptable
behavior.) The drivers were sometimes “tipped” by their relatives and friends for this snow
plowing accommodation. The county official noted that the county implemented another
preventive control (in addition to having employees sign-off the county’s policy) to stop this
practice. The county administrator informed all drivers that the county had installed GPS
equipment and cameras in all of the county’s trucks.The trucks’ movements could be monitored to provide assurance that only county roads had snow removed.
Another example of using the entity’s equipment for personal purposes is Peter Madoff
(brother of Bernie Madoff) allegedly using company funds to purchase a luxury automobile
for personal purposes. ABC News reported that Peter Madoff wheeled around Palm Beach
in a vintage Aston Martin worth more than $235,000, paid for by Madoff Securities, according to court documents filed by London-based bankruptcy trustees.6

Other Property, Plant, and Equipment Fraud
Schemes
Usually, an understatement of property, plant, and equipment is not perceived as a method
to perpetrate a fraud scheme. Auditing procedures and internal controls have traditionally
been designed to discover or prevent overstatement of assets and understatement of liabilities.
However, two actual cases, described subsequently, provide support for the argument that
auditing procedures and internal controls should also be designed to detect understatement
of assets.
Kate McCarty, “Peter Madoff ’s $235,000 Company Car,” ABC News, April 16, 2009, http://abcnews.
go.com/Blotter/story?id=7351964&page=1.
6
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A large manufacturing company in the Midwest with several national and international
locations had a location that acquired manufacturing equipment near year-end. Unfortunately, the paperwork concerning this acquisition was not prepared and forwarded to the
company’s headquarters before the required deadline for the issuance of its annual financial
statements. The financial statements were materially misstated as a result of the omission of
the manufacturing equipment and the related liability acquired to fund the equipment’s acquisition. Additionally, debt covenant requirements concerning certain financial ratios would
not have been met had the related long-term debt used to acquire the equipment been properly recorded. Management claimed that the omission of this transaction from the financial
statements was an error.
The misstatement could have been prevented had the company implemented proper internal controls. The company’s remote location’s purchasing department should issue sequentially numbered purchase orders for the equipment. A copy of the purchase order (or
electronic record) should be forwarded to the corporate headquarters as soon as it is sent
to the vendor. As part of the period-end financial reporting process, corporate headquarters should account for the numerical sequence of large outstanding purchase orders. The
company’s distributed locations should be contacted regarding any out of sequence purchase
orders or any outstanding purchase orders of an amount that would result in misstatement
greater than the tolerable amount.7
Another fraud scheme that can occur is when employees or managers place their own
equipment at a location and the equipment is not included on the books. For example,
a common fraud scheme at a retail establishment is for the employees or managers to install their own sales register at the store. Some of the sales (particularly cash sales) that are
observed by customers and other employees are seen as normal routine transactions, and
these transactions are recorded on this fraudulent sales register.8 None of the sales from this
employee-owned sales register are reported because the cash from this sales register is taken
by the employee. Any noncash sales (such as payment by check) are exchanged with cash
from other registers. The entity is expecting daily sales reports from its registers, and that is
what it receives—the sales from the “extra” register are not forwarded to bookkeeping at
the end of the day. The daily deposit equals the sales totals from all of the valid sales registers.
Traditional audit procedures require the auditor to vouch for additions to property, plant,
and equipment. The auditor rarely takes an inventory of existing property, plant, and equipment and traces the assets to the books. The extra sales register most likely would not be
discovered using traditional auditing techniques. However, analytical and other procedures
might detect this fraud.
Paragraph .34 of AU section 312, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards), states that tolerable misstatement is the maximum error in a population (for example, the class of
transactions or account balance) that the auditor is willing to accept.
8
For example, a bartender might bring in his or her own register and pocket some or all of the cash sales.
An actual case of management perpetrating this scheme was at Stew Leonard’s grocery store (See Jacques
Steinberg, “Papers Show Greed, Calculation and Betrayal in Stew Leonard Fraud Case,” New York Times,
October 22, 1993, www.nytimes.com/1993/10/22/nyregion/papers-show-greed-calculation-and-betrayal-in-stew-leonard-fraud-case.html).
7
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A comparison of same-day sales between the current and the previous year (before the
additional sales register was installed) most likely would indicate that sales had decreased in
the current period and raise suspicion. The decrease in sales could be due to unrecorded
sales which could be the result of shoplifting or other factors (such as an employee-owned
sales register).
If the company has multiple locations and other relevant factors (size of store, hours of
operation, favorable location, and so on) are similar, then sales at the location with the extra
sales register would be lower than sales at other locations. Finally, the amount of the deposit
that was in cash would be lower at the store with the fake sales register when compared with
other locations or previous periods (before the additional sales register was installed) because
the employee or managers would be skimming the cash and depositing checks that were
substituted for cash at other registers.9
How is this fraud scheme prevented? The company could install webcams at all locations.
If an extra cash register were to be installed, this would be documented and would raise a red
flag if the installation of the fake sales register was viewed by management or company security.
Each location could also be told that 10 webcams are installed at every location. In reality
there would only be 9. The webcams would have prominently displayed number on them:
webcam 1, webcam 2, webcam 3, webcam 4, webcam 5, webcam 7, webcam 8, webcam
9, and webcam 10. There would be no webcam 6. However, employees will constantly be
searching for a webcam that does not exist (webcam 6) and, because of the uncertainty of
the location of this nonexistent webcam, employees might be “encouraged” not to engage
in activities that violate company policy or result in fraud—such as installing their own sales
register.10

Internal Controls for Property, Plant, and
Equipment
One important control over property, plant, and equipment is to maintain a ledger that has a
listing of all of these assets and their location. All assets should be tagged and labeled as property of the entity.11 Documentation of the movement of certain assets (for example, copiers)
from one location to another should include the authorized approver’s name.12 Disposals of

Those who are familiar with retail store security are well aware of this extra sales register fraud and
would be looking for an extra sales register. The store manager who installed the fake cash register typically makes the deposit and would exchange checks received in the fake register with cash from legitimate
sales registers. Employees who record transactions on the fake sales register would accomplish the same
scheme by colluding with other employees who record sales on valid store-owned cash registers.
10
This technique is used at all branches of a business per a seminar participant who wished to remain
anonymous.
11
The company might use identification information contained on the asset when it is purchased, such as
a vehicle identification number, as the asset reference number.
12
For example, the University of Houston has a separate moving department that must be contacted
before furniture can be moved between offices.
9
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property, plant, and equipment should be recorded on a standard form and transmitted to
the bookkeeping department.
Acquisitions of property, plant, and equipment are permitted only within authorization
limits provided by those charged with governance. Large acquisitions, as defined by those
charged with governance, should be approved by those charged with governance. Assets that
require a title should be subject to a second review by appropriate personnel to provide
assurance that the title was obtained and that the asset is titled in the entity’s name. Those
assets that are financed and serve as security for a loan should have this fact indicated on the
property, plant, and equipment ledger for various purposes. This should serve as a reminder
to include the disclosure of this asset as security for a loan in the quarterly or annual financial
statements.
An annual inventory of property, plant, and equipment should be conducted to ascertain
that these assets exist and to comply (if applicable) with local property taxing authorities
who require an annual listing of these assets.
Insurance policies should be reviewed to provide assurance that significant coverage exists
for all assets, particularly those that are required to have insurance coverage, such as those
assets that serve as collateral for loans. Insurance coverage should also be reviewed for all
locations to ascertain if coverage was increased, reduced, or dropped for certain assets. This
might indicate that the asset was disposed or replaced and the bookkeeping department
would need to make an appropriate journal entry.

Analytical Procedures to Detect Property,
Plant, and Equipment and Estimation Fraud
Schemes
Property, Plant, and Equipment as a Percent of
Total Assets
The ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets should be relatively steady over
time. Large variances in either direction indicate something may be amiss. For example, if
there is a large spike in this ratio, it may indicate that a company is capitalizing routine maintenance costs. This pattern was a key part of WorldCom’s accounting fraud.13

Property, plant, and equipment as a percent of total assets =

Property, plant, and equipment
total assets

Sean Hannon, “5 Ratios that Help Detect Accounting Scandals,” June 17, 2009, www.stocktradingtogo.
com/2009/06/17/corporate-accounting-scandals-detecting-enron-worldcom-aig/.
13
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Asset Quality Index14
The asset quality ratio derives from dividing noncurrent assets (minus property, plant, and
equipment) by total assets. It measures the proportion of total assets for which future benefits
may be less certain. For the purpose of evaluating earnings manipulation, an increase in the asset
quality index may indicate a company’s propensity to capitalize costs. In the Beneish study, discussed
in chapter 5, “Accounts Receivable Fraud Schemes,” nonmanipulators had a mean of 1.039,
and manipulators had a mean of 1.254, an increase of 21 percent. ZZZZ Best’s index was
2.043, a 97 percent increase over the mean for nonmanipulators. This index could have
alerted auditors to irregularities. The formula for the asset quality index is:

1–
1–

Current Assetst + Net Fixed Assetst
Total assetst
Current Assetst-1 + Net Fixed Assetst–1

= Asset Quality Index

Total assetst–1

ZZZZ Best’s numbers were:

1–

1,727,973 +
2,401,487
5,045,671

1–

= 2.0435

107,096 + 57,490
178,036

Fixed Asset Turnover Ratio
The fixed-asset turnover ratio measures a company’s ability to generate net sales from fixedasset investments net of depreciation. A higher fixed-asset turnover ratio shows that the company has been more effective in using the investment in fixed assets to generate revenues.15
The fixed-asset turnover ratio is calculated as follows:

Fixed Asset Turnover =

Net Sales
Net Property, Plant, and Equipment

A decrease in this ratio might indicate that an entity is improperly capitalizing repairs and
maintenance expense. (Also, net sales may have decreased.)

Joseph T. Wells, “Irrational Ratios,” Journal of Accountancy (August 2001), www.journalofaccountancy.
com/Issues/2001/Aug/IrrationalRatios.htm.
15
Investopedia, s.v. “fixed-asset turnover ratio,” www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fixed-asset-turnover.asp.
14
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Repairs and Maintenance Expense as a
Percentage of Sales
This is calculated as follows:
Repairs and
Maintenance
Expense
Repairs and Maintenance Expense as a Percentage of Sales =
Sales
An increase in this ratio might indicate that an entity is improperly capitalizing repairs and
maintenance expense. (Also, net sales may have decreased.)16
Exhibit 6-4 provides an example of how comparing depreciation ratios between companies in the same industry might indicate a red flag concerning whether management is
manipulating the entity’s depreciation assumptions.
Exhibit 6-4
Depreciation Assumptions Red Flags*

Usually, it is a good idea to compare the depreciation rate of two companies in the same industry,
since their assets would tend to depreciate at similar rates. Pacific Sunwear and teen-apparel
competitors Abercrombie & Fitch and American Eagle Outfitters are presented for comparison. In
general, a couple of different metrics are recommended to be reviewed: depreciation/sales and
depreciation/gross plant property and equipment (PP&E). For the first metric, depreciation as a percentage of sales (which measures the margin impact of depreciation) Pacific Sunwear, Abercrombie & Fitch, and American Eagle had ratios of 4.5 percent, 4.3 percent, and 3.2 percent, respectively.
For the second ratio, depreciation as a percentage of gross PP&E (which measures how rapidly
the company is depreciating its assets) the ratios were 10.5 percent, 9.7 percent, and 11.1 percent
respectively. Since there is not much variation, it appears that the depreciation expense of each
company is reasonable.
* Adapted from Emil Lee, “Quick Accounting Basics: Depreciation, Part,” Motley Fool, January 4, 2007, www.fool.com/
investing/general/2007/01/04/accounting-basics-depreciation-part-2.aspx.

Accounting Estimations—Auditor’s
Guidance
AU Section 342
AU section 342, Auditing Accounting Estimates (AICPA, Professional Standards), provides guidance to auditors on obtaining and evaluating sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support significant accounting estimates in an audit of financial statements in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards. For purposes of this section, an accounting estimate is an
16

Ibid.
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approximation of a financial statement element, item, or account. Accounting estimates are
often included in historical financial statements because
a.
b.

the measurement of some amounts or the valuation of some accounts is uncertain,
pending the outcome of future events.
relevant data concerning events that have already occurred cannot be accumulated on a
timely, cost-effective basis.

Accounting estimates in historical financial statements measure the effects of past business
transactions or events, or the present status of an asset or liability. Examples of accounting
estimates include net realizable values of inventory and accounts receivable, property and
casualty insurance loss reserves, revenues from contracts accounted for by the percentage-ofcompletion method, and pension and warranty expenses.
Management is responsible for making the accounting estimates included in the financial
statements. Estimates are based on subjective as well as objective factors and, as a result, judgment is required to estimate an amount at the date of the financial statements. Management’s
judgment is normally based on its knowledge and experience about past and current events
and its assumptions about conditions it expects to exist and courses of action it expects to
take.
The auditor is responsible for evaluating the reasonableness of accounting estimates made
by management in the context of the financial statements taken as a whole. As estimates are
based on subjective as well as objective factors, it may be difficult for management to establish controls over them. Even when management’s estimation process involves competent
personnel using relevant and reliable data, there is potential for bias in the subjective factors.
Accordingly, when planning and performing procedures to evaluate accounting estimates,
the auditor should consider, with an attitude of professional skepticism, both the subjective
and objective factors.

Developing Accounting Estimates
Management is responsible for establishing a process for preparing accounting estimates.
Although the process may not be documented or formally applied, it normally consists of
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

identifying situations for which accounting estimates are required.
identifying the relevant factors that may affect the accounting estimate.
accumulating relevant, sufficient, and reliable data on which to base the estimate.
developing assumptions that represent management’s judgment of the most likely circumstances and events with respect to the relevant factors.
determining the estimated amount based on the assumptions and other relevant factors.
determining that the accounting estimate is presented in conformity with applicable
accounting principles and that disclosure is adequate.

The risk of material misstatement of accounting estimates normally varies with the complexity and subjectivity associated with the process, the availability and reliability of relevant
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data, the number and significance of assumptions that are made, and the degree of uncertainty associated with the assumptions.

Internal Control Related to Accounting Estimates
An entity’s internal control may reduce the likelihood of material misstatements of accounting estimates. Specific relevant aspects of internal control include the following:
a.
b.

Management communication of the need for proper accounting estimates
Accumulation of relevant, sufficient, and reliable data on which to base an accounting
estimate
c. Preparation of the accounting estimate by qualified personnel
d. Adequate review and approval of the accounting estimates by appropriate levels of authority, including the following:
i. Review of sources of relevant factors
ii. Review of development of assumptions
iii. Review of reasonableness of assumptions and resulting estimates
iv. Consideration of the need to use the work of specialists
v. Consideration of changes in previously established methods to arrive at accounting estimates
e. Comparison of prior accounting estimates with subsequent results to assess the reliability of the process used to develop estimates
f. Consideration by management of whether the resulting accounting estimate is consistent with the operational plans of the entity

Evaluating Accounting Estimates
The auditor’s objective when evaluating accounting estimates is to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to provide reasonable assurance that
a.
b.
c.

all accounting estimates that could be material to the financial statements have been
developed.
those accounting estimates are reasonable in the circumstances.
the accounting estimates are presented in conformity with applicable accounting principles and are properly disclosed.

Identifying Circumstances That Require
Accounting Estimates
In evaluating whether management has identified all accounting estimates that could be material to the financial statements, the auditor considers the circumstances of the industry or
industries in which the entity operates, its methods of conducting business, new accounting
pronouncements, and other external factors. The auditor should consider performing the
following procedures:
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a.
b.

c.

Consider assertions embodied in the financial statements to determine the need for
estimates.
Evaluate information obtained in performing other procedures, such as
i. information about changes made or planned in the entity’s business, including
changes in operating strategy, and the industry in which the entity operates that
may indicate the need to make an accounting estimate.
ii. changes in the methods of accumulating information.
iii. information concerning identified litigation, claims, and assessments (AU section 337, Inquiry of a Client’s Lawyer Concerning Litigation, Claims, and Assessments
[AICPA, Professional Standards]), and other contingencies.
iv. information from reading available minutes of meetings of stockholders, directors,
and appropriate committees.
v. information contained in regulatory or examination reports, supervisory correspondence, and similar materials from applicable regulatory agencies.
Inquire of management about the existence of circumstances that may indicate the need
to make an accounting estimate.

Evaluating Reasonableness
In evaluating the reasonableness of an estimate, the auditor normally concentrates on key
factors and assumptions that are
a.
b.
c.
d.

significant to the accounting estimate.
sensitive to variations.
deviations from historical patterns.
subjective and susceptible to misstatement and bias.

The Standards of Field Work
The auditor normally should consider the historical experience of the entity in making past
estimates as well as the auditor’s experience in the industry. However, changes in facts, circumstances, or entity’s procedures may cause factors different from those considered in the
past to become significant to the accounting estimate.
In evaluating reasonableness, the auditor should obtain an understanding of how management developed the estimate. Based on that understanding, the auditor should use one or a
combination of the following approaches:
a.
b.
c.

Review and test the process used by management to develop the estimate.
Develop an independent expectation of the estimate to corroborate the reasonableness
of management’s estimate.
Review subsequent events or transactions occurring prior to the date of the auditor’s
report.
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Review and Test Management’s Process
In many situations, the auditor assesses the reasonableness of an accounting estimate by
performing procedures to test the process used by management to make the estimate. The
following are procedures the auditor may consider performing when using this approach:
a.

Identify whether there are controls over the preparation of accounting estimates and
supporting data that may be useful in the evaluation.
b. Identify the sources of data and factors that management used in forming the assumptions, and consider whether such data and factors are relevant, reliable, and sufficient for
the purpose based on information gathered in other audit tests.
c. Consider whether there are additional key factors or alternative assumptions about the
factors.
d. Evaluate whether the assumptions are consistent with each other, the supporting data,
relevant historical data, and industry data.
e. Analyze historical data used in developing the assumptions to assess whether the data is
comparable and consistent with data of the period under audit, and consider whether
such data is sufficiently reliable for the purpose.
f. Consider whether changes in the business or industry may cause other factors to become significant to the assumptions.
g. Review available documentation of the assumptions used in developing the accounting
estimates and inquire about any other plans, goals, and objectives of the entity, as well as
consider their relationship to the assumptions.
h. Consider using the work of a specialist regarding certain assumptions (AU section 336,
Using the Work of a Specialist [AICPA, Professional Standards]).
i. Test the calculations used by management to translate the assumptions and key factors
into the accounting estimate.

Auditing Accounting Estimates
Develop an Expectation
Based on the auditor’s understanding of the facts and circumstances, he or she may independently develop an expectation about the estimate by using other key factors or alternative
assumptions about those factors.

Review Subsequent Events or Transactions
Events or transactions sometimes occur subsequent to the date of the balance sheet, but
prior to the date of the auditor’s report, that are important in identifying and evaluating the
reasonableness of accounting estimates or key factors or assumptions used in the preparation
of the estimate. In such circumstances, an evaluation of the estimate or of a key factor or assumption may be minimized or unnecessary, as the event or transaction can be used by the
auditor in evaluating their reasonableness.
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As discussed in paragraph .56 of AU section 312, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an
Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards), the auditor evaluates the reasonableness of accounting
estimates in relationship to the financial statements taken as a whole:
Because no one accounting estimate can be considered accurate with certainty, the
auditor may determine that a difference between an estimated amount best supported by the audit evidence and the estimated amount included in the financial
statements may not be significant, and such difference would not be considered to be
a likely misstatement. However, if the auditor believes the estimated amount included
in the financial statements is unreasonable, he or she should treat the difference between that estimate and the closest reasonable estimate as a likely misstatement.

Exhibit 6-5 contains examples of accounting estimates (the list should not be considered
all-inclusive).
Exhibit 6-5
Examples of Accounting Estimates*

Receivables
• Uncollectible receivables
• Allowance for loan losses
• Uncollectible pledges
Revenues
• Airline passenger revenue
• Subscription income
• Freight and cargo revenue
• Dues income
• Losses on sales contracts
Inventories
• Obsolete inventory
• Net realizable value of inventories when future selling prices and future costs are involved
• Losses on purchase commitments
Contracts
• Revenue to be earned
• Costs to be incurred
• Percent of completion
Financial instruments
• Valuation of securities
• Trading versus investment security classification
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• Probability of high correlation of a hedge
• Sales of securities with puts and calls
Leases
• Initial direct costs
• Executory costs
• Residual values
Litigation
• Probability of loss
• Amount of loss
Productive facilities, natural resources, and intangibles
• Useful lives and residual values
• Depreciation and amortization methods
• Recoverability of costs
• Recoverable reserves
Rates
• Annual effective tax rate in interim reporting
• Imputed interest rates on receivables and payables
• Gross profit rates under program method of accounting
Accruals
• Property and casualty insurance company loss reserves
• Compensation in stock option plans and deferred plans
• Warranty claims
• Taxes on real and personal property
• Renegotiation refunds
• Actuarial assumptions in pension costs
Other
• Losses and net realizable value on disposal of segment or restructuring of a business
• Fair values in nonmonetary exchanges
• Interim period costs in interim reporting
• Current values in personal financial statements
* AU section 9342, Auditing Accounting Estimates: Auditing Interpretations of Section 342, contains auditing interpretations of AU section 342, Auditing Accounting Estimates (AICPA, Professional Standards), concerning fair value disclosure.

137

CommonFraud-2012.indb 137

3/19/2012 11:34:57 AM

Common Fraud: A Guide to Thwarting the Top Ten Schemes

AU Section 316 and Estimates
AU section 316 refers to the use of estimates to perpetrate fraud and states that frauds have
been committed by management override of existing controls using such techniques as (a)
recording fictitious journal entries, particularly those recorded close to the end of an accounting period to manipulate operating results, (b) intentionally biasing assumptions and
judgments used to estimate account balances, and (c) altering records and terms related to
significant and unusual transactions.

Management Estimates
The auditor may identify a risk of misstatement due to fraud involving the development of
management estimates. This risk may affect a number of accounts and assertions, including
asset valuation, estimates relating to specific transactions (such as acquisitions, restructurings,
or disposals of a segment of the business), and other significant accrued liabilities (such as
pension and other postretirement benefit obligations or environmental remediation liabilities). The risk may also relate to significant changes in assumptions relating to recurring estimates. As indicated previously in section AU section 342, estimates are based on subjective
as well as objective factors, and potential exists for bias in the subjective factors, even when
management’s estimation process involves competent personnel using relevant and reliable
data.
In addressing an identified risk of material misstatement due to fraud involving accounting estimates, the auditor may want to supplement the audit evidence otherwise obtained
(see the section titled “Evaluating Reasonableness” in this chapter). In certain circumstances
(for example, evaluating the reasonableness of management’s estimate of the fair value of a
derivative), it may be appropriate to engage a specialist or develop an independent estimate
for comparison to management’s estimate. Information gathered about the entity and its environment may help the auditor evaluate the reasonableness of such management estimates
and underlying judgments and assumptions.
A retrospective review of similar management judgments and assumptions applied in prior
periods (addressed in subsequent sections) may also provide insight about the reasonableness
of judgments and assumptions supporting management estimates.

Journal Entries or Other Adjustments Processed
Outside the Normal Course of Business17
Standard journal entries used on a recurring basis to record transactions such as monthly
sales, purchases, and cash disbursements, or to record recurring periodic accounting estimates
generally are subject to the entity’s internal controls. Nonstandard entries (for example, entries used to record nonrecurring transactions, such as a business combination, or entries

See chapter 3, “Revenue Fraud Schemes—Fictitious Revenue Recognition, Recognizing Revenue
Prematurely, and Fictitious Journal Entries,” for a discussion of controls over journal entries.
17
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used to record a nonrecurring estimate, such as an asset impairment) might not be subject to
the same level of internal control.

The Nature and Complexity of the Accounts
Inappropriate journal entries or adjustments may be applied to accounts that (a) contain
transactions that are complex or unusual in nature or (b) contain significant estimates and
period-end adjustments.

Reviewing Accounting Estimates for Biases That
Could Result in Material Misstatement Due to
Fraud
In preparing financial statements, management is responsible for making a number of judgments or assumptions that affect significant accounting estimates and for monitoring the
reasonableness of such estimates on an ongoing basis. Fraudulent financial reporting often is
accomplished through intentional misstatement of accounting estimates. As discussed subsequently, the auditor should consider whether differences between estimates best supported
by the audit evidence and the estimates included in the financial statements, even if they are
individually reasonable, indicate a possible bias on the part of the entity’s management, in
which case the auditor should reconsider the estimates taken as a whole.
The auditor should also perform a retrospective review of significant accounting estimates
reflected in the financial statements of the prior year to determine whether management
judgments and assumptions relating to the estimates indicate a possible bias on the part of
management. The significant accounting estimates selected for testing should include those
that are based on highly sensitive assumptions or are otherwise significantly affected by judgments made by management. With the benefit of hindsight, a retrospective review should
provide the auditor with additional information about whether there may be a possible bias
on the part of management in making the current year estimates.This review, however, is not
intended to call into question the auditor’s professional judgments made in the prior year
that were based on information available at the time.
If the auditor identifies a possible bias on the part of management in making accounting
estimates, the auditor should evaluate whether circumstances producing such a bias represent
a risk of a material misstatement due to fraud. For example, information coming to the auditor’s attention may indicate a risk that adjustments to the current year estimates might be
recorded at the instruction of management to arbitrarily achieve a specified earnings target.
A case that covers many of the fraud schemes addressed in the professional standards
mentioned previously is the fraud that occurred at HealthSouth. The schemes employed
by HealthSouth included, among others, capitalizing expenses and manipulating estimates
to meet earnings target expectations. The case shows that the external auditors could have
performed a retrospective review of accounting estimates to detect this fraud. Portions of this
case that are relevant to the material in this chapter are addressed in exhibit 6-6.
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Exhibit 6-6
HealthSouth Fraud*

A forensic audit conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers concluded that HealthSouth Corporation’s
cumulative earnings were overstated by anywhere from $3.8 billion to $4.6 billion, according to a
January 2004 report issued by the scandal-ridden health-care concern. HealthSouth acknowledged
that the forensic audit discovered at least another $1.3 billion in suspect financial reporting in addition to the previously estimated $2.5 billion. The scandal’s postmortem report found additional fraud
of $500 million, and it identified at least $800 million of improper accounting for reserves, executive
bonuses, and related-party transactions.
HealthSouth paid the Birmingham office of Ernst & Young LLP $3.6 million for its 2001 financial statement audit and related services. Ernst & Young disavowed knowledge of the fraud, citing systemic
deception on the part of HealthSouth executives, several of whom have pled guilty to fraud charges.
However, communication about questionable activities took place between the health-care provider
and its auditor. For example, in a hearing to decide if Richard Scrushy’s (former CEO) assets should
be unfrozen, two Ernst & Young partners stated that the audit firm had received an e-mail from a
HealthSouth employee advising them to examine three specific accounts for fraudulent entries
related to asset capitalization. (Author’s note: Possible overstatement of asset fraud as a result of
the capitalization of expenses.)
Ernst & Young subsequently contacted HealthSouth’s president and chief operating officer, William
T. Owens, and the chairman of its audit committee, George Strong. Owens defended HealthSouth’s
capitalization method, but he agreed that further investigation was needed. Both Owens and Ernst
& Young partner James Lanthron eventually concluded that no costs were improperly capitalized.
Ernst & Young did not detect or investigate beyond the scope of normal audit procedures any other
substantive questionable activities outside of the capitalization issue.
Annual write-offs for uncollectible receivables lacked any consistency whatsoever. (Author’s note:
Estimate fraud.) Moreover, the amount of the accounts written off in any given year did not correlate
with the allowance established for them. To the extent that these disclosures were reliable, these
data indicate that HealthSouth used bad debt reserves to manipulate earnings. This lack of correlation could have been a warning sign of abusive earnings management.
Consider two similar items related to uncollectible accounts, to further understand possible earnings management. First, there were disproportionately large allowance for doubtful accounts
balances at the end of 1994 and 1995—nearly 40 percent of gross receivables. These existing
balances could have been drawn down without the need to record an accurate provision for doubtful accounts. Secondly, the year-end charge to bad expense, required to replenish the depleted
contra-asset account, could have been less than normally expected if the unadjusted allowance
balance jived with economic reality. By understating expenses in this manner, HealthSouth could
have manufactured earnings beginning in the mid-1990s. These data provide some evidence of the
classic “cookie-jar reserve” ploy.
* Adapted from Leonard G. Weld, Peter M. Bergevin, and Lorraine Magrath, “Anatomy of a Financial Fraud,” The CPA
Journal, October 2004, www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1004/essentials/p44.htm.

Analyzing HealthSouth’s Disclosures
Of interest is the amount of bad-debt expense matched against revenues in 1999. As noted,
that unusually large charge to earnings was made at the time when it became publicly
known that HealthSouth could no longer hit its earnings target. Company officials may have
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decided to replenish the balance in the allowance account (add cookies to the cookie jar) or
recognize previously understated levels of bad-debt expense. In either case, the large charge
(8.4 percent of revenues) occurred when Wall Street diminished its earnings expectations
for HealthSouth. Taking this “big bath” for bad debts merely exacerbated 1999’s already
poor financial performance, information that was already discounted in the marketplace.The
question arises: Did HealthSouth bury this apparently inflated expense amount within a sea
of red ink in an attempt to manage earnings?
The first of HealthSouth’s accounting problems surfaced in late 2002 after Richard Scrushy
sold $75 million in stock several days before the company posted a large loss.The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced it was investigating Richard Scrushy on
whether or not the stock sell was related to HealthSouth posting a large loss. HealthSouth
hired an outside law firm to review Scrushy’s stock sale, with the firm concluding that the
sale and profit loss were not related; however, this did not remove the company from the
SEC’s radar. On the evening of March 18, 2003, FBI agents executed search warrants at the
company’s headquarters after the company’s Chief Financial Officer William Owens agreed
to wear a wire in a failed attempt to get Scrushy to talk about the fraud.
In June 2005, Richard Scrushy was acquitted on all 36 of the accounting fraud counts
against him, including and most notably one count in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which casts doubt on the enforceability of the law. Then in June 2006, he was convicted on
bribery charges, having stood accused of arranging $500,000 in campaign donations to the
governor of Alabama in exchange for a seat on a state hospital regulatory board.18

HealthSouth Epilogue
Richard Scrushy’s spouse, Leslie, is having financial problems. She is in settlement talks with
HealthSouth Corp., according to court records, which might wind up releasing her from the
protracted litigation that is principally between her husband and the company he founded.
Court papers filed recently state certain procedural aspects of the case related to Leslie
Scrushy have been postponed until August 19, 2010 (or “until such a time as the parties reach
a settlement agreement”).
No prospective financial terms were disclosed. The crux of the disagreement between
Birmingham-based HealthSouth and Leslie Scrushy is the disposition of some contents of
the Scrushys’ Lake Martin and Vestavia Hills estates and the tax refunds obtained by the
couple after the HealthSouth fraud, according to court records.
Leslie Scrushy contends that the contents of the homes (which in the past were known to
have included expensive jewelry and valuable artwork) belong to her. HealthSouth wants to
auction all the assets to help pay Richard Scrushy’s $2.8 billion civil judgment owed to the

Richard Scrushy, the former CEO of HealthSouth, was sentenced to almost seven years in prison for
giving the governor of Alabama $500,000 in exchange for a seat on the state hospital regulatory board,
the Wall Street Journal reports. Former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman was sentenced to over seven
years, and both men must pay restitution. See Colleen Barry, “HealthSouth Boss Gets 7 Years for Bribery,”
Newser, June 29, 2007, www.newser.com/story/3661/healthsouth-boss-gets-7-years-for-bribery.html.
18

141

CommonFraud-2012.indb 141

3/19/2012 11:34:58 AM

Common Fraud: A Guide to Thwarting the Top Ten Schemes

company after he was found liable at a 2009 civil trial for the accounting fraud that almost
forced the company into bankruptcy.
HealthSouth would also like to recover as much of the tax refund money as possible. The
tax refund was obtained after Richard Scrushy was ordered to forfeit $48 million in executive bonuses that were initially paid because the health care company achieved certain profit
goals through fraud and subterfuge. After repaying the fraudulently earned bonuses, Richard
Scrushy applied for and received $17 million in federal and state refunds. A settlement by
Leslie Scrushy would release her from claims that she is the recipient of assets illegally shuttled by her husband to hide them from seizure to settle his HealthSouth tab. She complained
at the time that HealthSouth had refused to give her an allowance for living expenses out of
her husband’s seized assets. A court filing at about the same time by her husband asking for
money from his seized fortune to be released said that monthly expenses for Leslie and children were $16,600. A few months later, Leslie Scrushy was permitted to tap the tax refund
money for the “normal and customary” living expenses, according to court records.
Richard Scrushy’s wealth, estimated at $287 million in 2003 by government auditors, included artwork by Picasso and Chagall and as many as 68 pieces of jewelry festooned with
hundreds of carats of gems.The baubles include a 21.81 carat, emerald-cut diamond ring that
HealthSouth lawyers are particularly interested in recovering for its resale value.
Richard Scrushy was dubbed “the CEO” of the HealthSouth accounting fraud by a Jefferson Circuit Court judge at his civil trial. The HealthSouth founder was found liable for
the fraud and ordered to pay $2.87 billion to compensate shareholders for expenses such as
the phony loans taken out to cover the fraud and the massive accounting and research effort
required to reconstruct the company’s records.19
Finally, on July 19, 2010, it was reported that Richard Scrushy requested release from
prison during the appeal of his bribery conviction. His attorneys made the request in light
of a U.S. Supreme Court decision last month that ordered a review of his government corruption convictions and those of former Governor Don Siegelman. Court papers claim
Richard Scrushy is broke because of the $2.8 billion civil judgment and has no means or
motivation to flee.20

Russell Hubbard, “Leslie Scrushy in settlement talks with HealthSouth,” Birmingham News, August 4,
2010, http://blog.al.com/businessnews/2010/08/leslie_scrushy_in_settlement_t.html.
20
“Richard Scrushy requesting release from prison during appeal,” Fox 6 News blog, July 19, 2010, www.
foxalabamanews.com/2010/07/richard-scrushy-requesting-release-from.html.
19
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Ponzi and Asset Flip Schemes
Overview
The top 10 most common frauds include Ponzi and asset flip schemes. Ponzi schemes were
selected due to the historical use of this scheme to scam investors and the recent use of this
scheme by Bernie Madoff that resulted in a loss to investors of more than $66 billion. As
a result of criticism of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) handling of the
Madoff Ponzi scheme, it implemented several procedural and other changes to detect Ponzi
schemes. Asset flip schemes (real property) were also selected due to more recent increase in
the use of these high-dollar schemes to create unrealistic real estate prices.
Numerous real-world examples of these schemes are provided because many readers will
not be as familiar with these schemes as they are with fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets fraud schemes.

Ponzi Schemes
The term Ponzi scheme is named for Charles Ponzi. Unlike Madoff, Ponzi had a history of
criminal activities and had even served two terms in prison for his transgressions.This is perhaps the reason the Ponzi whistleblower was perceived as credible and why investors quickly
attempted to withdraw their funds when the scheme was revealed. Similar to Madoff, Ponzi
lived an exorbitant lifestyle and was adept at being a con artist. A summary of Ponzi’s scheme
is presented in exhibit 7-1.
Exhibit 7-1
Charles Ponzi and International Reply Coupons*

Ponzi’s Arrival in the United States
Charles Ponzi, an Italian immigrant, arrived in Boston aboard the S.S. Vancouver in 1903. One of his
early jobs was a dishwasher at a restaurant at which he also slept on the floor. He was promoted to
a waiter’s position, but he was fired for theft and for shortchanging some of his customers.
Ponzi left the United States and moved to Canada. While in Montreal, he worked at a bank that later
went bankrupt due to its both paying above average deposit rates to attract funds and making bad

143

CommonFraud-2012.indb 143

3/19/2012 11:34:58 AM

Common Fraud: A Guide to Thwarting the Top Ten Schemes

loans. Ponzi wrote a bad check in a rather large amount during his time in Montreal. He was arrested, admitted he was guilty, and spent three years in a prison in Quebec.
In 1911, he was released from prison and returned to the United States. He then got involved in a
scheme smuggling Italian immigrants into the U.S. and spent two more years in prison.
The Ponzi Scheme
Ponzi received an envelope from a Spanish company which contained an International Reply Coupon (IRC). Ponzi had never seen an IRC, but he found a weakness in the coupon system, one which
could potentially make him money.
An IRC is a coupon that can be exchanged for a number of postage stamps which represent the
minimum postage for a priority air mail letter to another country. Ponzi realized that he could take
advantage of the different postage costs in different countries to make a profit. He could buy IRCs
cheaply in one country and exchange them for more expensive stamps in another.
Ponzi would send money to agents abroad who would buy IRCs. They would then send the IRCs
back to the United States where Ponzi would exchange the coupon for stamps worth more than he
had spent on the coupon originally.
He would then sell the stamps. The reported net profit of such a transaction could be more than 400
percent. Ponzi persuaded investors to back the scheme, promising them a 50 percent return in 45
days, or even a 100 percent return in 90 days.
A calculation would have shown that Ponzi was operating at a huge loss, but as long as money kept
flowing in, he could pay the other investors to whom he owed money. He lived very luxuriously, making $250,000 a day and bought a mansion in Lexington, Massachusetts.
Discovery of the Ponzi Scheme
Financial analyst Clarence Barron was asked by The Boston Post to examine Ponzi’s company. Having done so, he realized that for Ponzi to be making as much as he did, 160,000,000 IRCs would have
to be in circulation. However, at the time there were only about 27,000 IRCs in circulation. This news
story, combined with announcements by the United States Post Office that IRCs were not being
bought in bulk anywhere caused a panic and rush withdrawal from Ponzi’s company.
On August 12, 1920, Ponzi was arrested with liabilities estimated at $7 million. In November 1920,
he pleaded guilty to mail fraud. He was released from prison in 1934 and lived the rest of his life in
poverty, dying in Rio de Janeiro in 1949.
* Adapted from Patrick Hinton, “A Biography of Charles Ponzi and his Scheme: The Man Behind Bernard L. Madoff’s
‘Ponzi Scheme,” January 9, 2009, Suite 101, investment.suite101.com/article.cfm/a_biography_of_charles_ponzi_and_
his_scheme.

Ponzi Schemes for Dummies
An article allegedly authored by Madoff provides insight into how to successfully carry out a
Ponzi scheme. The methodology to conduct this fraud is provided in exhibit 7-2.
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Exhibit 7-2
Ponzi Schemes for Dummies*

These steps, originally published as an April’s Fool’s joke under the guise that it was allegedly
authored by Bernie Madoff, actually provide remarkably accurate insight into how to successfully
carry out a Ponzi scheme.
1. Establish a strong reputation with investors and high net worth individuals. Create a social network that will give you an abundant pool of potential new clients (also known as “suckers”).
2. Create a model portfolio which will be the outline for the new fund. Seed capital is needed to
start off the fund and to give investors confidence in your ability to manage a portfolio and to
generate returns from it. Find a new investment vehicle or combination of investment vehicles
that is appealing and easy to sell to investors. Find a few friends who want to invest and invest
some of their money, putting the remainder into your personal bank account.
3. Create a short-form prospectus stating the details of the investment management agreement,
and offer to pay an above average rate (for example, 10 percent) on the investment from your
clients, regardless of what the market and portfolio actually does.
4. Begin finding new clients. The idea with any great Ponzi scheme is that once the fund is started,
new money needs to continually come in to pay off the interest owed to previous investors. And
as new investors are added, even more will be needed to cover the returns when the portfolio is
not generating sufficient income. Make sure not to add too many people at first, and work extra
hard to have a cold-calling list of new potential clients to work from.
5. Begin paying out the original investors with income generated by the fund, and if new capital
is needed for interest payments, use new client money rather than investing it in the fund. Any
excess returns from the fund above 10 percent should be directly deposited to another account
(preferably off-shore, away from prying eyes), to pay the Ponzi scheme artist (you) his or her
amount for being extra sly and devious.
6. Repeat steps 4 and 5. Note: In a bull market, the interest owed and the actual amount of income
generated may not be very far off. So continue to pocket the money from new clients, and payout the income generated from the portfolio, plus the remainder needed to cover the payments
from your personal account. Bull markets are where the money is to be made in the scheme,
and as long as you keep paying out the investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) won’t have a clue as to what is going on.
7. When the market begins to turn bearish, now you will have a portfolio of stocks, options, and
so on. that are decreasing in value and not generating any income. This is when you make an
extra effort to bring in new investors. If this is the case, and you have new investors to solicit,
repeat steps 4 and 5. If this is not the case, and the pool of investors you had on your list is now
exhausted, now is the time to take a vacation to a country that will not allow extradition back to
your home country.
8. Hire an accounting firm that will sign-off on the scheme and make your operation look like a
genius-inspired hedge fund.
9. Make sure all of the funds you have made from the scheme are currently held in a Swiss or
off-shore bank account and cannot be easily traced. As friends and fellow investors call asking
for their payment, or a return of their original capital, have your assistant tell them you are on
vacation and will call them back the moment you return. Keep this going as long as possible.
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10. When the SEC or other regulatory authorities show up at your office, hide your head and put
your hands behind your back. Make sure you do not talk to anyone but your lawyer.
* Adapted from “Ponzi Schemes for Dummies,” Wall Street Survivor, April 1, 2009, http://education.wallstreetsurvivor.
com/ponzi-scheme.

The FBI and Ponzi Schemes
What is a “Ponzi” scheme?
The FBI provides the following definition for Ponzi scheme:
A Ponzi scheme is essentially an investment fraud wherein the operator promises high financial returns or dividends that are not available through traditional
investments. Instead of investing victims’ funds, the operator pays “dividends” to
initial investors using the principle amounts “invested” by subsequent investors.
The scheme generally falls apart when the operator flees with all of the proceeds,
or when a sufficient number of new investors cannot be found to allow the continued payment of “dividends.”1

In order to avoid being swindled by a Ponzi scheme, the FBI recommends that an investor
exercise due diligence in selecting investments and the people with whom he or she invests.
It also recommends that the investor fully understands the investment before making an
investment.

The SEC and Ponzi Schemes
The SEC provided a list of frequently asked questions concerning Ponzi schemes.2 These are
presented in this section.

Ponzi Schemes—Frequently Asked Questions
1. What Is a Ponzi Scheme?
The SEC’s definition of a Ponzi scheme is similar to the FBI’s definition. A Ponzi scheme is
defined as an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Ponzi scheme organizers often solicit new
investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with
little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus on attracting new money to
make promised payments to earlier-stage investors and to use for personal expenses, instead
of engaging in any legitimate investment activity.

FBI, “Common Fraud Schemes,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/fraudschemes.
htm.
2
The FBI provides a video on Ponzi schemes available at www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm.
1
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2. Why do Ponzi Schemes Collapse?
With little or no legitimate earnings, the schemes require a consistent flow of money from
new investors to continue. Ponzi schemes tend to collapse when it becomes difficult to recruit new investors or when a large number of investors ask to cash out.
3. Does the SEC Investigate Ponzi Schemes?
The SEC investigates and prosecutes many Ponzi scheme cases each year both to prevent
new victims from being harmed and to maximize the recovery of assets to investors. The
majority of such cases are brought as emergency actions, which often seek a temporary restraining order and an asset freeze.
During 2009, the SEC filed 60 enforcement actions involving Ponzi schemes or Ponzilike payments, including charging Robert Allen Stanford and his companies with allegedly
conducting an $8 billion Ponzi scheme.
The Wall Street Journal provided the following overview of the Stanford Ponzi scheme:
According to the SEC, Stanford representatives informed investors who bought
CDs from Stanford International Bank (SIB) that their funds were used to purchase
easy-to-trade assets.The investors were also told that SIB had more than 20 analysts
monitoring the portfolio and there were annual audits by Antiguan (Antigua is a
country in the northern Leeward Islands of the Caribbean Sea) regulators. In fact,
the SEC alleged, the bulk of the money went into real estate and private equity,
and the investments were reviewed by only two people: Mr. Stanford and James
M. Davis, the bank’s chief financial officer and Mr. Stanford’s onetime classmate at
Baylor University.
Antigua regulators didn’t verify the assets, according to the SEC complaint, and
the agency said it couldn’t reach a small accounting firm on the island responsible
for the audits. The CDs aren’t insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
From 1992 to 2006, Stanford International Bank reported steady returns of from
6% to 10% annually on its certificates of deposit, according to the SEC. The bank
sold three types of CDs. Some were fixed-rate (the norm for bank CDs) but others
had flexible rates or were linked to indexes. The bank attributed its ability to pay
its strong returns to double-digit gains on its investment portfolio.
The bank reported identical portfolio returns of 15.71% for two straight years,
1995 and 1996, according to the federal complaint. In one year, when the S&P 500
lost 39%, the bank said the portfolio lost only 1.3%.The SEC alleged that Stanford
used these ‘impossible’ returns to promote its CDs and support its promise of rates
higher than those offered by other banks.
The SEC also alleged fraud concerning a mutual-fund product sold by Stanford
group companies with more than $1.2 billion in assets. The Stanford companies
claimed high returns for the product to lure financial advisers from other firms,
and once at Stanford, the advisers were encouraged to sell their clients the CDs,
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according to the complaint. It said performance data Stanford cited for the product
through 2005 were ‘impressive, but fictitious.’3

The SEC’s Response to its Office of Inspector General’s Reports on
the Madoff Fraud
In August and September 2009, the SEC’s Office of Inspector General issued three reports
on the Madoff fraud, including one entitled Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme. The SEC has closely analyzed the reports.
Even before the release of these reports, major efforts were underway to make improvements and address the shortcomings that were identified in the reports. A list of decisive and
comprehensive steps the SEC is taking to reduce the chances that similar frauds will occur
or be undetected in the future is available on the SEC’s Post-Madoff Reforms website. Appendix 7A, “SEC Response to Madoff Ponzi Scheme,” contains the steps the SEC began
taking to reduce the chances that such frauds as large as Madoff ’s Ponzi scheme will occur
or be undetected in the future.

Ponzi Scheme “Red Flags”
Many Ponzi schemes share the following red flags:
• High investment returns with little or no risk—Every investment carries some degree of
risk, and investments yielding higher returns typically involve more risk. Be highly
suspicious of any “guaranteed” investment opportunity.
• Overly consistent returns—Investments tend to go up and down over time, especially
those seeking high returns. Be suspect of an investment that continues to generate
regular, positive returns regardless of overall market conditions.
• Unregistered investments—Ponzi schemes typically involve investments that have not
been registered with the SEC or with state regulators. Registration is important
because it provides investors with access to key information about the company’s
management, products, services, and finances.
• Unlicensed sellers—Federal and state securities laws require investment professionals
and their firms to be licensed or registered. Most Ponzi schemes involve unlicensed
individuals or unregistered firms.
• Secretive or complex strategies—Avoiding investments you do not understand, or for
which you cannot get complete information, is a good rule of thumb.
• Issues without paperwork—Do not accept excuses regarding why you cannot review
information about an investment in writing, and always read an investment’s prospectus or disclosure statement carefully before you invest. Also, account statement
errors may be a sign that funds are not being invested as promised.
Kara Scannell, Miguel Bustillo, and Evan Perez, “SEC Accuses Texas Financier of ‘Massive’ $8 Billion Fraud,”
Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2009, online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB123489015427300943.html.
3
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• Difficulty receiving payments—Be suspicious if you do not receive a payment or have
difficulty cashing out your investment. Keep in mind that Ponzi scheme promoters
sometimes encourage participants to “roll over” promised payments by offering even
higher investment returns.

Similarities and Differences Between Ponzi and
Pyramid Schemes
Ponzi and pyramid schemes are closely related because they both involve paying longerstanding members with money from new participants, instead of actual profits from investing
or selling products to the public. Exhibit 7-3 describes some common differences.
Exhibit 7-3
Pyramid and Ponzi Schemes
Pyramid Scheme

Ponzi Scheme

Typical “hook”

Earn high profits by making one payment and finding a set number of others to become distributors of a product.
The scheme typically does not involve
a genuine product. The purported
product may not exist or it may only be
“sold” within the pyramid scheme.

Earn high investment returns with
little or no risk by simply handing
over your money; the investment
typically does not exist.

Payments or profits

Must recruit new distributors to receive
payments.

No recruiting necessary to receive
payments.

Interaction with
original promoter

Sometimes none. New participants may
enter scheme at a different level.

Promoter generally acts directly with
all participants.

Source of payments

From new participants—always disclosed.

From new participants—never
disclosed.

Collapse

Fast. An exponential increase in the
number of participants is required at
each level.

May be relatively slow if existing
participants reinvest money.

Bernie Madoff Ponzi Scheme
SEC Overview
The SEC provided the following overview of Madoff:
Bernard L. Madoff orchestrated a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme that swindled
money from thousands of investors. Unlike the promoters of many Ponzi schemes,
Madoff did not promise spectacular short-term investment returns. Instead, his
investors’ phony account statements showed moderate, but consistently positive
returns—even during turbulent market conditions.
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In December 2008, the SEC charged Bernard Madoff and his investment firm,
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, with securities fraud for the multibillion dollar Ponzi scheme he perpetrated on advisory clients of his firm for many
years.The SEC filed emergency motions to freeze assets and appoint a receiver, and
worked to return as much money as possible to harmed investors.
Madoff had been a prominent member of the securities industry throughout
his career. He served as vice chairman of the NASD, a member of its board of
governors, and chairman of its New York region. He was also a member of NASDAQ Stock Market’s board of governors and its executive committee and served
as chairman of its trading committee. Madoff founded his investment advisory firm
in 1960.4

Madoff conducted the largest recorded Ponzi scheme to date—more than $65 billion in
losses. Madoff was trusted by thousands of investors. He was also an adept con artist, and as
a result he is now serving a 150-year sentence at the Butner Correctional Facility (mediumsecurity facility) in North Carolina. He is eligible for parole on November 14, 2139.5
The New York Times reported the following after Madoff ’s sentencing:
Mr. Madoff, looking thinner and more haggard than when he pleaded guilty in
March, stood impassively as Federal District Judge Denny Chin condemned his
crimes as ‘extraordinarily evil’ and imposed a sentence that was three times as long
as the federal probation office suggested and more than 10 times as long as defense
lawyers had requested.
In meting out the maximum sentence, Judge Chin pointed out that no friends,
family or other supporters had submitted any letters on Mr. Madoff ’s behalf that
attested to the strength of his character or good deeds he had done. No members
of Mr. Madoff ’s immediate family were in court.6
The SEC and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, a governmentchartered program to compensate customers of failed brokerage firms, were criticized repeatedly in the courtroom statements by the victims on Monday, and at a
rally of victims held near the courthouse afterward.

The Scheme Falls Apart for Madoff
According to the New York Daily News, the one-time NASDAQ chairman operated a classic
Ponzi scheme, paying off early investors with funds from subsequent clients to keep the illusion of profit alive. Madoff told an employee clients wanted $7 billion in redemptions. He
was “struggling” to get it, he said.

SEC, “Ponzi Schemes—Frequently Asked Questions,” www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, www.bop.gov/iloc2/InmateFinderServlet?Transaction=NameSearch&needing
MoreList=false&FirstName=Bernard&Middle=&LastName=Madoff&Race=W&Sex=M&Age=&x=35
&y=21.
6
Diana B. Henriques, “Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme,” New York Times, June 29,
2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html.
4
5
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By Tuesday (of the week he confessed to the scheme), Madoff announced he wanted to distribute employee bonuses, two months ahead of time. A suspicious senior
employee said Madoff was ‘under great stress.’
On Wednesday, employees challenged Madoff ’s claim the firm recently made
profits. He declared he couldn’t speak of the situation at the office because he
‘wasn’t sure he would be able to hold it together.’
They went to his E. 64th St. apartment, when he revealed his business was a
fraud, that he was ‘finished,’ that he owned ‘absolutely nothing.’
Shocked employees, including his sons Andrew and Mark, called the Securities
and Exchange Commission, which told the FBI.
When the agents showed up at his apartment, Madoff admitted he’d ‘paid investors with money that wasn’t there,’ was ‘broke’ and knew ‘it could not go on.’7

Joseph Cochett (an attorney for victims who visited Madoff in prison) stated that Madoff
said he stopped trading in 1995, and in 2000 he knew the gig was up. Madoff also said he
knew that after he stopped trading, how much he could take in and how much he could take
out would be a function of math.8
Madoff accomplished this fraud by using the methodology shown in exhibit 7-2 and also
by compensating feeder fund managers very well. It is relevant to address the role of the
feeder firms in this scam since so many investors placed their resources with a fund that subsequently invested the resources with Madoff. Many of these investors are now suing these
feeder funds. (See exhibit 7-4.)
Exhibit 7-4
Feeder Funds Face Lawsuits

For years, Madoff was known as a spectacularly successful money manager. Ordinary investors
were barred from putting their money in his funds. However, they could go to one of the feeder
funds, which for a fee would send their money on to him.
“They want a bite of the forbidden fruit, and organizations like Fairfield Greenwich and others in
some cases provide that access,” said Daniel A. Strachman (author of a book on hedge funds).
“Someone like Madoff seems to have been able to take advantage of that by using these people.”
Fairfield Greenwich is a hedge fund company that operated what is believed to be the largest feeder
fund, and it is reported to have lost $7.5 billion in the Madoff debacle. Many other funds have now
lost all or part of their investors’ money, and they’re expected to spend years fighting lawsuits.
Attorney Jeff Zwerling, who represents some of Madoff’s alleged victims, says some of these funds
are virtually bankrupt. It will be difficult for these investors to recover any money from them, but Zwerling said there are exceptions. “If the feeder fund did not invest all its assets in there but lost, say,
50 percent of its investment and is still an ongoing entity, then I think the investors have a much better shot of recovering at least some significant portion of their investment,” Zwerling said. He points
Thomas Zambito and Greg B. Smith, “Feds say Bernard Madoff ’s $50 billion Ponzi scheme was worst ever,”
New York Daily News, December 13, 2008, www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2008/12/13/2008-12-13_
feds_say_bernard_madoffs_50_ billion_ponz.html.
8
“Madoff Victims’ Attorney on Jailhouse Interview,” Associated Press, www.youtube.com/watch?v=
HWA25iiOfmU.
7
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out that some of the feeder funds were tied to bigger companies with deep pockets. Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co., for example, was sued this week because one of its subsidiaries was tied
to a company that invested with Madoff.*
On August 18, 2010, Reuters reported that a federal judge (Victor Marrero) refused to dismiss an
investor lawsuit against Fairfield Greenwich Group, a hedge fund firm accused of funneling money
to the now-imprisoned Bernard Madoff for his massive Ponzi scheme.
Investors and Picard (court appointed trustee) have accused Fairfield of guiding billions of dollars to
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, which Picard is now liquidating. Picard has estimated
Fairfield received more than $1 billion of fees from Madoff, including fees for operating its “feeder
funds.”
In his ruling, Marrero said the investors sufficiently set forth claims that various defendants ignored
“red flags” about Madoff, including his seeming “uncanny” ability to generate consistent returns for
his clients in all sorts of markets.†
* Jim Zarroli, “Madoff Fallout Grows as ‘Feeder Firms’ Scrutinized,” NPR, December 23, 2008, www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=98657393.
† Jonathan Stempel, “Madoff feeder fund firm faces narrowed lawsuit,” Reuters, August 18, 2010, www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE67H5PO20100818.

The Madoff Whistleblower
The author interviewed Harry Markopolos, the Madoff whistleblower.9 Markopolos stated
that he repeatedly informed the SEC of his suspicions that Madoff was operating a Ponzi
scheme, but no one would listen. He attributes failure of the SEC to respond to his concerns
for two reasons:
1. These were regulators, not financial professionals.The SEC did not understand the math
behind the Madoff Ponzi scheme.
2. The SEC is concerned about protecting the industry, not the investor.
He stated that no one at the SEC was held accountable for not detecting the fraud or
heeding the warning signs. According to Markopolos, there were three glaring red flags
about the scheme:
1. Over 96 percent of the months had positive returns (on investments).
2. The performance line was at a 45-degree angle.
3. Only stocks that would go up (increase in value) were selected to be in the fund.
In his book, No One Would Listen, Markopolos listed more than 30 red flags that should
have alerted regulators.10

Minnesota Society of Certified Public Accountants Management and Business Advisers conference,
Minneapolis, MN, June 14, 2010.
10
For additional resources on Bernie Madoff ’s Ponzi scheme, the reader is referred to www.noonewouldlisten.com. Also see SEC, “Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff ’s Ponzi
Scheme,” www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf.
9
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Markopolos noted that if the SEC is unable to detect large frauds, such as the Madoff
Ponzi scheme, how could it be expected to detect smaller ones. Markopolos further suggested that, in order to prevent these frauds from occurring again, the SEC regulators should be
compensated on a level of those who work on Wall Street, paid a bonus based upon results,
and recruited from the (investment) industry.
Markopolos said that those who took out money early did well. Over 90 percent of the
fund fees went to feeder funds. “Bernie only kept a small amount (less than 1 percent of the
fees)…he paid feeder funds so well they looked the other way.” He continued, “They would
say no to enough people (you cannot invest with Madoff)…to keep the interest up.”

The Injured
Madoff ’s schemes affected thousands of people. A list of almost 14,000 investors can be
accessed at http://images.epk.com/madoffclientlist.pdf. The 162-page report lists many famous names, including John Malkovich, John Denver, Hall of Famer Sandy Koufax, New
Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg, and NewYork Mets owner Fred Wilpon.11 Other celebrities
who had invested with Madoff include Kevin Bacon and his wife Kyra Sedgwick, Steven
Spielberg, and Jeffrey Katzenberg.12
Joseph Cochett (an attorney for some victims and who visited Madoff in prison) stated
that Madoff showed no remorse and was a sociopath, and he believed that Madoff did not
act alone. Madoff ’s schemes affected not just the wealthy, but also charitable organizations
and teachers—even his own attorney and accountant.
As an example, one individual who had to go back to work at age 90 was Ben Lomond.
Lomond and his wife lost more than $700,000 in Madoff ’s Ponzi scheme. He is now working at a grocery store, making $10 an hour.13

Action by the SEC
Appendix 7A contains a report of the SEC’s response to the Madoff Ponzi scheme.The SEC
has taken action to improve its operations in the following areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Revitalizing the Enforcement Division
Revamping the handling of complaints and tips
Encouraging greater cooperation by insiders
Enhancing safeguards for investors’ assets
Improving risk assessment capabilities
Conducting risk-based examinations of financial firms
Improving fraud detection procedures for examiners

epk.com/business/bernie-madoffs-famous-client-list-released/?gclid=CNPRwbmw36MCFQ8E5Qodi
2KRkg.
12
Joyce Eng, “Bernie Madoff ’s Celebrity Victims Include Kevin, Kyra and Spielberg,” TV Guide, June 29,
2009, www.tvguide.com/News/Madoffs-Celebrity-Victims-1007493.aspx.
13
“90-Year-Old Madoff Victim Back at Work,” Associated Press, www.youtube.com/watch?v=
UsuCfz47d4U.
11
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Recruiting staff with specialized experience
Expanding and targeting training
Improving internal controls
Advocating for a whistleblower program
Seeking more resources
Integrating broker-dealer and investment adviser examinations
Enhancing the licensing, education, and oversight regime for “back-office” personnel

Appendix 7B, “SEC Center for Complaints and Enforcement Tips,” contains information on how to contact the SEC concerning complaints and enforcement tips. Appendix
7B also contains a summary of the portions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, which was signed into law in July 2010. Among other things, the
act establishes a whistleblower program that enables the SEC to pay an award, under regulations prescribed by the SEC and subject to certain limitations, to eligible whistleblowers
who voluntarily provide the SEC with original information about a violation of the federal
securities laws that leads to the successful enforcement of a covered judicial or administrative
action, or a related action, as defined by the act.

Madoff’s Auditor
David Friehling, a sole proprietor, was Madoff ’s auditor for more than 17 years. He failed to
conduct an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Additionally, he
was not independent with respect to his client. The Journal of Accountancy reported that the
AICPA expelled Friehling from the institute after concluding its own ethics investigation.
“Friehling essentially sold his license to Madoff for more than 17 years while Madoff ’s
Ponzi scheme went undetected,” James Clarkson, acting director of the SEC’s New York
Regional Office, said in a press release. “For all those years, Friehling deceived investors and
regulators.”14
Bloomberg reported the following about Friehling:15
David Friehling, the accountant for con artist Bernard Madoff, pleaded guilty for
his role in the largest U.S. Ponzi scheme and said he helped Madoff and others
prepare phony tax returns.
Friehling, 49, entered a guilty plea in Manhattan federal court. He pled guilty to
nine counts including securities fraud, investment-adviser fraud, and three counts
of obstructing tax law administration. In detailing the tax charges, he said he helped
Madoff and others prepare false returns. Friehling has reached a cooperation agreement with the government and is helping prosecutors with their probe.
The accountant, who served as Madoff ’s outside auditor since 1991, told U.S.
District Judge Alvin Hellerstein that he didn’t conduct an independent investiga“Madoff Auditor Charged with Securities Fraud,” March 19, 2009, www.journalofaccountancy.com/
Web/20091553.
15
David Glovin, “Bernard Madoff ’s Accountant Friehling Pleads Guilty,” Bloomberg, November 3, 2009,
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a1FZmJf7QVYE.
14
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tion of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC as accounting rules required
of him. He said he was unaware of Madoff ’s Ponzi scheme and accepted on ‘face
value’ his claims about the finances of the firm. ‘In surely the biggest mistake of
my life, I placed my trust in Bernard Madoff,’ Friehling told Hellerstein. ‘I am truly
sorry for the suffering of all the victims.’
‘David Friehling was one of the key enablers of Bernard Madoff ’s historic fraud,’
U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said in a statement. ‘Friehling has taken responsibility for his crimes and will now assist us in holding others accountable for their
involvement.’
Friehling said he began working with Horowitz (his father-in-law who retired
from the firm in 1998 and who died in 2009) in 1989 and took primary responsibility for the Madoff account in 1991. ‘At no time was I aware Bernard Madoff
was engaged in a Ponzi scheme,’ Friehling said in court. He also said that his family
held accounts with Madoff and that their accounts were wiped out in the fraud.
Friehling said he had no contact with Madoff ’s investors and didn’t bring investors into Madoff ’s fund. He admitted that he didn’t review material sources of
firm revenue, didn’t examine a bank account through which billions of dollars of
client funds flowed, and didn’t verify assets, liabilities or purported stock purchases.
From 2004 to 2007, he was paid from $12,000 to $14,500 a month for his services,
prosecutors said in court papers.
Friehling signed off on Madoff ’s 2007 statement claiming the firm had $1.09
billion in assets, liabilities of $425 million and equity of $668 million, the SEC
said in a civil lawsuit that Friehling settled. Friehling agreed to forfeit $3.1 million,
including property he owns in New City and at a resort community in Florida, as
the proceeds of his crimes. Friehling is a past president of the Rockland County
chapter of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants.

A Final Word on Ponzi Schemes
Since the Madoff Ponzi scheme, numerous other Ponzi schemes have been disclosed or
discovered by the SEC.
For example, in May 2010 the SEC alleges that Kenneth Starr (the investment adviser to
some of Hollywood’s biggest stars—not the Bill Clinton special prosecutor) conducted a
$30 million Ponzi scheme that scammed Martin Scorsese, Annie Leibovitz, Sylvester Stallone, and Wesley Snipes.16 As another example, in June 2010, the SEC charged four Canadian men and two others living in Florida with perpetrating a $300 million international
Ponzi scheme on investors in a purportedly successful gold mining operation.17 The SEC has
Daniel Indiviglio, “Kenneth Starr Charged With Running $30 Million Ponzi Scheme,” Atlantic, May 27,
2010, www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/05/kenneth-starr-charged-with-running-30-millionponzi-scheme/57362/.
17
SEC, “SEC Charges Perpetrators of $300 Million Ponzi Scheme Involving Purported Gold Mining
Investments,” news release, June 10, 2010, www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-99.htm.
16
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been pursuing numerous other Ponzi cases, including affinity Ponzi schemes.18 Perhaps the
reforms that the SEC has put in place have had a positive effect as Ponzi schemes are being
more aggressively pursued in a post-Madoff world.

Asset Flip (Real Property) Schemes
Property Flipping
The Home Flipping Guide defines property flipping as:
…the purchase of a real estate by a certain investor and quickly reselling it at a
higher price in just a matter of days or a few months. The technique is to look
for properties, especially homes, that are under-priced and whose values can be
marked up after some renovations. A home is normally sold at a lower price due
to several factors such as a divorce, the owner was laid off, the home is about to be
foreclosed or a death occurred in the household.19

The Legalities of Flipping
Flipping is not necessarily illegal. An individual who buys and then sells a home has technically “flipped” his or her home. However, flipping is illegal when several individuals conspire
to increase the price of real estate through non-arm’s–length transactions with the intent
of deceiving an unsuspecting and somewhat naïve buyer. The naïve buyer most likely will
never recoup the price of his or her home from a subsequent sale. Flipping sometimes involves mortgage fraud.20 An alleged mortgage fraud and real estate flipping case is provided
in exhibit 7-5.
Exhibit 7-5
Mortgage and Real Estate Flipping Case*

One of the largest mortgage fraud cases in the state of North Carolina’s history has gotten bigger.
More than 300 people who bought lots in several coastal Carolina subdivisions in 2006 and 2007 filed

SEC, “Affinity Fraud: How To Avoid Investment Scams That Target Groups,” www.sec.gov/investor/
pubs/affinity.htm. Affinity fraud refers to investment scams that prey upon members of identifiable groups,
such as religious or ethnic communities, the elderly, or professional groups. The fraudsters who promote
affinity scams frequently are—or pretend to be—members of the group. They often enlist respected community or religious leaders from within the group to spread the word about the scheme by convincing
those people that a fraudulent investment is legitimate and worthwhile. Many times, those leaders become
unwitting victims of the fraudster’s ruse.
19
Property flipping, “How to Flip Properties,” www.propertyflippinginfo.com/.
20
Mortgage fraud is one of the fastest growing white collar crimes in the United States. Mortgage fraud is
defined as a material misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission relied upon by an underwriter or lender
to fund, purchase, or insure a loan (Fraud Prevention, “Is Flipping Houses Illegal,” June 25, 2010, fraudusa.
us/2675/is-flipping-houses-illegal/).
18
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suit (in February 2010) because they believe the value of their property was destroyed by fraud allegations in the sales of nearby lots, which resulted in a scandal and a wave of foreclosures.
The subdivisions are Cannonsgate in Carteret County, Summerhouse in Onslow County, and Craven’s Grant in Georgetown, S.C. The new lawsuit, like several earlier suits alleging mortgage fraud,
seeks damages from the developers, lenders, appraisers, and others involved in the land there.
“When you look at these developments and see the foreclosure rates, it’s clear that the devastation
has spread to all the property there,” said David Binkley, a Michigan lawyer who filed the suit, along
with lawyer John S. O’Connor of Charlotte.
His clients were not directly defrauded, Binkley said, but the land flipping that allegedly inflated the
cost of some lots makes it almost impossible for anybody in the development to sell. Most potential
buyers have been scared off, and even the same banks that lent the plaintiffs money to buy lots
won’t lend there now.
Several attorneys in North Carolina and Virginia, including O’Connor, had filed at least four earlier
suits on behalf of more than 200 other property owners in the subdivisions. They claim that middle
men, primarily the Virginia firm, Total Realty Management, conspired with the developers, lending
agents, appraisers, and others to improperly inflate the price of lots that TRM sold as investments.
Some of the inflated prices, they claim, were built upon multiple fake sales by TRM of the same lot,
with the value (on paper at least) jumping with each sale, until finally it was sold at an inflated price
to an unwitting buyer. That “multiple flipping” (which in some cases doubled the apparent value of
the lots in a matter of months) helped persuade potential buyers that they could make quick profits,
according to the suits. It also gave appraisers who were in on the alleged scheme the ability to use
the values to put inflated values on other lots.
When the real estate bubble burst, land prices plummeted on the coast. In this case, though, the
value of the property fell much further than it would have without the alleged mortgage fraud, according to the new lawsuit.
In one case, a lot that just two years ago was deemed good enough collateral for a $369,000 loan,
sold recently to the lender for $45,000 at a foreclosure auction. The lender then got only $12,500 for it
in a cash transaction, said Binkley, the Michigan lawyer.
In many cases, Binkley’s clients say they got deals that covered the first year or two of payments,
but now find themselves shelling out monthly payments for something they believe has little or no
value. P. Jeffrey Ewert, a Charlotte neuropsychologist, said he bought a waterfront lot at Cannonsgate. “I was told there was no risk involved and they would be able to flip the lots quickly when we
were ready to sell,” he said. Ewert said he bought the lot from an employee of the developer’s sales
company, Mace Watts, for $649,000. Only later did he learn that Watts had bought the lot from the
developer for $400,000 shortly before.
Ewert’s deal included prepaid mortgage payments for the first year, but lately he has been making
payments of more than $2,000 a month. He is now planning to walk away from the loan regardless
of the effect on his credit because he can’t afford the payments and he doesn’t feel any moral responsibility to a lender he believes knew about the fraud. “It’s just throwing good money after bad,”
he said. Ewert’s lot was one of the most expensive in Cannonsgate. Now, after a similar lot sold for
$175,000, he figures it’s worth little more than one quarter of what he paid.
* Adapted from Jay Price, “Suit fuels fraud case,” News and Observer, February 21, 2010, www.newsobserver.
com/2010/02/21/350085/suit-fuels-fraud-case.html.
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Fix and Flip Scheme
Fix and flip schemes occur when a flipper will purchase a house at a relatively low price.The
flipper will make repairs and improvements and will then try to sell the house in a relatively
short time to achieve a gain on the sale of the real property. Sometimes the flipper will only
make cheap cosmetic repairs (such as carpeting over termite damaged subflooring) rather
than making substantive repairs. A case that involved fix and flip and mortgage fraud in low
income housing projects in Baltimore, Maryland, is provided in exhibit 7-6.
Exhibit 7-6
Fix and Flip Scheme*

Vincent Quayle and the folks at the St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center in Baltimore began to sense
something was wrong about 1997. That is when the number of people coming to them for foreclosure counseling began increasing exponentially. These people were not victims of recent unemployment, illness, or divorce, but people who had never really been able to afford the house they owned.
Andre Weitzman, a Baltimore attorney, got curious when in the process of representing Yvonne
Peaks, a woman whose newly purchased house had collapsed when the city demolished the one
next door, he discovered that Robert Beeman, the man she’d bought the house from for $83,000, had
bought it himself a month earlier for $15,000. From the property records, Weitzman found more than
a hundred other people who bought from Beeman at substantial markups on quick resales and sued
Beeman and G. Samson Ugorji, the appraiser, on their behalf in the spring of 1998.
In Baltimore, 2000 properties were resold within 120 days in the past 4 years for at least twice, and
sometimes up to 10 times, what the seller paid. According to the Cleveland Plain-Dealer, 1,000 flips,
worth more than $31 million, have occurred there since 1997, about 80 percent in the lowest income
East Side neighborhoods. Boston researcher John Anderson has been documenting the growth in
land flips in the low-income, predominantly minority neighborhoods there since the early 1990s. “So
much fraud, so little time,” he quipped.
* Adapted from Ada Focer, “Flip…Flip…Flip…Flop,” National Housing Institute, September/October 2000, www.nhi.org/
online/issues/113/focer.html.

Price Versus Value
Flipping is a cyclical problem embedded in the dysfunctional housing and mortgage markets
in low-income neighborhoods. Property flippers usually justify their profits in one of three
ways. First, they allege they got lucky and heard about a “bargain” they were in a position
to “snap up” at a below-market price. Second, they assert they are smarter than other buyers
in the market and saw unrecognized value in the property that they were able to market to
bring a higher sale price. Finally, and perhaps most common, sellers say they put value back
into the property by rehabbing it before reselling it.

The How To’s of Flipping Fraud
Flippers often call themselves “developers.” The more authentic among them buy houses
in poor neighborhoods at dirt cheap prices, replace the windows and put on vinyl siding,
then quickly sell them to unsuspecting first-time homebuyers at huge mark-ups. The less
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authentic among them simply buy and hold the property for a few months, weeks, days, or
even hours, before reselling them at double or even triple what they paid. The most criminal among them sell and resell the property to each other several times before selling it to a
buyer who never takes possession of it before defaulting on the mortgage in order to engineer a completely phony high-price sale.
These types of flippers do not do the substantive rehabilitation that would justify significantly higher sales, such as replacing faulty electrical, plumbing, or heating; replacing porches
or roofs; adding insulation; de-leading; and so on, and they do not use licensed contractors
who take out building permits and whose work is inspected by city inspectors.Yet the flippers claim if someone is willing to pay this much, that is how much it must be worth.
Take for example, the case of a buyer with absolutely no savings. Two identical houses are
for sale on the same street. One is selling for $50,000 and the other is selling for $100,000,
but the first would require a $5,000 down payment.The seller of the second house is willing
to take back a second mortgage for all the buyer’s cash expenses. The buyer has no choice.
He or she must buy the more expensive house or not buy at all.
This scenario does not prove that the house is worth $100,000. In this case, the financing
was not typical, the buyer was not in a position to negotiate anything, and the seller, in fact,
was able to set the price. Arguably, the buyer was not particularly well-informed or acting
in her or his own best interest when assuming a mortgage in excess of the property’s true,
$50,000 value.
At other times, the sales price may exceed value because the buyers are working in concert with the sellers and are not even attempting to negotiate the best price. Baltimore Sun
reporter John O’Donnell wrote about Mary Anne Shirvani Kintop, a Pennsylvania woman
who took out 12 mortgages for over $1 million in 8 different names, including those of her
2 young daughters. Her 7-year old took out 3 of the mortgages. A real estate broker,William
Otto Schmidbauer, was the seller in all the cases and had paid Kintop $800–$1,000 for the
use of her name for each mortgage. When O’Donnell found Kintop, she was living in poverty, recovering from a stroke and a long-time drug habit. Obviously, if Kintop paid $100,000
for a house, one cannot infer too much about its value on that basis alone.

Flips Frauds May Harm Whole Neighborhoods
When the fraudulently flipped properties go to foreclosure, as they almost inevitably do
(often all at once), prices plummet below actual market values until the excess supply is
absorbed. If another owner has to sell at that time, they risk getting less than they owe on
their mortgage.
Land flipping accelerates disinvestment. Rather than increasing the investment value of
properties, flippers pull value out of property, and the instability caused by high foreclosures
fractures the social fabric which ultimately lowers the actual values, not just the prices, of all
properties in the immediate neighborhood. The risk for other owners of getting no return
for improvements is often high enough to discourage them from significantly rehabbing
their own houses.
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Mortgage Fraud in Property Flips
Property flips almost invariably involve mortgage fraud. The proof of the fraud is in the loan
files, which contain fabricated appraisals and fabricated creditworthiness of the buyer.
A fabricated appraisal can misrepresent the condition of the property, or it can compare a
property to sales that are not really comparable, for example, comparing the property to that
of one in a more highly valued neighborhood or to a property that has also been flipped
recently.
The illusion a buyer can afford the mortgage is sometimes supported with falsified, or
even completely fabricated, documents. Forged paycheck stubs, federal tax returns, and credit
reports can now be created with a computer and a laser printer.
Community advocates and activists can help by learning to recognize and monitor property flipping in their own neighborhoods. Concerned parties should investigate the circumstances of each sale, publicize questionable findings as widely as possible, and protest lenders
whose loans make these manipulated sales possible.21

Flipping Red Flags
BITS is a not-for-profit, CEO-driven financial service industry consortium made up of 100
of the largest financial institutions in the United States. This organization had a subgroup,
BITS Mortgage Fraud Reduction Project Group, which issued a whitepaper entitled Mortgage Fraud Prevention: An Education and Awareness Toolkit for Consumers.22 This publication listed
the following property flipping red flags:
• The date of the appraisal is prior to the sales contract or application date.
• The seller identified on the sales contract does not own the property according to
real estate tax assessment records.
• The seller recently acquired the property for a significantly lower price or there
have been several transfers of the property according to the real estate tax assessment
record.
• The seller will acquire ownership through a quitclaim deed at closing.23
• The seller’s signature is inconsistent throughout the transaction documents.
• At closing, the HUD-1 Settlement Statement reflects unusual or previously undisclosed fees.
• The realtor, broker, or loan originator advises against obtaining a property inspection
or requires you to use a particular inspector.
Ada Focer, “Flip…Flip…Flip…Flop,” National Housing Institute, September/October 2000, www.nhi.
org/online/issues/113/focer.html. This article was written in 2000, but the fix and flip scheme is still occurring.
22
www.bits.org/publications/fraud/BITSMortgageFraudToolkit013108.pdf.
23
A quitclaim deed is a term used to describe a document by which a person (the grantor) disclaims any
interest the grantor may have in a piece of real property and passes that claim to another person (the
grantee). By contrast, the deeds normally used for real estate sales (called grant deeds or warranty deeds,
depending on the jurisdiction) contain guarantees from the grantor to the grantee that the title is clear
(Wikipedia, s.v. “quickclaim deed,” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quitclaim_deed).
21
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This group also listed the following red flags concerning the appraisal:
• The appraiser is associated with or is physically located in the realtor’s or broker’s
office.
• You are encouraged to misrepresent your intent to occupy the property.
• You are restricted from visually inspecting the property’s interior prior to
purchasing.
• The property is located in a high-risk area and nearby homes are in poor condition,
have recently foreclosed, and so on.
• The tax assessment for the current year is well below the asking price for the
property.
• Characteristics of the property (lot size, photographs, square footage, room count,
amenities, and so on), as reflected on the appraisal report, are inaccurate.
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Appendix 7A—SEC Response to
Madoff Ponzi Scheme1
In December 2008, Bernard L. Madoff admitted to perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. Shortly thereafter, the SEC began taking decisive and comprehensive steps to reduce the chances that such frauds will
occur or be undetected in the future. Today, the agency is continuing to reform and improve the way it
operates. Among other things, the SEC has been:
Revitalizing the Enforcement Division
Under the leadership of a new Enforcement Director, the SEC is restructuring the division to better
ensure that it focuses on significant cases that will have a meaningful impact. The restructuring will
reduce bureaucracy and speed up the enforcement process by removing a layer of management in the
1,100 person division. The newly structured division will include specialized units that will enable staff
in those units to concentrate their expertise in focused areas and help detect patterns, links, trends and
motives. In addition, the Division has streamlined internal processes to make investigative procedures
more efficient.
Revamping the Handling of Complaints and Tips
Each year, the SEC receives a massive number of tips and complaints. In order to improve the way it
handles them, the agency contracted with a federally funded research and development center to create
a centralized system for managing this information. Already, the team has reviewed and analyzed existing intake procedures and is currently working to improve the process for collecting, recording, investigating, referring and tracking this data. As part of the process, the agency is also working on a system
that will apply risk analytics, which will help to reveal links, trends, and patterns that might not be visible
when each complaint is examined one at a time. Additionally, the Enforcement Division is in the process
of creating a special unit to carefully screen and assign tips to the proper investigators.
Encouraging Greater Cooperation by “Insiders”
The SEC is crafting agreements to secure the cooperation of individuals who are on the “inside” of companies engaged in fraudulent activity. These cooperation agreements, similar to those used by criminal
law enforcement authorities, provide that insiders who offer truthful evidence and agree to cooperate
and testify would be eligible for a possible reduction in sanctions. Such cooperation agreements could
produce witnesses and key information early in investigations, enabling the agency to build stronger
cases more quickly.
Enhancing Safeguards for Investors’ Assets
In December the SEC will consider adopting rules that would better protect clients of investment advisers from theft and abuse. The rules, proposed in May, would provide greater assurance to investors that
their accounts contain the funds that their investment adviser and account statements say they contain.
Among other things, the proposed rules would encourage investment advisers to place their clients’ assets in the custody of an independent firm, unlike Bernard Madoff did.
Securities and Exchange Commission, “The Securities and Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms,” www.sec.gov/
spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm.
1
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Surprise Exams
One proposal would require investment advisers who control or have custody of their clients’ assets
to hire an independent public accountant to conduct an annual “surprise exam” to verify those assets
actually exist. This surprise examination would provide another set of eyes on the clients’ assets, thereby
offering additional protection against the theft or misuse of funds.
Third Party Reviews
A second proposal would apply to investment advisers who do not use independent firms to maintain
their clients’ assets. Such advisers would be required to obtain a third party written report assessing
the safeguards that protect the clients’ assets. The report—prepared by an accountant registered and
inspected by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board –would, among other things, describe the
controls that are in place to protect the assets, the tests performed on the controls, and the results of
those tests. Existing rules make no distinction between an investment adviser whose affiliate holds its
clients’ funds and an investment adviser that uses a truly independent custodian.
Improving Risk Assessment Capabilities
The SEC is improving its risk assessment procedures and techniques, agency-wide, to better identify
areas of risk to investors. For instance, the agency is enhancing the information that financial firms
submit and is improving techniques to better identify those particular firms that warrant a closer look.
The agency is also increasing collaboration with third parties and other government agencies. Finally,
the agency created a new Division of Risk, Strategy and Financial Innovation which will provide new
expertise in risk assessment, financial products and financial engineering.
Conducting Risk-Based Examinations of Financial Firms
The SEC dispatched its examiners to conduct a “sweep” of firms that present certain risk characteristics
to ensure, among other things, that the clients’ assets in fact exist. Such risks include advisers whose
clients’ assets are held with an affiliate, as opposed to an independent entity; hedge funds that seem
to have “smooth” or outlier returns; firms that use an unknown auditor or no auditor at all; firms with a
disciplinary history; and broker-dealers that sell an affiliate’s hedge fund or limited partnership.
Improving Fraud Detection Procedures for Examiners
The SEC instituted measures to improve the ability of examiners to detect fraud and other types of violations. Examiners across the country now routinely reach out to third parties such as custodians, counterparties and customers during exams to verify the existence and integrity of client assets managed by the
firm. In addition, the measures include more rigorous reviews of firms before the examiners enter the
premises, and a more complete exam guide that focuses not only on obvious signs of fraud but also more
subtle signals that deserve closer inspection, such as a firm using an unknown accountant. The measures also include expanded use of exams of an entire entity when firms have joint or dual registrants
such as affiliated broker-dealers and investment advisers.
Recruiting Staff with Specialized Experience
The SEC has been bringing in new staff with diverse skill sets to expand its knowledge base and improve
its ability to assess risk, conduct examinations, detect and investigate wrongdoing, and focus our priorities. Some initial examples included:
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Senior Specialized Examiners
The agency has hired new staffers to the examination unit—and will bring on board more—who have
specialized experience in areas such as trading, operations, portfolio management, options, compliance,
valuation, new instruments and portfolio strategies, and forensic accounting.
Additional Staff with Capital Markets Expertise
The agency has been hiring additional staff with expertise in modern financial products and techniques—such as derivatives and hedge fund activities. Now, other staffers can tap into that expertise
to help them identify emerging issues and understand the ways the industry is changing. Such expertise
can also be helpful in efforts to improve the techniques used in examinations and the collection and
analysis of data.
Expanding and Targeting Training
The SEC has provided—and will continue to provide—staff training related to hedge funds and specialized products; derivatives and options; the verification of trades and custody arrangement; and the use of
databases maintained by exchanges and clearinghouses, among other things. Additionally, hundreds of
staffers have been training to become Certified Fraud Examiners, and the SEC is expanding the availability of programs for staffers to become Certified Financial Analysts and Chartered Alternative Investment
Analysts.
Improving Internal Controls
The examination unit and enforcement division each has implemented a quarterly review program to help
ensure that important issues are resolved in a thorough and timely manner and that no exam or investigation falls through the cracks. As part of the quarterly review programs, managers will meet to review
and discuss all open exams and investigations and address whether additional expertise is needed to
resolve issues, finalize exams and bring investigations to conclusion.
Advocating for a Whistleblower Program
The SEC has requested expanded authority from Congress to reward whistleblowers who bring forward
substantial evidence about significant federal securities violations. In proposed legislation that the
Chairman sent to Congress, a fund would be established to pay whistleblowers using money collected
from wrongdoers that is not otherwise distributed to investors. Variations of this legislation are being
considered by both the House and Senate.
Seeking More Resources
The SEC has been seeking additional funding to hire more examiners who can go into more financial
firms to see whether they are in compliance with the law, as well as for more enforcement staff who can
bring more enforcement cases when fraud and other violations of the law are found. In recent years, the
SEC has not had adequate resources to oversee the securities industry. For example, the SEC has just
over 450 people in its exam program to examine the more than 11,000 regulated investment advisers and
8,000 mutual funds. Congress is considering legislation that would increase both the level and flexibility
of funding for the SEC.
Integrating Broker-Dealer and Investment Adviser Examinations
The SEC has instituted several measures to integrate the broker-dealer and investment adviser examination programs. The New York Regional Office, for example, has adopted a protocol that will integrate
examination teams to make sure people with the right skill sets are assigned to examinations. Under the
new protocol, a single team of examiners, drawn from the broker-dealer and investment management
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units, will jointly examine selected firms to ensure that the examination team includes those most expert
in the subject of the exam. In addition, the examination program has expanded opportunities for examiners to cross-train and increase coordination between broker-dealer and investment management staff on
their examination plans.
Enhancing the Licensing, Education and Oversight Regime for “Back-Office” Personnel
Working with senior SEC staff, FINRA has committed to establish a new system to enhance the oversight
and professional requirements of personnel performing back-office functions at broker-dealer firms.
“Back-office” personnel typically perform critical custody, accounting, transfer agency and account
maintenance functions. They have an important role that must be performed with skill and integrity.
Under the regime FINRA is developing, certain back-office personnel would be subject to licensing
and education requirements as well as enhanced oversight. Such a regime would further promote the
qualifications and professionalism of those performing back-office functions so that client accounts are
better protected.
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Appendix 7B—SEC Center for
Complaints and Enforcement Tips
You can file a complaint or provide the SEC with tips on potential securities law violations though the
following link: http://www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml. The SEC welcomes hearing from you because your
information may alert them to broker or firm misconduct, an unfair practice in the securities industry that
needs to be changed, or the latest fraud.1
Information for Whistleblowers
On July 21, 2010, the President signed into law the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” (the “Act”). Among other things, the Act establishes a whistleblower program that enables
the Securities and Exchange Commission to pay an award, under regulations prescribed by the SEC and
subject to certain limitations, to eligible whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the SEC with original
information about a violation of the federal securities laws that leads to the successful enforcement of a
covered judicial or administrative action, or a related action, as defined by the Act.
The SEC has 270 days from the date of enactment to issue final regulations implementing the whistleblower program and is in the process of preparing a rule proposal. Compliance with the regulations will
be a prerequisite to an award, so please check with the SEC for updated information concerning the
regulations if you wish to be considered for an award.
The Act states that “information provided to the Commission in writing by a whistleblower shall not lose
the status of original information...solely because the whistleblower provided the information prior to the
effective date of the regulations, if the information is provided by the whistleblower after the date of enactment.” If you wish to submit information regarding a potential violation of the federal securities laws,
please use their online form, or mail the information to the SEC Complaint Center.
The Act expressly prohibits retaliation by employers against individuals who become whistleblowers
under SEC rules and provides them with a private cause of action in the event that they are discharged or
discriminated against by their employers in violation of the Act. In addition, OSHA’s Office of the Whistleblower Protection Program continues to administer the whistleblower protection provisions under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
The SEC can best respond to you if it receives accurate and complete information. Though you are not
required to furnish any more information than you wish, critical information for them to completely evaluate your complaint or tip includes:
• Your name, mail and e-mail addresses, and telephone numbers.
• The name, mail and e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, and website address of any individual or
company you mention in the complaint.
• Specific details of how, why, and when you were defrauded or encountered problems with investments or your broker or adviser.
The SEC will thoroughly review and evaluate your information so that it may refer it to the appropriate
SEC office. The Office of Investor Education and Advocacy will handle certain general questions about
1

Securities and Exchange Commission, “Questions and Complaints,” www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml.
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the securities laws and complaints relating to financial professionals or a complainant’s personal financial matters. The professionals in this office can counsel you regarding possible remedies and may,
under appropriate circumstances, approach brokerage firms, advisers or other financial professional
concerning matters you have raised.
Attorneys in the Division of Enforcement evaluate information and tips concerning violations of the
federal securities laws. It is the general policy of the SEC to conduct its investigations on a confidential
basis to preserve the integrity of its investigative process as well as to protect persons against whom
unfounded charges may be made or where the SEC determines that enforcement action is not necessary
or appropriate.
Subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, the SEC cannot disclose the existence or
non-existence of an investigation and any information gathered unless made a matter of public record in
proceedings brought before the SEC or in the courts. You can find information about public enforcement
actions on their website.
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Bribery, Conflicts of Interest, and
Other Corruption Fraud Schemes
Overview
This chapter addresses corruption schemes. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
(ACFE) defines corruption as follows:
In the context of occupational fraud, corruption refers to schemes in which fraudsters use their influence in business transactions in a way that violates their duty to
their employers in order to obtain a benefit for themselves or someone else. For
example, employees might receive or offer bribes, extort funds from third parties,
or engage in conflicts of interest.1

Corruption schemes are a significant fraud category per the ACFE’s studies. The percentage of reported cases of corruption schemes was more than the percentage of cases for
fraudulent financial reporting, and the median loss was greater than the median loss for
misappropriation of assets for the most recent two ACFE studies.
Recent ACFE studies found that corruption schemes accounted for 26.9 percent of all
occupational fraud cases in 2008 and rose to 32.8 percent in 2010. However, the median
loss per case decreased from $375,000 in 2008 to $250,000 in 2010.2 Data for the United
States only showed that corruption schemes decreased from 26.9 percent in 2008 to 21.9
percent in 2010. The corruption scheme median loss in the United States also decreased
from $375,000 in 2008 to $175,000 in 2010.
The four corruption sub-schemes in the ACFE studies include bribery, conflicts of interest, illegal gratuities, and economic extortions. Because data was not presented for all four
sub-categories, bribery and conflicts of interest schemes were selected to be among the top
10 most common fraud schemes based upon a review of professional literature which presented more fraud cases using these schemes when compared with the illegal gratuities and

Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), 2008 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and
Abuse (2008).
2
Per the ACFE 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, the study is based upon 1,843
cases. The offenses occurred in more than 100 countries on 6 continents, and more than 43 percent took
place outside the United States.
1
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economic extortion schemes. However, this chapter will also cover examples of the illegal
gratuities and economic extortion corruption sub-schemes.
All four corruption schemes are addressed in this chapter. Numerous real-world examples
of these schemes are provided, as it is believed that many readers will not be as familiar with
corruption schemes as they are with fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of
assets fraud schemes.

Conflicts of Interest Schemes
A legal dictionary defines conflict of interest as follows:
A term used to describe the situation in which a public official or fiduciary who,
contrary to the obligation and absolute duty to act for the benefit of the public
or a designated individual, exploits the relationship for personal benefit, typically
pecuniary.
In certain relationships, individuals or the general public place their trust and
confidence in someone to act in their best interests. When an individual has the
responsibility to represent another person—whether as administrator, attorney, executor, government official, or trustee—a clash between professional obligations
and personal interests arises if the individual tries to perform that duty while at the
same time trying to achieve personal gain. The appearance of a conflict of interest
is present if there is a potential for the personal interests of an individual to clash
with fiduciary duties, such as when a client has his or her attorney commence an
action against a company in which the attorney is the majority stockholder.3

An example of conflict of interest is an employee who has a financial interest in one or
more of the company’s vendors. If the employee is in a position to influence the amount of
business the company conducts with the company, then a conflict of interest exists. If that
conflict of interest causes the company to acquire more than the requisite amount of goods
or if a higher price is paid than an arm’s–length transaction, then fraud has occurred. This
is because the employee will derive economic benefit due to his or her financial interest in
the vendor who has increased revenue because of the increased business from the employee
who has a conflict of interest.The employee with the conflict of interest is working in his or
her best interest, not the company’s best interest. The economic loss to the company is the
acquisition of unnecessary or overpriced goods and services.4
Exhibit 8-1 provides an example of a policy to avoid conflicts of interest schemes.

The Free Dictionary, s.v. “conflict of interest,” http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/conflict+
of+interest.
4
Flatrock, “Fraud Occurs When: Fraud, Conflict of Interest, Breach of Duty, Embezzlement,” www.
flatrock.org.nz/topics/money_politics_law/fraud_occurs_when_this_exists.htm.
3
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The ACFE conflicts of interest sub-schemes include sales schemes and purchasing schemes.
A retail organization periodical provides the following definitions for sales and purchasing
schemes:5
A sales scheme occurs when an employee sells the employer’s product to the related party at a discount that would otherwise not have been available or warranted.
This creates a loss of revenue to the employer that they would have otherwise
received. The same amount of monetary benefit is received by the related party.
A purchasing scheme occurs when the employee favors a supplier in which
they have a commercial interest, even if the price is comparable to other suppliers.
There are two possible causes of loss in these cases. The good or service could be
overpriced, or the quality of the supply may be reduced.This may not immediately
cause a monetary loss, but may damage efficiency and goodwill in the long term.

As an example of a sales scheme, a major electronics retail chain allowed its store managers
to discount damaged merchandise. One store manager sold a plasma television to a neighbor
at a discount, stating that the plasma television had scratches on the screen frame. In reality,
the plasma television was in perfect condition.
A preventive control would be to require all merchandise that is discounted by the manager to have the item’s discount limited to a certain amount or percentage of the item’s price
that is established by corporate management. Another preventative control is to advise store
employees that surveillance equipment, such as webcams, have been installed throughout the
store, and that the store is continuously monitored by a theft prevention group located at
corporate headquarters. An additional preventive control would be to advise all store managers that mystery shoppers are used to observe operations.6 Finally, the retail chain could
establish a whistleblower hotline for employees and others (customers, vendors, and so on)
to report unethical behavior.
A detective control to prevent this scheme is for corporate management to review the
sales discounts approved by the store manager to assess if the discounts are excessive. Also, a
frequency distribution of discounts by product line might highlight that a particular product (such as a plasma television) has more discounts than other product lines. This red flag
would cause management to investigate reasons for this discrepancy (such as a store manager
receiving “tips” for discounting merchandise, the purchasing manager getting a kickback for
buying substandard products, and so on).
As an example of a purchasing scheme, a purchasing manager of a construction contractor favored one particular company to supply concrete in the construction of elementary
schools. The purchasing manager had an ownership interest in the concrete company. After
several years, one of the elementary school’s gymnasiums collapsed as the basement foundation consisted of substandard concrete.

C-Stores: Retail Works, “Collusion and Bribery,” www.cstores.co.za/people-managment/operations-amaintenance/fraud/18-collusion-and-bribery.
6
Mystery shoppers pose as customers and are hired by the corporate office to observe operations. Store
employees are unable to distinguish a mystery shopper from a real customer.
5
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Preventative controls would include rotating the vendors and using competitive bids. The
company could rotate the vendors among the purchasing agents so that no one purchasing agent would work continuously with the same vendors. Additionally, competitive bids
should be obtained for products and services to be provided to the company.
Controls to detect purchasing schemes include a review of vendors who consistently are
awarded contracts. The review should be conducted to assess the reasons (better product,
more timely delivery, kickback to the company’s purchasing agents, conflict of interest, and
so on) why these vendors are awarded contracts.
A preventive control over both of these schemes is to have a conflicts of interest policy that
is understood by all employees. The policy should include acceptable behavior conducted
with vendors (such as acceptance of gifts and so on), co-workers, and others. Employees
should sign-off each year that they have read and understand the conflicts of interest policy.
An example of a conflicts of interest policy is provided in exhibit 8-1.
Exhibit 8-1
3M Business Conduct Policies—Conflicts of Interest Policy*

Policy statement
It is 3M policy that employees and others acting on 3M’s behalf must be free from conflicts of interest that could adversely influence their judgment, objectivity or loyalty to the company in conducting
3M business activities and assignments. The company recognizes that employees may take part in
legitimate financial, business, charitable and other activities outside their 3M jobs, but any potential
conflict of interest raised by those activities must be disclosed promptly to management.
What it means
• Request management approval of outside activities, financial interests or relationships that may
pose a real or potential conflict of interest. Remember that management approval is subject to
ongoing review, so you need to periodically update your management on your involvement.
• Avoid personal relationships with other 3M employees where parties in the relationship may
receive or give unfair advantage or preferential treatment because of the relationship.
• Avoid actions or relationships that might conflict or appear to conflict with your job responsibilities or the interests of 3M.
• Even the appearance of a conflict of interest can damage an important company interest.
• Obtain necessary approvals before accepting any position as an officer or director of an outside
business concern.
• Prior to serving on the board of directors of a bona fide charitable, educational or other nonprofit
organization, you are encouraged to advise your management and 3M Community Affairs (in
the United States) or your human resources manager (in other countries). Community Affairs
(Volunteer@mmm.com) may connect you with volunteer resources such as 3M Volunteer Match
or training.
What to avoid
• Working with a business outside your 3M responsibilities that are in competition with any 3M
business.
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• Accepting a gift that does not meet the standards in the 3M Business Gifts and Entertainment
Policy.
• Having a direct or indirect financial interest in or a financial relationship with a 3M competitor,
supplier or customer (except for insignificant stock interests in publicly-held companies).
• Taking part in any 3M business decision involving a company that employs your spouse or family
member.
• Having a second job where your other employer is a direct or indirect competitor, distributor, suppler or customer of 3M.
• Having a second job or consulting relationship that affects your ability to satisfactorily perform
your 3M assignments.
• Using nonpublic 3M information for your personal gain or advantage, or for the gain or advantage
of another, including the purchase or sale of securities in a business 3M is interested in acquiring, selling or otherwise establishing or terminating business relations with.
• Investing in an outside business opportunity in which 3M has an interest, except for having an
insignificant stock interest in publicly held companies.
• Receiving personal discounts or other benefits from suppliers, service providers or customers
that are not available to all 3M employees.
• Receiving personal honoraria for services you perform that are closely related to your work at
3M. Your supervisor should approve occasional honoraria, such as for a university presentation
or symposium.
• Having romantic relationships with certain other employees where: there is an immediate reporting relationship between the employees; there is no direct reporting relationship between the employees but where a romantic relationship could cause others to lose confidence in the judgment
or objectivity of either employee; or the relationship could cause embarrassment to the company.
Note. In some circumstances, romantic relationships between employees may raise compliance
issues under the 3M Harassment Policy.
* http://solutions.3m.com/wps/portal/3M/en_US/businessconduct/bcmain/policy/policies/protect3m/conflictofinterest.

Bribery Schemes
The ACFE defines bribery as follows:
Bribery includes official bribery, which refers to the corruption of a public official,
and commercial bribery, which refers to the corruption of a private individual to
gain a commercial or business advantage. The elements of official bribery vary by
jurisdiction, but generally are:
giving or receiving a thing of value to influence an official act.
The thing of value isn’t limited to cash or money. Courts have held that such
things as lavish gifts and entertainment, payment of travel and lodging expenses,
payment of credit card bills, “loans,” promises of future employment, and interests
in business can be bribes if they were given or received with the intent to influ-
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ence or be influenced. Some state statutes might distinguish between felonies or
misdemeanors according to the amount of illegal payment.
Proof of corrupt influence often involves demonstration that the person receiving the bribe favored the bribe-payer in some improper or unusual way, such as
by providing preferential treatment, bending or breaking the rules, taking extraordinary steps to assist the bribe-payer, or allowing the bribe-payer to defraud the
agency or company. It isn’t necessary, however, that the prosecution or plaintiff
demonstrate that the bribe-taker acted improperly; a bribe might be paid to induce an official to perform an act that otherwise would be legal, or an act that the
official might have performed without a bribe. Bribery schemes involving these
circumstances, however, are difficult to prove and lack appeal for prosecution.7

Another source defines bribery as follows:
The most commonly known collusion fraud is bribery, something given to influence a specific act to happen, whether given after an act has been performed or
made to obtain a future benefit or information.8

The ACFE notes that bribery sub-schemes include kickbacks and bid rigging.
Bribery schemes are more difficult to discover than misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial reporting fraud schemes because bribery transactions are typically not recorded
on the books. For example, there is no debit to “fraud expense” when a bribe is paid. Most
misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial reporting fraud schemes require a journal
entry to be made to perpetrate these schemes.
See exhibits 8-2 and 8-3 for examples of two real-world bribery cases. Exhibit 8-2 provides an example of a kickback scheme that is more fully discussed later in the chapter. Exhibit 8-3 provides an example of bribe paid to obtain a political favor.
Exhibit 8-2
Bribery, Fraud, and Conspiracy Related to Defense Contracts in Afghanistan*

Overview
Two U.S. military officials pleaded guilty to various bribery, fraud, and conspiracy charges relating
to Department of Defense (DOD) contracts in Afghanistan, the Department of Justice announced.
A third military official pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property, which was obtained through the
bribery conspiracy. In addition, four DOD contractors and four affiliated contracting companies
were indicted for their roles in paying bribes to the military officials and otherwise defrauding the
United States.
Christopher P. West, a U.S. Army Major from Chicago who served in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2005,
pleaded guilty to charges including three counts of bribery and three counts of conspiracy. West
admitted to accepting $90,000 cash from contractors in exchange for awarding DOD contracts at
Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. West also pleaded guilty to two additional counts of conspiracy for
accepting cash payments from contractors in exchange for defrauding DOD by certifying inflated
numbers of bunkers and barriers delivered at Bagram Airfield, causing the DOD to pay for goods
ACFE, The Fraud Trial, www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Products/Self-Study_CPE/
Fraud-Trial-2011-Chapter-Excerpt.pdf.
8
Worrells, “Collusion and Bribery Schemes,” www.worrells.net.au.
7
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that were invoiced but never received. Bunkers and barriers are cement structures used for force
protection and perimeter walls. West agreed to pay $500,000 in restitution to DOD, to forfeit any
fraud-related assets to the United States and to cooperate with the department’s investigation.
Department’s Investigation
Charles Patton, a friend of West’s and a U.S. Army Sergeant from Chicago, pleaded guilty to charges
of receiving stolen property. Although a member of the same military unit as West, Patton was not
deployed to Afghanistan. Patton admitted that he received shipments of cash from West in 2004 and
2005, while West was deployed. Patton hid the money in his home until West returned to the United
States and retrieved the cash. Later, at West’s request, Patton moved the money to a safe deposit
box in his own name. Patton has agreed to pay $100,000 in restitution, to forfeit any fraud-related
assets, and to cooperate with the Department’s investigation.
Patrick W. Boyd, a U.S. Air Force Master Sergeant from Rockledge, Fla., who served as a contracting officer at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005, pleaded guilty to three counts of bribery
and three counts of conspiracy for accepting $90,000 cash from contractors in exchange for the
award of DOD contracts at Bagram Airfield. Boyd also admitted to the additional offense conduct of
receiving $25,000 in cash from a contractor in return for the award of a telecommunications infrastructure contract at Bagram Airfield. Boyd has agreed to pay $130,000 in restitution to the DOD, to
forfeit any fraud-related assets, and to cooperate with the Department’s investigation.
The superseding indictment also charges brothers Assad John Ramin and Tahir Ramin, (both U.S.
citizens) and their companies AZ Corporation and Top’s Construction; Noor Alam, an Afghan citizen,
and his company Northern Reconstruction Organization; and Abdul Qudoos Bakhshi, an Afghan
citizen, and his company Naweed Bakhshi Company, with various counts of bribery, fraud, and conspiracy. The indictment alleges that these individuals and their companies conspired to and did pay
bribes to West, Boyd, and others in order to obtain contracts for supplying concrete bunkers and
barriers and asphalt paving. It also charges that the contractors, along with West and others, conspired to and did inflate the number of bunkers and barriers delivered to Bagram Airfield, thereby
causing the DOD to pay for bunkers and barriers that were invoiced for but never delivered.
* Adapted from U.S. Department of Justice, “Two Military Officials Plead Guilty to Bribery, Fraud and Conspiracy Related to
Defense Contracts in Afghanistan,” news release, June 19, 2009, www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/247257.
htm.

Exhibit 8-3
Jury Convicts HealthSouth Founder in Bribery Trial*

An Alabama jury convicted HealthSouth Corp. founder Richard M. Scrushy of paying half a million
dollars in bribes to former governor Don Siegelman in exchange for a seat on a state health-care
board.
A year ago, a separate federal jury in Birmingham acquitted Scrushy of three dozen fraud counts
in connection with a $2.7 billion accounting fraud at HealthSouth, the nation’s largest operator of
rehabilitation hospitals. That acquittal came despite testimony from every 1 of the 5 finance chiefs in
the company’s history implicating Scrushy in the fraud. Jurors convicted Siegelman, 60, of 7 bribery,
conspiracy and fraud counts but acquitted him of racketeering and 25 other charges.
The two-month trial featured the sworn account of Scrushy’s onetime investment banker at UBS,
former finance chief, Michael Martin, and gubernatorial aide, Nick Bailey, who told jurors that
Scrushy had directed HealthSouth and affiliated businesses to make contributions to Siegelman’s
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lottery campaign in a clear attempt to win a voice on an influential state commission that controlled
hospital expansion.
Siegelman, a Democrat, served one term as Alabama’s highest elected official, exiting in 2003. He
mounted a bid to return to the governor’s mansion in 2006. But the veteran politician overwhelmingly
lost the Democratic primary in a campaign that overlapped with his criminal trial.
Scrushy, a former physical therapist who grew wealthy enough from his HealthSouth stock to
purchase Gulf Coast vacation homes, impressionist art, diamonds, and armored vehicles, remains a
polarizing figure in Alabama.
Scrushy also made an unusual, brief appearance at the criminal trial of former Enron Corp. leaders Kenneth L. Lay and Jeffrey K. Skilling, telling a reporter he was trying to “rebuild his life” and
expressing disdain for witnesses who cooperated with the government. The key witness against
Scrushy in his accounting fraud trial was sentenced to five years in prison. In a rare turnabout, that
witness’s lawyer went on to defend Scrushy in the corruption trial.
The Wall Street Journal later reported on Scrushy’s sentence:
Richard Scrushy was sentenced to nearly seven years in prison for bribery, and a federal judge denied
his bid to remain free pending appeal, putting the HealthSouth founder behind bars immediately. Said
Scrushy’s wife: ‘It’s a sad day in America today. I just want to go home and be with my babies and try to
explain what has happened in America today.’†
* Adapted from Carrie Johnson, “Jury Convicts HealthSouth Founder in Bribery Trial,” Washington Post, June 30, 2006,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/29/AR2006062901912.html.
† Peter Lattman, “HealthSouth’s Richard Scrushy is Behind Bars,” Wall Street Journal Law Blog, June 29, 2007, http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/29/healthsouths-richard-scrushy-is-behind-bars/.

Bid Rigging
The ACFE categorizes bid rigging as a bribery sub-scheme.
A business dictionary defines bid rigging as follows:
An illegal conspiracy where competitors join to artificially increase the prices of
goods and/or services offered in bids to potential customers. It may also include
carving up the potential business between the conspirators.9
Sometimes a company insider provides bids received from numerous competitors and the insider advises his external co-conspirator of the amounts bid so the
co-conspirator can submit a last minute bid at the lowest price. The company insider sometimes has a financial interest in the co-conspirator’s business or receives
a kickback.

Exhibit 8-4 provides an example of bid rigging at a financial institution.
Exhibit 8-4
Former Bank Executive Pleads Guilty To Bribery, Fraud (Bid Rigging)*

A former vice president with Fleet Bank and Bank of America has pleaded guilty to bribery and fraud
in a scheme to rig bids in Fleet’s sale of distressed loans, the U.S. attorney for Connecticut said
Thursday.
9

BusinessDictionary, s.v. “bid rigging,” www.businessdictionary.com/definition/bid-rigging.html.
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Kevin J. O’Keefe, 48, of Middletown, pleaded guilty Wednesday before U.S. District Judge Alvin W.
Thompson to one count of conspiracy to commit financial institution bribery and one count of bank
fraud, Acting U.S. Attorney Nora R. Dannehy said.
O’Keefe conspired with a lawyer and a real estate developer to create shell companies that bid
for distressed loans Fleet Bank was selling, according to prosecutors. † O’Keefe, who worked at
Fleet and its successor, Bank of America, from late 2001 until early 2007, used his bank job to obtain
confidential information that he provided to his co-conspirators.
The conspirators used the information to submit attractive bids for the loans. In all, they reaped
more than $1.5 million through their schemes, prosecutors said.
The lawyer and the real estate developer, both from Connecticut, have so far been identified only
as “Individual A” and “Individual B.” They have not been charged with any crimes, U.S. attorney’s
spokesman Tom Carson said. The investigation is continuing.
It is not clear exactly how the money was divided, but O’Keefe received $500,000 or more, according
to prosecutors. To further aid the conspiracy, O’Keefe gave his partners the best available details
on loans the bank was selling while providing other bidders with outdated information, prosecutors
said. In some cases, O’Keefe disqualified competing bidders to improve the conspirators’ chances.
In pleading guilty, O’Keefe also admitted that he and the lawyer sought to defraud both Bank of
America and a client of the lawyer who wanted a release for an old mortgage, prosecutors said.
Discovering no record of the mortgage in the bank’s records, O’Keefe nonetheless authorized a
release in exchange for $55,000, they said.
Richard R. Brown, O’Keefe’s Hartford attorney, said his client pleaded guilty because he “greatly
regrets his misconduct.” Brown said O’Keefe no longer works for Bank of America or “any financial
institution,” but has found other employment. Brown declined to say what type of work, or where.
The real estate developer was sentenced to thirty months in prison and must forfeit to the government real estate valued at $2 million and made restitution to a victim investor per an April 30, 2010
Department of Justice Press Release.‡
* Adapted from “Former Bank Executive Pleads Guilty To Bribery, Fraud,” Hartford Courant, June 13, 2008, available at
http://cable.tmcnet.com/news/2008/06/13/3497159.htm.
† A shell company is not operated for itself. It is a company that has no independent assets or operations of its own, but is
used by its owners to conduct specific business dealings or maintain control of other companies (www.bing.com/Dictionary/Search?q=define+shell+company).
‡ FBI, New Haven Division, “Real Estate Developer Sentenced to 30 Months in Federal Prison for Role in Bribery Scheme,”
news release, April 30, 2010, http://newhaven.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nh043010a.htm.

Kickbacks
The ACFE lists kickbacks as a bribery sub-scheme. A forensic CPA firm defines kickbacks as
follows:
Kickbacks are payments received by the employee from the third party after the
influence has resulted in a gain to the other person. These payments are usually
given to obtain a favorable decision, or to obtain influence from the employee in
relation to the employer purchasing something from or selling something to the
third party.10

10

www.worrells.net.au.
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Exhibit 8-5 contains an example of an alleged kickback by a global supply manager at
Apple Computers.
Exhibit 8-5
Apple Computers Manager Indicted for Kickbacks, Wire Fraud, and Money Laundering*

A manager at technology company Apple has been indicted by a federal grand jury in California on
charges including taking kickbacks, wire fraud and money laundering, according to court documents.
Paul Shin Devine, a global supply manager at Apple, is accused of accepting more than $1 million in
kickbacks from half a dozen Asian suppliers of iPhone and iPod accessories, the San Jose Mercury
News reported. Devine appeared in court on Friday, according to court documents.
Cupertino, California-based Apple also filed a civil suit against Devine and claimed he received more
than $1 million in payments, kickbacks, and bribes over several years, the newspaper reported.
Devine was charged in the indictment with 23 counts of wire fraud, money laundering, conspiracy
and kickbacks by a federal grand jury on Wednesday, court documents showed. He is scheduled to
return to court on Monday to have a lawyer appointed for him, according to the documents.
Devine allegedly used his position at Apple to obtain confidential information that he shared with
Apple suppliers to help them negotiate favorable contracts with Apple, the Mercury News reported.
In return, the suppliers paid Devine kickbacks, which he allegedly shared with Andrew Ang of Singapore, the newspaper reported. Ang was charged with three counts of wire fraud and conspiracy,
according to the court documents.
The investigation was conducted jointly by the FBI and Internal Revenue Service.
* Adapted from “Apple manager accused of bribery, fraud,” Reuters, available at www.stuff.co.nz/technology/4026089/
Apple-manager-accused-of-bribery-fraud.

Kickbacks and Bid Rigging Controls and Red Flags
A forensic accounting firm provides these controls concerning kickback and bid rigging
schemes:11
• Conduct searches on unknown tenderers (those making the bid) and the people
behind the businesses (see www.knowx.com).
• Request references from people who have dealt with any unknown tenderers in the
past and whether there were cost increases or the work was of sufficient quality.
• Structure the decision-making process to provide for the greatest exposure and accountability.
• Require that at least two people either make or review a decision involving competitive bidding. The need for collusion will reduce the chances of bribes being
effective and therefore used.

11

www.worrells.net.au.
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Some other controls to prevent kickback and bid rigging schemes include12
• rotating the vendors among the purchasing agents (or whoever receives bids).
• closely supervising the bidding process.
• providing adequate separation of duties between vendor approval, purchase requisitions, purchase approval, receiving, and payment.
• utilizing whistleblower hotlines to report inappropriate behavior.
• providing a conflict of interest policy that includes a vendor policy section regarding
gifts, kickbacks, and so on and ensuring that appropriate personnel sign this policy
annually.
• talking to the vendor’s competitors—they might have knowledge of kickbacks if the
competitors were not awarded the contract.
• performing background checks on employees on an unannounced basis to highlight
exorbitant lifestyles or other behavior (such as criminal activity). Refer to www.
lexisnexis.com/risk/.
• requiring all bids to be submitted in sealed envelopes that are not opened until the
bid time deadline.
A forensic accounting firm provides these red flags concerning kickback and bid rigging
schemes:13
• Numerous contracts being awarded to the same supplier under terms that were
unusual or were not the most commercially offered
• Common patterns in tenders (offers) being received, particularly where the same
calculations, components, or mistakes appears in multiple tenders
• The winning tenders consistently being the last to tender or being altered at the last
minute, indicating that they were waiting for information to be provided about the
other tenders
• The winning tenders being consistently just less than the next lowest tender, indicating that the tenderer received details of the other tenders to undercut the lowest
price
• Low tenderers excessively charging for variations to contracts, resulting in contract
payments that are in excess of the other tenders
• One employee consistently pushing for contracts to be awarded to one or a few
tenders even though they may not appear to be the best tenderer
• Employees living above their means or purchasing items that do not naturally match
their income level

Joseph T. Wells, “The Case of the Pilfering Purchase Manager,” Journal of Accountancy (May 2004), www.
journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2004/May/TheCaseOfThePilferingPurchaseManager.htm.
13
Ibid.
12
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Some other red flags for kickbacks and bid rigging include when14
• the purchasing agent does not take time off.
• the purchasing agent or bid supervisor has personal financial problems.
• there is a close personal relationship between purchasing agent or bid supervisor and
vendor, contractor, or subcontractor.
• more inventory, supplies, or services are ordered than needed.
• goods are frequently returned due to low quality.
• departments may be over budget in their expenses.
• there is a higher volume of purchases to one or more selected vendors.
• the price of items purchased is higher than competitors or the quality is substandard
(presumably because the vendor is covering the cost of the kickback).

Illegal Gratuities
The ACFE lists illegal gratuities as a corruption sub-scheme. An illegal gratuity is defined as
follows:
Under criminal law, bribery occurs when someone directly or indirectly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official with the intent to influence
any official act. Essentially, a bribe requires a corrupt intent to influence an official
(seeking a quid pro quo) but the official need not reciprocate to constitute a crime.
The criminal illegal gratuity statute is violated when someone directly or indirectly
gives, offers, or promises anything of value to a public official for or because of any
official act. Unlike bribery, an illegal gratuity does not require a corrupt intent.The
illegal gratuity statute prohibits rewards for past or future public acts.15
Unlike a bribe, an illegal gratuity does not require proof of a quid pro quo. In
other words, the government doesn’t need to prove that the illegal gratuity was
given in exchange for a specific act.
Until the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States vs. Sun-Diamond, in prosecuting an illegal gratuity case, federal prosecutors only had to prove that a gratuity
was given or offered to a public official. For example, the mere offer of lunch was
an illegal gratuity.
The Sun-Diamond decision, however, modified the old standard. The case arose
from gifts provided by Sun-Diamond to former Secretary of Agriculture Mike
Espy. The company and two of its executives were successfully prosecuted under
the Federal Anti-Gratuity statute on the basis that the gifts to a government official
violated the statute, regardless of whether there was evidence linking the gifts to
official conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court, in reversing the company’s conviction,
held that there must be evidence of some connection between the gratuity and the
Ibid.
Dave Hickey, “Illegal gratuities and gifts: primer and reminder,” National Defense, April 1, 2005, available
at www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/national-security-international/386407-1.html.
14
15
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official’s conduct. The illegal nature of the gratuity can be established by proving
that it was a reward for past favorable treatment by the official or was given for
future, favorable treatment.16

See http://projects.newsobserver.com/dome/profiles/jim_black for information on a recent case in which the former North Carolina Speaker of the House was fined $1 million
and sentenced to prison due to the acceptance of illegal gratuities (and other crimes).

Illegal Gratuities Red Flags and Controls
The red flags and controls concerning illegal gratuities are similar to the ones addressed previously in this chapter concerning the bribery schemes of kickbacks and bid rigging.

Economic Extortion
Economic extortion is one of the four major corruption sub-categories. Economic extortion schemes require a vendor to make a payment to a customer so that the customer will
acquire the vendor’s products or services.
For example, a large retail chain purchasing agent might inform a vendor that the chain
will carry the vendor’s products (perhaps exclusively) if the chain were to “tip” the purchasing agent a certain amount of money.
Exhibit 8-6 provides an example of an alleged economic extortion scheme in which a
vendor is possibly requiring its customers to buy advertising space or face the implications
of a bad review (lost business).The vendor in question is Yelp, an online service that provides
business ratings based upon customer reviews.
Exhibit 8-6
Yelp’s Legal Troubles Mount*

Extortion allegations against the online review site Yelp are mounting, with a California furniture
store filing the third complaint against the review site in less than a month. Additionally, nine more
companies have joined a class action lawsuit filed against Yelp a few weeks ago.
All of the cases accuse the powerful San Francisco start-up of extortion and fraudulent business
practices, alleging the site’s reviews are not unbiased—and, specifically, that it manipulates ratings
and awards visibility based on whether or not companies pay to advertise. Yelp has denied the
charges.
In a complaint filed in San Francisco Superior Court March 12, (2010), the owner of a 17-year-old
San Francisco business called Renaissance Furniture Restoration claimed Yelp deleted his business’s positive ratings after he declined to buy advertising.
In July (2009), Restoration had 261 Yelp page views and an overall rating of 4.5 stars out of a possible
5. The suit alleges that two days after he refused to pay “at least $300 a month” for advertising, six
of seven 5-star reviews vanished from the site and his overall rating sank to 3.5 stars.

Laura Leslie, “What’s an ‘Illegal Gratuity’?” WUNC News, February 14, 2007, http://wunc.org/programs/news/Isaac-Hunters-Tavern/what-s-an-illegal-gratuity.
16
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The ho-hum rating cost owner Boris Levitt big time. By August, the number of page views driven to
Restoration’s website fell to 158 and his revenue dropped by 25 percent.
“People wouldn’t click on a business which only had a 3-star average rating, and I started to lose
business,” he told the San Francisco Chronicle.
As of Thursday (March 11, 2010), the company had 4.5 stars again, but just three reviews: two 5-star
recommendations and a 4-star review.
The lawsuits “are borne from a lack of understanding of how Yelp works to provide customers
with useful information about local businesses and protect users from fake, or shill, reviews,” Yelp
co-founder and CEO Jeremy Stoppelman wrote, explaining that when businesses ask customers for
reviews (something Levitt acknowledges he did), they can get caught in Yelp’s review filter.
In addition to Levitt’s lawsuit, nine small businesses joined a class action lawsuit originally filed (in
February 2010) by Cats and Dogs Animal Hospital in Long Beach, California. Among other things, the
suit claims Yelp’s sales reps tried to get the vets to pay $300 a month for advertising (for a minimum
of 12 months) to hide any negative reviews. The companies that joined the suit include Chicago’s
Bleeding Heart Bakery; Scion Restaurant of Washington, D.C.; J.L. Ferri Entertainment of New York
City; and six California companies: Sofa Outlet, Celibré; Astro Appliance Service; Wag My Tail; Le
Petite Retreat; and Mermaids Cruise. (A third lawsuit filed early this month from the D’ames Day Spa
of San Diego also accused Yelp of deleting positive reviews when the spa declined to buy advertising.)
* Adapted from Courtney Rubin, “Yelp’s Legal Troubles Mount,” Inc., March 18, 2010, www.inc.com/news/articles/2010/03/
third-lawsuit-filed-against-yelp.html.

The red flags and controls concerning customer initiated economic extortion schemes are similar
to the ones previously addressed concerning the bribery schemes of kickbacks and bid rigging.
The red flags concerning vendor initiated economic extortion schemes include customer complaints to appropriate regulatory authorities and initiation of lawsuits. The vendor
should have established policies to prohibit economic extortion and a separate complaint
department (or whistleblower hotlines) through which customers can report economic extortion incidents.

What Is Your Fraud IQ?
The Journal of Accountancy periodically provides fraud questions in a column entitled: “What
is Your Fraud IQ?” Selected questions that relate to corruption fraud schemes are provided
in exhibit 8-7 and the answers are in exhibit 8-8.17

Joseph T. Wells, “What’s Your Fraud IQ?” Journal of Accountancy (May 2007), www.journalofaccountancy.
com/Issues/2007/May/WhatIsYourFraudIq; Joseph T. Wells, “What’s Your Fraud IQ?” Journal of Accountancy (June 2006), www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2006/Jul/WhatSYourFraudIq; Andi McNeal,
“What’s Your Fraud IQ?” Journal of Accountancy (September 2009), www.journalofaccountancy.com/
Issues/2009/Sep/20091565; and Andi McNeal, “What’s Your Fraud IQ?” Journal of Accountancy (May 2010),
www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2010/May/20102566.
17
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Exhibit 8-7
What Is Your Fraud IQ?

Questions
1. In a bribery case, it is enough to prove that a thing of value was given. It is not necessary to
prove that it was given with the intent to influence the receiver.
a.

True

b.

False

2. Jones is a buyer for Smith & Co. He buys exclusively from Brown despite the fact that other
suppliers are better and cheaper. Jones has an undisclosed interest in Brown’s business. This
situation would be classified as __________________________.
a.

Embezzlement

b.

Larceny

c.

Conflict of interest

d.

Bribery

3. Charlotte Grey, CPA, is conducting the annual audit of XYZ Corp.’s financial statements. While
performing the year-end inventory procedures, she notices that several inventory items are
regularly purchased at prices above the industry standard. These same items are also frequently purchased well before the typical reorder point and are, therefore, consistently overstocked.
She notes that XYZ has recently changed vendors for these items, and she can’t locate the new
vendor on the company’s approved vendor list. Which of the following fraud schemes might
these findings indicate is occurring?
a.

Inventory theft

b.

Asset overvaluation

c.

Bribery

d.

Lapping

4. Lester Van Andel suspects that one of the purchasing agents at Clint Industries is funneling orders—complete with inflated purchase prices—to small companies run by his family members
in exchange for kickbacks. Van Andel knows that these vendors’ business filings with the Secretary of State should contain enough information to help him confirm the companies’ ownership
and thus the conflict of interest. However, to access the filings with the Secretary of State, he
will need to obtain a subpoena.
a.

True

b.

False
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Exhibit 8-8
What Is Your Fraud IQ?

Answers
1. (b) In a bribery case, it is not enough to prove that a thing of value was given and received. One
also has to prove that it was intended to influence the receiver.
2. (c) The elements of conflict of interest include (1) an agent taking an interest in a transaction, (2)
that is actually or potentially adverse to the principal, (3) without full and timely disclosure to the
principal.
3. (c) The combination of findings that Charlotte Grey discovered could indicate that a bribery
scheme is occurring. For example, one of XYZ’s purchasing agents may be accepting bribes for
diverting orders for these inventory items to a new vendor—one that has not been through the
company’s usual vetting process. The vendor would likely charge an inflated price for the items
to cover the amount of the kickbacks paid to the purchasing agent. Additionally, the bribery
scheme might explain the overstocked quantity of the goods on hand, as both the purchasing
agent and the vendor may push through excessive purchases to increase their take from the
scam.
4. (b) Most states require corporations that do business within their jurisdictions to complete annual filings with the Secretary of State. Such filings are considered public records; consequently, access to such records does not necessitate a subpoena or the permission of the registered
company. Additionally, nearly every state makes the information from such filings available
online to the general public. The information included in such filings varies from state to state,
but generally includes: information on the company’s owners, directors, and executives; the
principal business address; the date of incorporation; and business ID numbers. Similar filings
and information are also frequently available for limited liability companies. (For a consolidated
listing of the corporate and business filings available for each state, see llrx.com/columns/
roundup29.htm.)
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Preface
Some organizations have significantly lower levels of misappropriation of assets and are less
susceptible to fraudulent financial reporting than other organizations because these organizations take proactive steps to prevent or deter fraud. It is only those organizations that
seriously consider fraud risks and take proactive steps to create the right kind of climate to
reduce its occurrence that have success in preventing fraud.This document identifies the key
participants in this antifraud effort, including the board of directors, management, internal
and independent auditors, and certified fraud examiners.
Management may develop and implement some of these programs and controls in response to specific identified risks of material misstatement of financial statements due to
fraud. In other cases, these programs and controls may be a part of the entity’s enterprisewide risk management activities.
Management is responsible for designing and implementing systems and procedures for
the prevention and detection of fraud and, along with the board of directors, for ensuring a
culture and environment that promotes honesty and ethical behavior. However, because of
the characteristics of fraud, a material misstatement of financial statements due to fraud may
occur notwithstanding the presence of programs and controls such as those described in this
document.

The Standards of Fieldwork
Introduction
Fraud can range from minor employee theft and unproductive behavior to misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial reporting. Material financial statement fraud can have
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a significant adverse effect on an entity’s market value, reputation, and ability to achieve its
strategic objectives. A number of highly publicized cases have heightened the awareness of
the effects of fraudulent financial reporting and have led many organizations to be more proactive in taking steps to prevent or deter its occurrence. Misappropriation of assets, though
often not material to the financial statements, can nonetheless result in substantial losses to an
entity if a dishonest employee has the incentive and opportunity to commit fraud.
The risk of fraud can be reduced through a combination of prevention, deterrence, and
detection measures. However, fraud can be difficult to detect because it often involves concealment through falsification of documents or collusion among management, employees, or
third parties.Therefore, it is important to place a strong emphasis on fraud prevention, which
may reduce opportunities for fraud to take place, and fraud deterrence, which could persuade
individuals that they should not commit fraud because of the likelihood of detection and
punishment. Moreover, prevention and deterrence measures are much less costly than the
time and expense required for fraud detection and investigation.
An entity’s management has both the responsibility and the means to implement measures to
reduce the incidence of fraud.The measures an organization takes to prevent and deter fraud also
can help create a positive workplace environment that can enhance the entity’s ability to recruit
and retain high-quality employees.
Research suggests that the most effective way to implement measures to reduce wrongdoing is to base them on a set of core values that are embraced by the entity. These values
provide an overarching message about the key principles guiding all employees’ actions. This
provides a platform upon which a more detailed code of conduct can be constructed, giving
more specific guidance about permitted and prohibited behavior, based on applicable laws
and the organization’s values. Management needs to clearly articulate that all employees will
be held accountable to act within the organization’s code of conduct.
This document identifies measures entities can implement to prevent, deter, and detect
fraud. It discusses these measures in the context of three fundamental elements. Broadly
stated, these fundamental elements are (1) create and maintain a culture of honesty and high
ethics; (2) evaluate the risks of fraud and implement the processes, procedures, and controls
needed to mitigate the risks and reduce the opportunities for fraud; and (3) develop an appropriate oversight process. Although the entire management team shares the responsibility
for implementing and monitoring these activities, with oversight from the board of directors,
the entity’s chief executive officer (CEO) should initiate and support such measures. Without the CEO’s active support, these measures are less likely to be effective.
The information presented in this document generally is applicable to entities of all sizes.
However, the degree to which certain programs and controls are applied in smaller, lesscomplex entities and the formality of their application are likely to differ from larger organizations. For example, management of a smaller entity (or the owner of an owner-managed
entity), along with those charged with governance of the financial reporting process, are
responsible for creating a culture of honesty and high ethics. Management also is responsible
for implementing a system of internal controls commensurate with the nature and size of
the organization, but smaller entities may find that certain types of control activities are not
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relevant because of the involvement of and controls applied by management. However, all
entities must make it clear that unethical or dishonest behavior will not be tolerated.

Creating a Culture of Honesty and High
Ethics
It is the organization’s responsibility to create a culture of honesty and high ethics and to
clearly communicate acceptable behavior and expectations of each employee. Such a culture
is rooted in a strong set of core values (or value system) that provides the foundation for
employees as to how the organization conducts its business. It also allows an entity to develop
an ethical framework that covers (1) fraudulent financial reporting, (2) misappropriation of
assets, and (3) corruption as well as other issues.2
Creating a culture of honesty and high ethics should include the following.

Setting the Tone at the Top
Directors and officers of corporations set the “tone at the top” for ethical behavior within
any organization. Research in moral development strongly suggests that honesty can best
be reinforced when a proper example is set—sometimes referred to as the tone at the top.
The management of an entity cannot act one way and expect others in the entity to behave
differently.
In many cases, particularly in larger organizations, it is necessary for management to both
behave ethically and openly communicate its expectations for ethical behavior because most
employees are not in a position to observe management’s actions. Management must show
employees through its words and actions that dishonest or unethical behavior will not be tolerated, even if the result of the action benefits the entity. Moreover, it should be evident that all
employees will be treated equally, regardless of their position.
For example, statements by management regarding the absolute need to meet operating
and financial targets can create undue pressures that may lead employees to commit fraud
to achieve them. Setting unachievable goals for employees can give them two unattractive
choices: fail or cheat. In contrast, a statement from management that says, “We are aggressive
in pursuing our targets, while requiring truthful financial reporting at all times,” clearly indicates to employees that integrity is a requirement. This message also conveys that the entity
has “zero tolerance” for unethical behavior, including fraudulent financial reporting.
The cornerstone of an effective antifraud environment is a culture with a strong value
system founded on integrity. This value system often is reflected in a code of conduct.3 The
code of conduct should reflect the core values of the entity and guide employees in making
appropriate decisions during their workday. The code of conduct might include such topics
Corruption includes bribery and other illegal acts.
An entity’s value system also could be reflected in an ethics policy, a statement of business principles, or
some other concise summary of guiding principles.
2
3
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as ethics, confidentiality, conflicts of interest, intellectual property, sexual harassment, and
fraud.4 For a code of conduct to be effective, it should be communicated to all personnel in
an understandable fashion. It also should be developed in a participatory and positive manner
that will result in both management and employees taking ownership of its content. Finally,
the code of conduct should be included in an employee handbook or policy manual, or in
some other formal document or location (for example, the entity’s intranet) so it can be
referred to when needed.
Senior financial officers hold an important and elevated role in corporate governance.
While members of the management team, they are uniquely capable and empowered to
ensure that all stakeholders’ interests are appropriately balanced, protected, and preserved.
For examples of codes of conduct, see Appendix B, “AICPA ‘CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and
Commercial Crime Prevention,’ An Organizational Code of Conduct,” and Appendix C,
“Financial Executives International Code of Ethics Statement” provided by Financial Executives International. In addition, visit the Institute of Management Accountant’s Ethics Center
at www.imanet.org for their members’ standards of ethical conduct.

Creating a Positive Workplace Environment
Research results indicate that wrongdoing occurs less frequently when employees have positive feelings about an entity than when they feel abused, threatened, or ignored. Without a
positive workplace environment, there are more opportunities for poor employee morale,
which can affect an employee’s attitude about committing fraud against an entity. Factors
that detract from a positive work environment and may increase the risk of fraud include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Top management that does not seem to care about or reward appropriate behavior
Negative feedback and lack of recognition for job performance
Perceived inequities in the organization
Autocratic rather than participative management
Low organizational loyalty or feelings of ownership
Unreasonable budget expectations or other financial targets
Fear of delivering “bad news” to supervisors and/or management
Less-than-competitive compensation
Poor training and promotion opportunities
Lack of clear organizational responsibilities
Poor communication practices or methods within the organization

The entity’s human resources department often is instrumental in helping to build a corporate culture and a positive work environment. Human resource professionals are responsible for
Although the discussion in this document focuses on fraud, the subject of fraud often is considered in
the context of a broader set of principles that govern an organization. Some organizations, however, may
elect to develop a fraud policy separate from an ethics policy. Specific examples of topics in a fraud policy
might include a requirement to comply with all laws and regulations and explicit guidance regarding making payments to obtain contracts, holding pricing discussions with competitors, environmental discharges,
relationships with vendors, and maintenance of accurate books and records.
4

189

CommonFraud-2012.indb 189

3/19/2012 11:35:06 AM

Common Fraud: A Guide to Thwarting the Top Ten Schemes

implementing specific programs and initiatives, consistent with management’s strategies, that
can help to mitigate many of the detractors mentioned above. Mitigating factors that help create a positive work environment and reduce the risk of fraud may include:
•
•
•
•
•

Recognition and reward systems that are in tandem with goals and results
Equal employment opportunities
Team-oriented, collaborative decision-making policies
Professionally administered compensation programs
Professionally administered training programs and an organizational priority of
career development

Employees should be empowered to help create a positive workplace environment and
support the entity’s values and code of conduct. They should be given the opportunity to
provide input to the development and updating of the entity’s code of conduct, to ensure
that it is relevant, clear, and fair. Involving employees in this fashion also may effectively
contribute to the oversight of the entity’s code of conduct and an environment of ethical
behavior (see the section titled “Developing an Appropriate Oversight Process”).
Employees should be given the means to obtain advice internally before making decisions
that appear to have significant legal or ethical implications. They should also be encouraged
and given the means to communicate concerns, anonymously if preferred, about potential
violations of the entity’s code of conduct, without fear of retribution. Many organizations
have implemented a process for employees to report on a confidential basis any actual or
suspected wrongdoing, or potential violations of the code of conduct or ethics policy. For
example, some organizations use a telephone “hotline” that is directed to or monitored by
an ethics officer, fraud officer, general counsel, internal audit director, or another trusted individual responsible for investigating and reporting incidents of fraud or illegal acts.

Hiring and Promoting Appropriate Employees
Each employee has a unique set of values and personal code of ethics. When faced with sufficient pressure and a perceived opportunity, some employees will behave dishonestly rather
than face the negative consequences of honest behavior. The threshold at which dishonest
behavior starts, however, will vary among individuals. If an entity is to be successful in preventing fraud, it must have effective policies that minimize the chance of hiring or promoting individuals with low levels of honesty, especially for positions of trust. Proactive hiring
and promotion procedures may include:
• Conducting background investigations on individuals being considered for employment or for promotion to a position of trust5
• Thoroughly checking a candidate’s education, employment history, and personal
references
Some organizations also have considered follow-up investigations, particularly for employees in positions
of trust, on a periodic basis (for example, every five years) or as circumstances dictate.
5
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• Periodic training of all employees about the entity’s values and code of conduct,
(training is addressed in the following section)
• Incorporating into regular performance reviews an evaluation of how each individual has contributed to creating an appropriate workplace environment in line with
the entity’s values and code of conduct
• Continuous objective evaluation of compliance with the entity’s values and code of
conduct, with violations being addressed immediately

Training
New employees should be trained at the time of hiring about the entity’s values and its code
of conduct. This training should explicitly cover expectations of all employees regarding
(1) their duty to communicate certain matters; (2) a list of the types of matters, including
actual or suspected fraud, to be communicated along with specific examples; and (3) information on how to communicate those matters. There also should be an affirmation from
senior management regarding employee expectations and communication responsibilities.
Such training should include an element of “fraud awareness,” the tone of which should be
positive but nonetheless stress that fraud can be costly (and detrimental in other ways) to the
entity and its employees.
In addition to training at the time of hiring, employees should receive refresher training
periodically thereafter. Some organizations may consider ongoing training for certain positions, such as purchasing agents or employees with financial reporting responsibilities. Training should be specific to an employee’s level within the organization, geographic location,
and assigned responsibilities. For example, training for senior manager level personnel would
normally be different from that of nonsupervisory employees, and training for purchasing
agents would be different from that of sales representatives.

Confirmation
Management needs to clearly articulate that all employees will be held accountable to act
within the entity’s code of conduct. All employees within senior management and the finance function, as well as other employees in areas that might be exposed to unethical behavior (for example, procurement, sales and marketing) should be required to sign a code of
conduct statement annually, at a minimum.
Requiring periodic confirmation by employees of their responsibilities will not only reinforce the policy but may also deter individuals from committing fraud and other violations
and might identify problems before they become significant. Such confirmation may include
statements that the individual understands the entity’s expectations, has complied with the
code of conduct, and is not aware of any violations of the code of conduct other than those
the individual lists in his or her response. Although people with low integrity may not hesitate to sign a false confirmation, most people will want to avoid making a false statement
in writing. Honest individuals are more likely to return their confirmations and to disclose
what they know (including any conflicts of interest or other personal exceptions to the code
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of conduct). Thorough followup by internal auditors or others regarding nonreplies may
uncover significant issues.

Discipline
The way an entity reacts to incidents of alleged or suspected fraud will send a strong deterrent message throughout the entity, helping to reduce the number of future occurrences.The
following actions should be taken in response to an alleged incident of fraud:
•
•
•
•

A thorough investigation of the incident should be conducted.6
Appropriate and consistent actions should be taken against violators.
Relevant controls should be assessed and improved.
Communication and training should occur to reinforce the entity’s values, code of
conduct, and expectations.

Expectations about the consequences of committing fraud must be clearly communicated
throughout the entity. For example, a strong statement from management that dishonest
actions will not be tolerated, and that violators may be terminated and referred to the appropriate authorities, clearly establishes consequences and can be a valuable deterrent to
wrongdoing. If wrongdoing occurs and an employee is disciplined, it can be helpful to communicate that fact, on a no-name basis, in an employee newsletter or other regular communication to employees. Seeing that other people have been disciplined for wrongdoing can
be an effective deterrent, increasing the perceived likelihood of violators being caught and
punished. It also can demonstrate that the entity is committed to an environment of high
ethical standards and integrity.

Evaluating Antifraud Processes and Controls
Neither fraudulent financial reporting nor misappropriation of assets can occur without a
perceived opportunity to commit and conceal the act. Organizations should be proactive in
reducing fraud opportunities by (1) identifying and measuring fraud risks, (2) taking steps to
mitigate identified risks, and (3) implementing and monitoring appropriate preventive and
detective internal controls and other deterrent measures.

Many entities of sufficient size are employing antifraud professionals, such as certified fraud examiners,
who are responsible for resolving allegations of fraud within the organization and who also assist in the detection and deterrence of fraud. These individuals typically report their findings internally to the corporate
security, legal, or internal audit departments. In other instances, such individuals may be empowered directly
by the board of directors or its audit committee.
6
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Identifying and Measuring Fraud Risks
Management has primary responsibility for establishing and monitoring all aspects of the entity’s fraud risk-assessment and prevention activities.7 Fraud risks often are considered as part
of an enterprise-wide risk management program, though they may be addressed separately.8
The fraud risk-assessment process should consider the vulnerability of the entity to fraudulent activity (fraudulent financial reporting, misappropriation of assets, and corruption) and
whether any of those exposures could result in a material misstatement of the financial statements or material loss to the organization. In identifying fraud risks, organizations should
consider organizational, industry, and country-specific characteristics that influence the risk
of fraud.
The nature and extent of management’s risk assessment activities should be commensurate
with the size of the entity and complexity of its operations. For example, the risk assessment
process is likely to be less formal and less structured in smaller entities. However, management should recognize that fraud can occur in organizations of any size or type, and that almost any employee may be capable of committing fraud given the right set of circumstances.
Accordingly, management should develop a heightened “fraud awareness” and an appropriate fraud risk-management program, with oversight from those charged with governance.

Mitigating Fraud Risks
It may be possible to reduce or eliminate certain fraud risks by making changes to the entity’s activities and processes. An entity may choose to sell certain segments of its operations,
cease doing business in certain locations, or reorganize its business processes to eliminate
unacceptable risks. For example, the risk of misappropriation of funds may be reduced by
implementing a central lockbox at a bank to receive payments instead of receiving money at
the entity’s various locations. The risk of corruption may be reduced by closely monitoring
the entity’s procurement process. The risk of financial statement fraud may be reduced by
implementing shared services centers to provide accounting services to multiple segments,
affiliates, or geographic locations of an entity’s operations. A shared services center may be
less vulnerable to influence by local operations managers and may be able to implement
more extensive fraud detection measures cost-effectively.

Management may elect to have internal audit play an active role in the development, monitoring, and
ongoing assessment of the entity’s fraud risk-management program. This may include an active role in the
development and communication of the entity’s code of conduct or ethics policy, as well as in investigating
actual or alleged instances of noncompliance.
8
Some organizations may perform a periodic self-assessment using questionnaires or other techniques to
identify and measure risks. Self-assessment may be less reliable in identifying the risk of fraud due to a lack
of experience with fraud (although many organizations experience some form of fraud and abuse, material
financial statement fraud or misappropriation of assets is a rare event for most) and because management
may be unwilling to acknowledge openly that they might commit fraud given sufficient pressure and
opportunity.
7
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Implementing and Monitoring Appropriate
Internal Controls
Some risks are inherent in the environment of the entity, but most can be addressed with an
appropriate system of internal control. Once fraud risk assessment has taken place, the entity
can identify the processes, controls, and other procedures that are needed to mitigate the
identified risks. Effective internal control will include a well-developed control environment,
an effective and secure information system, and appropriate control and monitoring activities.9 Because of the importance of information technology in supporting operations and the
processing of transactions, management also needs to implement and maintain appropriate
controls, whether automated or manual, over computer generated information.
In particular, management should evaluate whether appropriate internal controls have
been implemented in any areas management has identified as posing a higher risk of fraudulent activity, as well as controls over the entity’s financial reporting process. Because fraudulent financial reporting may begin in an interim period, management also should evaluate
the appropriateness of internal controls over interim financial reporting.
Fraudulent financial reporting by upper-level management typically involves override of
internal controls within the financial reporting process. Because management has the ability
to override controls, or to influence others to perpetrate or conceal fraud, the need for a
strong value system and a culture of ethical financial reporting becomes increasingly important. This helps create an environment in which other employees will decline to participate
in committing a fraud and will use established communication procedures to report any
requests to commit wrongdoing. The potential for management override also increases the
need for appropriate oversight measures by those charged with governance, as discussed in
the following section.
Fraudulent financial reporting by lower levels of management and employees may be deterred or detected by appropriate monitoring controls, such as having higher-level managers
review and evaluate the financial results reported by individual operating units or subsidiaries. Unusual fluctuations in results of particular reporting units, or the lack of expected fluctuations, may indicate potential manipulation by departmental or operating unit managers
or staff.

Developing an Appropriate Oversight
Process
To effectively prevent or deter fraud, an entity should have an appropriate oversight function
in place. Oversight can take many forms and can be performed by many within and outside
the entity, under the overall oversight of the audit committee (or those charged with governance, such as the board of directors, where no audit committee exists).
The report of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission,
Internal Control—Integrated Framework, provides reasonable criteria for management to use in evaluating the
effectiveness of the entity’s system of internal control.
9
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Audit Committee or Those Charged with
Governance
The audit committee (or those charged with governance where no audit committee exists) should evaluate management’s identification of fraud risks, implementation of antifraud
measures, and creation of the appropriate “tone at the top.” Active oversight by the audit
committee can help to reinforce management’s commitment to creating a culture with “zero
tolerance” for fraud.
An entity’s audit committee also should ensure that senior management (in particular, the
CEO) implements appropriate fraud deterrence and prevention measures to better protect
investors, employees, and other stakeholders. The audit committee’s evaluation and oversight
not only helps make sure that can serve as a deterrent to senior management engaging in
fraudulent activity (that is, by ensuring an environment is created whereby any attempt by
senior management to involve employees in committing or concealing fraud would lead
promptly to reports from such employees to appropriate persons, including the audit committee).
The audit committee also plays an important role in helping those charged with governance fulfill their oversight responsibilities with respect to the entity’s financial reporting process and the system of internal control.10 In exercising this oversight responsibility,
the audit committee should consider the potential for management override of controls or
other inappropriate influence over the financial reporting process. For example, the audit
committee may obtain from the internal auditors and independent auditors their views on
management’s involvement in the financial reporting process and, in particular, the ability
of management to override information processed by the entity’s financial reporting system
(for example, the ability for management or others to initiate or record nonstandard journal
entries). The audit committee also may consider reviewing the entity’s reported information
for reasonableness compared with prior or forecasted results, as well as with peers or industry
averages. In addition, information received in communications from the independent auditors11 can assist the audit committee in assessing the strength of the entity’s internal control
and the potential for fraudulent financial reporting.
As part of its oversight responsibilities, the audit committee should encourage management to provide a mechanism for employees to report concerns about unethical behavior,
actual or suspected fraud, or violations of the entity’s code of conduct or ethics policy. The
committee should then receive periodic reports describing the nature, status, and eventual
disposition of any fraud or unethical conduct. A summary of the activity, follow-up and disposition also should be provided to all of those charged with governance.
See the Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on the Audit Committee, (Washington, D.C.:
National Association of Corporate Directors, 2000). For the board’s role in the oversight of risk management, see Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Risk Oversight, (Washington, D.C.: National
Association of Corporate Directors, 2002).
11
See section 325, Communicating Internal Control Related Matters Identified in an Audit, and section 380, The
Auditor’s Communication With Those Charged With Governance. [Footnote revised, May 2006, due to conforming changes necessary due to the issuance of Statement on Standards No. 112. Footnote revised, April 2007,
due to conforming changes necessary due to the issuance of Statement on Standards No. 114.]
10
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If senior management is involved in fraud, the next layer of management may be the most
likely to be aware of it. As a result, the audit committee (and others of those charged with
governance) should consider establishing an open line of communication with members of
management one or two levels below senior management to assist in identifying fraud at
the highest levels of the organization or investigating any fraudulent activity that might occur.12 The audit committee typically has the ability and authority to investigate any alleged
or suspected wrongdoing brought to its attention. Most audit committee charters empower
the committee to investigate any matters within the scope of its responsibilities, and to retain
legal, accounting, and other professional advisers as needed to advise the committee and assist
in its investigation.
All audit committee members should be financially literate, and each committee should
have at least one financial expert. The financial expert should possess:
• An understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and audits of financial
statements prepared under those principles. Such understanding may have been obtained either through education or experience. It is important for someone on the
audit committee to have a working knowledge of those principles and standards.
• Experience in the preparation and/or the auditing of financial statements of an
entity of similar size, scope and complexity as the entity on whose board the committee member serves. The experience would generally be as a chief financial officer,
chief accounting officer, controller, or auditor of a similar entity. This background
will provide a necessary understanding of the transactional and operational environment that produces the issuer’s financial statements. It will also bring an understanding of what is involved in, for example, appropriate accounting estimates, accruals,
and reserve provisions, and an appreciation of what is necessary to maintain a good
internal control environment.
• Experience in internal governance and procedures of audit committees, obtained
either as an audit committee member, a senior corporate manager responsible for
answering to the audit committee, or an external auditor responsible for reporting
on the execution and results of annual audits.

Management
Management is responsible for overseeing the activities carried out by employees, and typically does so by implementing and monitoring processes and controls such as those discussed
previously. However, management also may initiate, participate in, or direct the commission
and concealment of a fraudulent act. Accordingly, the audit committee (or those charged
with governance where no audit committee exists) has the responsibility to oversee the
activities of senior management and to consider the risk of fraudulent financial reporting

Report of the NACD Best Practices Council: Coping with Fraud and Other Illegal Activity, A Guide for Directors,
CEOs, and Senior Managers (1998) sets forth “basic principles” and “implementation approaches” for dealing
with fraud and other illegal activity.
12
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involving the override of internal controls or collusion (see discussion on the audit committee and board of directors above).
Public companies should include a statement in the annual report acknowledging management’s responsibility for the preparation of the financial statements and for establishing
and maintaining an effective system of internal control. This will help improve the public’s
understanding of the respective roles of management and the auditor.This statement has also
been generally referred to as a “Management Report” or “Management Certificate.” Such a
statement can provide a convenient vehicle for management to describe the nature and manner of preparation of the financial information and the adequacy of the internal accounting
controls. Logically, the statement should be presented in close proximity to the formal financial statements. For example, it could appear near the independent auditor’s report, or in the
financial review or management analysis section.

Internal Auditors
An effective internal audit team can be extremely helpful in performing aspects of the oversight function.Their knowledge about the entity may enable them to identify indicators that
suggest fraud has been committed. The Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (IIA Standards), issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors, state, “The internal auditor
should have sufficient knowledge to identify the indicators of fraud but is not expected to
have the expertise of a person whose primary responsibility is detecting and investigating
fraud.” Internal auditors also have the opportunity to evaluate fraud risks and controls and
to recommend action to mitigate risks and improve controls. Specifically, the IIA Standards
require internal auditors to assess risks facing their organizations. This risk assessment is to
serve as the basis from which audit plans are devised and against which internal controls are
tested.The IIA Standards require the audit plan to be presented to and approved by the audit
committee (or board of directors where no audit committee exists). The work completed as
a result of the audit plan provides assurance on which management’s assertion about controls
can be made.
Internal audits can be both a detection and a deterrence measure. Internal auditors can
assist in the deterrence of fraud by examining and evaluating the adequacy and the effectiveness of the system of internal control, commensurate with the extent of the potential
exposure or risk in the various segments of the organization’s operations. In carrying out this
responsibility, internal auditors should, for example, determine whether:
• The organizational environment fosters control consciousness.
• Realistic organizational goals and objectives are set.
• Written policies (for example, a code of conduct) exist that describe prohibited
activities and the action required whenever violations are discovered.
• Appropriate authorization policies for transactions are established and maintained.
• Policies, practices, procedures, reports, and other mechanisms are developed to
monitor activities and safeguard assets, particularly in high risk areas.
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• Communication channels provide management with adequate and reliable
information.
• Recommendations need to be made for the establishment or enhancement of costeffective controls to help deter fraud.
Internal auditors may conduct proactive auditing to search for corruption, misappropriation of assets, and financial statement fraud. This may include the use of computer-assisted
audit techniques to detect particular types of fraud. Internal auditors also can employ analytical and other procedures to isolate anomalies and perform detailed reviews of high-risk accounts and transactions to identify potential financial statement fraud. The internal auditors
should have an independent reporting line directly to the audit committee, to enable them
to express any concerns about management’s commitment to appropriate internal controls
or to report suspicions or allegations of fraud involving senior management.

Independent Auditors
Independent auditors can assist management and the board of directors (or audit committee)
by providing an assessment of the entity’s process for identifying, assessing, and responding
to the risks of fraud. Those charged with governance, such as the board of directors or audit
committee, should have an open and candid dialogue with the independent auditors regarding management’s risk assessment process and the system of internal control. Such a dialogue
should include a discussion of the susceptibility of the entity to fraudulent financial reporting
and the entity’s exposure to misappropriation of assets.

Certified Fraud Examiners
Certified fraud examiners may assist the audit committee and board of directors with aspects
of the oversight process either directly or as part of a team of internal auditors or independent auditors. Certified fraud examiners can provide extensive knowledge and experience
about fraud that may not be available within a corporation. They can provide more objective input into management’s evaluation of the risk of fraud (especially fraud involving
senior management, such as financial statement fraud) and the development of appropriate
antifraud controls that are less vulnerable to management override. They can assist the audit
committee and board of directors in evaluating the fraud risk assessment and fraud prevention measures implemented by management. Certified fraud examiners also conduct examinations to resolve allegations or suspicions of fraud, reporting either to an appropriate level
of management or to the audit committee or board of directors, depending upon the nature
of the issue and the level of personnel involved.
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Other Information
To obtain more information on fraud and implementing antifraud programs and controls,
please go to the following websites where additional materials, guidance, and tools can be
found.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

www.aicpa.org

Association of Certified Fraud Examiners

www.cfenet.com

Financial Executives International

www.fei.org

Information Systems Audit and Control Association

www.isaca.org

The Institute of Internal Auditors

www.theiia.org

Institute of Management Accountants

www.imanet.org

National Association of Corporate Directors

www.nacdonline.org

Society for Human Resource Management

www.shrm.org
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AICPA CPA’s Handbook of
Fraud and Commercial Crime
Prevention, An Organizational
Code of Conduct1
The following is an example of an organizational code of conduct, which includes definitions of what is considered unacceptable, and the consequences of any breaches thereof. The
specific content and areas addressed in an entity’s code of conduct should be specific to that
entity.

Organizational Code of Conduct
The Organization and its employees must, at all times, comply with all applicable laws and
regulations. The Organization will not condone the activities of employees who achieve results through violation of the law or unethical business dealings. This includes any payments
for illegal acts, indirect contributions, rebates, and bribery.The Organization does not permit
any activity that fails to stand the closest possible public scrutiny. All business conduct should
be well above the minimum standards required by law. Accordingly, employees must ensure
that their actions cannot be interpreted as being, in any way, in contravention of the laws and
regulations governing the Organization’s worldwide operations. Employees uncertain about
the application or interpretation of any legal requirements should refer the matter to their
superior, who, if necessary, should seek the advice of the legal department.

General Employee Conduct
The Organization expects its employees to conduct themselves in a businesslike manner.
Drinking, gambling, fighting, swearing, and similar unprofessional activities are strictly prohibited while on the job. Employees must not engage in sexual harassment, or conduct
Tracy L. Coenen, The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud & Commercial Crime Prevention (New York: AICPA, 2000),
7–10, fig. 2-2.
1
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themselves in a way that could be construed as such, for example, by using inappropriate
language, keeping or posting inappropriate materials in their work area, or accessing inappropriate materials on their computer.

Conflicts of Interest
The Organization expects that employees will perform their duties conscientiously, honestly, and in accordance with the best interests of the Organization. Employees must not use
their position or the knowledge gained as a result of their position for private or personal
advantage. Regardless of the circumstances, if employees sense that a course of action they
have pursued, are presently pursuing, or are contemplating pursuing may involve them in a
conflict of interest with their employer, they should immediately communicate all the facts
to their superior.

Outside Activities, Employment, and
Directorships
All employees share a serious responsibility for the Organization’s good public relations,
especially at the community level. Their readiness to help with religious, charitable, educational, and civic activities brings credit to the Organization and is encouraged. Employees
must, however, avoid acquiring any business interest or participating in any other activity
outside the Organization that would, or would appear to:
• Create an excessive demand upon their time and attention, thus depriving the Organization of their best efforts on the job.
• Create a conflict of interest—an obligation, interest, or distraction—that may interfere with the independent exercise of judgment in the Organization’s best interest.

Relationships with Clients and Suppliers
Employees should avoid investing in or acquiring a financial interest for their own accounts
in any business organization that has a contractual relationship with the Organization, or that
provides goods or services, or both to the Organization, if such investment or interest could
influence or create the impression of influencing their decisions in the performance of their
duties on behalf of the Organization.

Gifts, Entertainment, and Favors
Employees must not accept entertainment, gifts, or personal favors that could, in any way,
influence, or appear to influence, business decisions in favor of any person or organization
with whom or with which the Organization has, or is likely to have, business dealings. Similarly, employees must not accept any other preferential treatment under these circumstances
because their position with the Organization might be inclined to, or be perceived to, place
them under obligation.
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Kickbacks and Secret Commissions
Regarding the Organization’s business activities, employees may not receive payment or
compensation of any kind, except as authorized under the Organization’s remuneration
policies. In particular, the Organization strictly prohibits the acceptance of kickbacks and
secret commissions from suppliers or others. Any breach of this rule will result in immediate
termination and prosecution to the fullest extent of the law.

Organization Funds and Other Assets
Employees who have access to Organization funds in any form must follow the prescribed
procedures for recording, handling, and protecting money as detailed in the Organization’s
instructional manuals or other explanatory materials, or both. The Organization imposes
strict standards to prevent fraud and dishonesty. If employees become aware of any evidence
of fraud and dishonesty, they should immediately advise their superior or the Law Department so that the Organization can promptly investigate further. When an employee’s position requires spending Organization funds or incurring any reimbursable personal expenses,
that individual must use good judgment on the Organization’s behalf to ensure that good
value is received for every expenditure.
Organization funds and all other assets of the Organization are for Organization purposes
only and not for personal benefit.This includes the personal use of organizational assets, such
as computers.

Organization Records and Communications
Accurate and reliable records of many kinds are necessary to meet the Organization’s legal
and financial obligations and to manage the affairs of the Organization. The Organization’s
books and records must reflect in an accurate and timely manner all business transactions.
The employees responsible for accounting and recordkeeping must fully disclose and record
all assets, liabilities, or both, and must exercise diligence in enforcing these requirements. Employees must not make or engage in any false record or communication of any kind, whether
internal or external, including but not limited to:
• False expense, attendance, production, financial, or similar reports and Statements
• False advertising, deceptive marketing practices, or other misleading representations

Dealing with Outside People and Organizations
Employees must take care to separate their personal roles from their Organization positions
when communicating on matters not involving Organization business. Employees must not
use organization identification, stationery, supplies, and equipment for personal or political
matters.
When communicating publicly on matters that involve Organization business, employees
must not presume to speak for the Organization on any topic, unless they are certain that
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the views they express are those of the Organization, and it is the Organization’s desire that
such views be publicly disseminated.
When dealing with anyone outside the Organization, including public officials, employees
must take care not to compromise the integrity or damage the reputation of either the Organization, or any outside individual, business, or government body.

Prompt Communications
In all matters relevant to customers, suppliers, government authorities, the public and others
in the Organization, all employees must make every effort to achieve complete, accurate, and
timely communications—responding promptly and courteously to all proper requests for
information and to all complaints.

Privacy and Confidentiality
When handling financial and personal information about customers or others with whom
the Organization has dealings, observe the following principles:
1. Collect, use, and retain only the personal information necessary for the Organization’s
business. Whenever possible, obtain any relevant information directly from the person
concerned. Use only reputable and reliable sources to supplement this information.
2. Retain information only for as long as necessary or as required by law. Protect the physical security of this information.
3. Limit internal access to personal information to those with a legitimate business reason
for seeking that information. Use only personal information for the purposes for which
it was originally obtained. Obtain the consent of the person concerned before externally disclosing any personal information, unless legal process or contractual obligation
provides otherwise.
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Financial Executives
International Code of Ethics
Statement1
The mission of Financial Executives International (FEI) includes significant efforts to promote ethical conduct in the practice of financial management throughout the world. Senior financial officers hold an important and elevated role in corporate governance. While
members of the management team, they are uniquely capable and empowered to ensure
that all stakeholders’ interests are appropriately balanced, protected, and preserved. This code
provides principles to which members are expected to adhere and advocate. They embody
rules regarding individual and peer responsibilities, as well as responsibilities to employers,
the public, and other stakeholders.Violations of FEI’s code of ethics may subject the member to censure, suspension, or expulsion under procedural rules adopted by FEI’s Board of
Directors.
All members of FEI will:
1. Act with honesty and integrity, avoiding actual or apparent conflicts of interest in personal and professional relationships.
2. Provide constituents with information that is accurate, complete, objective, relevant,
timely, and understandable.
3. Comply with rules and regulations of federal, state, provincial, and local governments,
and other appropriate private and public regulatory agencies.
4. Act in good faith; responsibly; and with due care, competence, and diligence, without
misrepresenting material facts or allowing one’s independent judgment to be subordinated.
5. Respect the confidentiality of information acquired in the course of one’s work except
when authorized or otherwise legally obligated to disclose. Confidential information
acquired in the course of one’s work will not be used for personal advantage.
6. Share knowledge and maintain skills important and relevant to constituents’ needs.
Financial Executives International, “Code of Ethics,” 2012, http://www.financialexecutives.org/Kentico
CMS/About/Vision---Goals/Code-of-Ethics.aspx.
1
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7. Proactively promote ethical behavior as a responsible partner among peers, in the work
environment, and in the community.
8. Achieve responsible use of and control over all assets and resources employed or entrusted.
9. Report known or suspected violations of this code in accordance with the FEI rules of
procedure.
10. Be accountable for adhering to this code.
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